•  213
    The Emergence of Borders: Moral Questions Mapped Out
    with Cara Nine
    Russian Sociological Review 13 (4): 42-59. 2014.
    In this paper, we examine the extent to which the concept of emergence can be applied to questions about the nature and moral justification of territorial borders. Although the term is used with many different senses in philosophy, the concept of “weak emergence”—advocated by, for example, Sawyer (2002, 2005) and Bedau (1997)—is especially applicable, since it forces a distinction between prediction and explanation that connects with several issues in the dis-cussion of territory. In particular,…Read more
  •  120
    Explanation in dynamical cognitive science
    Minds and Machines 18 (3): 331-348. 2008.
    In this paper, I outline two strands of evidence for the conclusion that the dynamical approach to cognitive science both seeks and provides covering law explanations. Two of the most successful dynamical models—Kelso’s model of rhythmic finger movement and Thelen et al.’s model of infant perseverative reaching—can be seen to provide explanations which conform to the famous explanatory scheme first put forward by Hempel and Oppenheim. In addition, many prominent advocates of the dynamical approa…Read more
  •  90
    Mind and Machine
    Palgrave-Macmillan. 2012.
    Walmsley offers a succinct introduction to major philosophical issues in artificial intelligence for advanced students of philosophy of mind, cognitive science and psychology. Whilst covering essential topics, it also provides the student with the chance to engage with cutting edge debates.
  •  70
    Mysticism and Social Epistemology
    with André Kukla
    Episteme 1 (2): 139-158. 2004.
    This article deals with the grounds for accepting or rejecting the insights of mystics. We examine the social-epistemological question of what the non-mystic should make of the mystic's claim, and what she might be able to make of it, given various possible states of the evidence available to her.For clarity, let's reserve the term “mystic” for one who claims to have had an ineffable insight. As such, there are two parts to the mystic's claim: first, a substantive insight into the way the world …Read more
  •  61
    Emergence and Reduction in Dynamical Cognitive Science
    New Ideas in Psychology 28 274-282. 2010.
    This paper examines the widespread intuition that the dynamical approach to cognitive science is importantly related to emergentism about the mind. The explanatory practices adopted by dynamical cognitive science rule out some conceptions of emergence; covering law explanations require a deducibility relationship between explanans and explanandum, whereas canonical theories of emergence require the absence of such deducibility. A response to this problem – one which would save the intuition that…Read more
  •  20
    Emergence, group judgment and the discursive dilemma
    Mind and Society 14 (2): 185-201. 2015.
    In this paper, I argue that the account of emergence advanced by Broad is both defensible and applicable to some examples of group-level phenomena. Specifically, Broad’s account enables the formulation of a non-reductive physicalism or of a non-reductive individualism, and correctly describes the case of group-judgment under the conditions of the discursive dilemma. Furthermore, this analysis shows that emergent phenomena need not be characterised using the resources of complexity theory.
  •  17
    Methodological Situatedness; or, DEEDS Worth Doing and Pursuing
    Cognitive Systems Research 9 150-159. 2008.
    This paper draws a distinction between two possible understandings of the DEEDS (Dynamical, Embodied, Extended, Distributed and Situated) approach to cognition. On the one hand, the DEEDS approach may be interpreted as making a metaphysical claim about the nature and location of cognitive processes. On the other hand, the DEEDS approach may be read as providing a methodological prescription about how we ought to conduct cognitive scientific research. I argue that the latter, methodological, read…Read more
  •  16
    Max Tegmark, a physicist at the University of Pennsylania recently remarked, 'To tell you the truth, I think most of my colleagues are terrified of talking to philosophers -- like being caught coming out of a pornographic cinema.' Fortunately, it would seem that at least some neuroscientists do not suffer from such reticence when it comes to their professional relationship with philosophy. Testament to this was the quality and variety of the papers in both philosophically- ambitious-neuroscience…Read more
  •  16
    Artificial intelligence and the value of transparency
    AI and Society 1-11. forthcoming.
    Some recent developments in Artificial Intelligence—especially the use of machine learning systems, trained on big data sets and deployed in socially significant and ethically weighty contexts—have led to a number of calls for “transparency”. This paper explores the epistemological and ethical dimensions of that concept, as well as surveying and taxonomising the variety of ways in which it has been invoked in recent discussions. Whilst “outward” forms of transparency may be straightforwardly ach…Read more
  •  13
    Cognitive science. An introduction to the science of mind, de José Luis Bermúdez
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 186-191. 2011.
  •  4
    The worst-motive fallacy: A negativity bias in motive attribution
    with O'Madagain Cathal
    Psychological Science. forthcoming.
    In this article, we describe a hitherto undocumented fallacy-in the sense of a mistake in reasoning-constituted by a negativity bias in the way that people attribute motives to others. We call this the "worst-motive fallacy," and we conducted two experiments to investigate it. In Experiment 1, participants expected protagonists in a variety of fictional vignettes to pursue courses of action that satisfy the protagonists' worst motive, and furthermore, participants significantly expected the prot…Read more