•  11
    Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural study
    with Sunae Kim, Beate Sodian, Markus Paulus, Atsushi Senju, Akiko Okuno, Mika Ueno, and Shoji Itakura
    Consciousness and Cognition 85 103017. 2020.
  •  8
  •  1
    Entretien avec Joëlle Proust
    Cahiers Philosophiques 4 7. 2011.
  •  19
    De la difficulté d’être naturaliste en matiére d’intentionalité
    Revue de Synthèse 111 (1-2): 13-32. 1990.
  •  8
    Langages
    with François de Polignac, Françoise Vielliard, Jean-Claude Margolin, Paul J. Smith, Joël Cornette, Pierre-François Moreau, and Mireille Gueissaz
    Revue de Synthèse 110 (3-4): 499-515. 1989.
  •  10
    XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3): 241-268. 2008.
  • Interpréter Diderot aujourd'hui, Colloque de Cerisy
    with E. De Fontenay
    Diderot Studies 23 204-206. 1988.
  •  58
    Dans son compte-rendu de mon livre, Les Animaux Pensent-ils?, Machery objecte que l'évolution n'étant ni hiérarchique ni linéaire, il n'et pas justifié de proposer une analyse hiérarchique des représentations. Je réponds à cette objection, en montrant qu'on peut en effet distinguer des types de représentation par leurs propriétés sémantiques et computationnelles. On peut reconnaître le caractère anagénétique du développement de la cognition sans pour autant légitimer une conception hiérarchique …Read more
  •  56
    Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 717-743. 2015.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive,…Read more
  •  63
    Les conditions de la connaissance de soi
    Philosophiques 27 (1): 161-186. 2000.
    La connaissance de soi suppose que l'on puisse former des pensées vraies de la forme 'je Y que P', où 'Y' fait référence à une attitude propositionnelle, 'P' à son contenu, et 'je' au penseur de cette pensée. La question qui se pose est de savoir, ce qui, dans le contenu mental occurrent [P], justifie l'auto-attribution de cette pensée. Ce problème dit de la transition soulève trois difficultés ; celle de la préservation du contenu intentionnel entre la pensée de premier et de second ordre ; cel…Read more
  •  20
    Réponses à mes critiques
    Philosophiques 35 (1): 139-159. 2008.
  • Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à Carnap
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3): 394-396. 1988.
  •  282
    Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients
    with E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery, and Marc Jeannerod
    Cognition 65 (1): 71-86. 1997.
    The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty…Read more
  • Descripteurs distaux et externalisme
    Dialectica 48 (3): 249. 1994.
  •  11
    Philosophie de la logique
    Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 93 (1). 1988.
  •  2
    Bolzano’s Analytic Revisited
    The Monist 64 (2): 214-230. 1981.
    What I propose is to reconsider the interpretation of Bolzano’s concept of analytic propositions which was offered thirty years ago by Bar-Hillel. The claim of Bar-Hillel was that, in a late addition to his book, The Theory of Science, Bolzano actually had been radically improving his concept of analyticity, thus creating some inconsistencies with the previous, uncorrected version. This allows us to equate the new Bolzanian definition of analytic with what was to be defined, a century later, as …Read more
  •  5
    This article summarizes how I came to deal with the subject matter of action, the main claims that I have defended, the prospects for future research, the interdisciplinary collaborations that are needed, and the obstacles to be surmounted.
  •  8
    This chapter discusses what is the specific difference of mental function, relative to the general concept of a biological function. It contrasts various approaches of this problem through evolutionary psychology, developmental system theory and neuroscientific growth theory models. It concludes that an holistic, dynamic approach to mental function suggests to reject the traditional division in mental faculties.
  •  44
    This book deals with the experience of externality, i.e. an experience, common in schizophrenia, present both in verbal hallucination and in thought insertion. The view defended is that thought insertion is a case of failed agency, experienced by the agent at the personal level as an intelligible thought with which she cannot identify. Such a case in which sense of agency and sense of subjectivity come apart reveals the existence of two dimensions in self-consciousness. Several difficulties of t…Read more
  • L'expérience et les formes
    Archives de Philosophie 50 (3): 439. 1987.
  •  50
    Rationality and metacognition in non-human animals
    In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. pp. 247--274. 2006.
    The project of understanding rationality in non-human animals faces a number of conceptual and methodological difficulties. The present chapter defends the view that it is counterproductive to rely on the human folk psychological idiom in animal cognition studies. Instead, it approaches the subject on the basis of dynamic- evolutionary considerations. Concepts from control theory can be used to frame the problem in the most general terms. The specific selective pressures exerted on agents endowe…Read more
  • Kai Vogeley, Martin Kurthen, Peter Falkai, and Wolfgang Maier. Essential Functions of the Human
    with Elkhonon Goldberg, Kenneth Podell, Karl H. Pribram, Vittorio Gallese, Marianne Hammerl, Andy P. Field, Frederick Travis, R. Keith Wallace, and J. Allan Cheyne
    Consciousness and Cognition 8 270. 1999.
  • Espace et représentation
    Archives de Philosophie 58 (n/a): 563. 1995.