•  17
    Affordances from a control viewpoint
    Philosophical Psychology. forthcoming.
    Perceiving an armchair prepares us to sit. Reading the first line in a text prepares us to read it. This article proposes that the affordance construct used to explain reactive potentiation of behavior similarly applies to reactive potentiation of cognitive actions. It defends furthermore that, in both cases, affordance-sensings do not only apply to selective (dis)engagement, but also to the revision and the termination of actions. In the first section, characteristics of environmental affordanc…Read more
  •  5
    Subjectivité et conscience d'agir: approches cognitive et clinique de la psychose
    with Henri Grivois
    Presses Universitaires de France - PUF. 1998.
    Dans la psychose, les données cliniques montrent que dès l'apparition des premiers troubles aigus, une difficulté caractéristique se manifeste au niveau de l'attribution de la responsabilité causale des actions. Les patients se sentent poussés à agir par les autres tout en ayant aussi le sentiment de contrôler l'action d'autrui. Cette difficulté va souvent de pair chez les schizophrènes avec une modification du sentiment d'identité personnelle. Parmi les symptômes de l'autisme, on trouve des dif…Read more
  •  16
    What can metacognition teach us about the evolution of communication?
    Evolutionary Linguistic Theory 5 (1): 1-10. 2023.
    Procedural metacognition is the set of affect-based mechanisms allowing agents to regulate cognitive actions like perceptual discrimination, memory retrieval or problem solving. This article proposes that procedural metacognition has had a major role in the evolution of communication. A plausible hypothesis is that, under pressure for maximizing signalling efficiency, the metacognitive abilities used by nonhumans to regulate their perception and their memory have been re-used to regulate their c…Read more
  •  6
    Mental Acts
    In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Mental Agency as Sensitivity to Reasons Mental Agency as Voluntary Control Mental Agency, ‘Evaluative Control,’ and Metacognition References Further reading.
  • Adaptive Control Loops as an Intermediate Mind-Brain Reduction Basis
    In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain, Ontos Verlag. pp. 191-219. 2009.
  • Sens frégéen et compréhension de la langue
    In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding, W. De Gruyter. pp. 304-324. 1981.
  •  79
    Malfunction and Mental Illness
    with Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, and Barry Smith
    The Monist 82 (4): 658-670. 1999.
    For years a debate has raged within the various literatures of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology over whether, and to what degree, the concepts that characterize psychopathology are social constructions that reflect cultural values. While the majority position among philosophers has been normativist, i.e., that the conception of a mental disorder is value-laden, a vocal and cogent minority have argued that psychopathology results from malfunctions that can be described by terminology that i…Read more
  •  1
    Are Children Sensitive to What They Know?: An Insight from Yucatec Mayan Children
    with Sunae Kim, Olivier Le Guen, and Beate Sodian
    Journal of Cognition and Culture 21 (3-4): 226-242. 2021.
    Metacognitive abilities are considered as a hallmark of advanced human cognition. Existing empirical studies have exclusively focused on populations from Western and industrialized societies. Little is known about young children’s metacognitive abilities in other societal and cultural contexts. Here we tested 4-year-old Yucatec Mayan by adopting a metacognitive task in which children’s explicit assessment of their own knowledge states about the hidden content of a container and their informing j…Read more
  •  72
    The foundations of metacognition (edited book)
    with Michael J. Beran, Johannes Brandl, and Josef Perner
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Bringing together researchers from across the cognitive sciences, the book is valuable for philosophers of mind, developmental and comparative psychologists, and neuroscientists.
  •  16
    Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural study
    with Sunae Kim, Beate Sodian, Markus Paulus, Atsushi Senju, Akiko Okuno, Mika Ueno, and Shoji Itakura
    Consciousness and Cognition 85 (C): 103017. 2020.
  •  33
    Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds?
    Philosophical Topics 27 (1): 203-232. 1999.
  •  10
  •  4
    Entretien avec Joëlle Proust
    Cahiers Philosophiques 4 7-21. 2011.
  •  20
    De la difficulté d’être naturaliste en matiére d’intentionalité
    Revue de Synthèse 111 (1-2): 13-32. 1990.
  •  10
    Langages
    with François de Polignac, Françoise Vielliard, Jean-Claude Margolin, Paul J. Smith, Joël Cornette, Pierre-François Moreau, and Mireille Gueissaz
    Revue de Synthèse 110 (3-4): 499-515. 1989.
  •  17
    XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3): 241-268. 2008.
  •  62
    Dans son compte-rendu de mon livre, Les Animaux Pensent-ils?, Machery objecte que l'évolution n'étant ni hiérarchique ni linéaire, il n'et pas justifié de proposer une analyse hiérarchique des représentations. Je réponds à cette objection, en montrant qu'on peut en effet distinguer des types de représentation par leurs propriétés sémantiques et computationnelles. On peut reconnaître le caractère anagénétique du développement de la cognition sans pour autant légitimer une conception hiérarchique …Read more
  •  20
    Précis de La nature de la volonté
    Philosophiques 35 (1): 109. 2008.
  •  123
    Does metacognition necessarily involve metarepresentation?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3): 352-352. 2003.
    Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need involve neither metarepresentation nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind.
  •  17
    Le Matérialisme au conditionnel
    Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 85 (1). 1980.
  •  34
    The Evolution of Primate Communication and Metacommunication
    Mind and Language 31 (2): 177-203. 2016.
    Against the prior view that primate communication is based only on signal decoding, comparative evidence suggests that primates are able, no less than humans, to intentionally perform or understand impulsive or habitual communicational actions with a structured evaluative nonconceptual content. These signals convey an affordance-sensing that immediately motivates conspecifics to act. Although humans have access to a strategic form of propositional communication adapted to teaching and persuasion…Read more
  • Is there a sense of agency for thought?
    In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  654
    Exploring the informational sources of metaperception: The case of Change Blindness Blindness
    with Anna Loussouarn and Damien Gabriel
    Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4): 1489-1501. 2011.
    Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” . They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their sel…Read more