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21Affordances from a control viewpointPhilosophical Psychology. forthcoming.Perceiving an armchair prepares us to sit. Reading the first line in a text prepares us to read it. This article proposes that the affordance construct used to explain reactive potentiation of behavior similarly applies to reactive potentiation of cognitive actions. It defends furthermore that, in both cases, affordance-sensings do not only apply to selective (dis)engagement, but also to the revision and the termination of actions. In the first section, characteristics of environmental affordanc…Read more
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5Subjectivité et conscience d'agir: approches cognitive et clinique de la psychosePresses Universitaires de France - PUF. 1998.Dans la psychose, les données cliniques montrent que dès l'apparition des premiers troubles aigus, une difficulté caractéristique se manifeste au niveau de l'attribution de la responsabilité causale des actions. Les patients se sentent poussés à agir par les autres tout en ayant aussi le sentiment de contrôler l'action d'autrui. Cette difficulté va souvent de pair chez les schizophrènes avec une modification du sentiment d'identité personnelle. Parmi les symptômes de l'autisme, on trouve des dif…Read more
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24What can metacognition teach us about the evolution of communication?Evolutionary Linguistic Theory 5 (1): 1-10. 2023.Procedural metacognition is the set of affect-based mechanisms allowing agents to regulate cognitive actions like perceptual discrimination, memory retrieval or problem solving. This article proposes that procedural metacognition has had a major role in the evolution of communication. A plausible hypothesis is that, under pressure for maximizing signalling efficiency, the metacognitive abilities used by nonhumans to regulate their perception and their memory have been re-used to regulate their c…Read more
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14Mental ActsIn Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Mental Agency as Sensitivity to Reasons Mental Agency as Voluntary Control Mental Agency, ‘Evaluative Control,’ and Metacognition References Further reading.
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1Adaptive Control Loops as an Intermediate Mind-Brain Reduction BasisIn Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain, Ontos Verlag. pp. 191-219. 2009.
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Sens frégéen et compréhension de la langueIn Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding, W. De Gruyter. pp. 304-324. 1981.
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95Malfunction and Mental IllnessThe Monist 82 (4): 658-670. 1999.For years a debate has raged within the various literatures of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology over whether, and to what degree, the concepts that characterize psychopathology are social constructions that reflect cultural values. While the majority position among philosophers has been normativist, i.e., that the conception of a mental disorder is value-laden, a vocal and cogent minority have argued that psychopathology results from malfunctions that can be described by terminology that i…Read more
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2Are Children Sensitive to What They Know?: An Insight from Yucatec Mayan ChildrenJournal of Cognition and Culture 21 (3-4): 226-242. 2021.Metacognitive abilities are considered as a hallmark of advanced human cognition. Existing empirical studies have exclusively focused on populations from Western and industrialized societies. Little is known about young children’s metacognitive abilities in other societal and cultural contexts. Here we tested 4-year-old Yucatec Mayan by adopting a metacognitive task in which children’s explicit assessment of their own knowledge states about the hidden content of a container and their informing j…Read more
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74The foundations of metacognition (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2012.Bringing together researchers from across the cognitive sciences, the book is valuable for philosophers of mind, developmental and comparative psychologists, and neuroscientists.
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21Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural studyConsciousness and Cognition 85 (C): 103017. 2020.
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1512- and 24-Month-Old Infants’ Search Behavior Under Informational UncertaintyFrontiers in Psychology 11. 2020.
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23De la difficulté d’être naturaliste en matiére d’intentionalitéRevue de Synthèse 111 (1-2): 13-32. 1990.
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25XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist ViewProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3): 241-268. 2008.
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64Réponse à Édouard Machery. Pour une pensée évolutionniste des répresentationsDialogue 44 (1): 161-166. 2005.Dans son compte-rendu de mon livre, Les Animaux Pensent-ils?, Machery objecte que l'évolution n'étant ni hiérarchique ni linéaire, il n'et pas justifié de proposer une analyse hiérarchique des représentations. Je réponds à cette objection, en montrant qu'on peut en effet distinguer des types de représentation par leurs propriétés sémantiques et computationnelles. On peut reconnaître le caractère anagénétique du développement de la cognition sans pour autant légitimer une conception hiérarchique …Read more
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3Ein Lösungsvorschlag zum Problem der repräsentationalen Basis tierischer MetakognitionIn Wolfgang Welsch, Christian Tewes & Klaus Vieweg (eds.), Natur und Geist: über ihre evolutionäre Verhältnisbestimmung, Akademie Verlag. pp. 205. 2011.
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47A critical review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's when self-consciousness breaks (review)Philosophical Psychology 15 (4). 2002.This book deals with the experience of externality, i.e. an experience, common in schizophrenia, present both in verbal hallucination and in thought insertion. The view defended is that thought insertion is a case of failed agency, experienced by the agent at the personal level as an intelligible thought with which she cannot identify. Such a case in which sense of agency and sense of subjectivity come apart reveals the existence of two dimensions in self-consciousness. Several difficulties of t…Read more
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26Intentionality, Consciousness and the System's PerspectiveIn Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, Springer. pp. 51--72. 1999.
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50Rationality and metacognition in non-human animalsIn Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. pp. 247--274. 2006.The project of understanding rationality in non-human animals faces a number of conceptual and methodological difficulties. The present chapter defends the view that it is counterproductive to rely on the human folk psychological idiom in animal cognition studies. Instead, it approaches the subject on the basis of dynamic- evolutionary considerations. Concepts from control theory can be used to frame the problem in the most general terms. The specific selective pressures exerted on agents endowe…Read more
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Kai Vogeley, Martin Kurthen, Peter Falkai, and Wolfgang Maier. Essential Functions of the HumanConsciousness and Cognition 8 270. 1999.
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273Perceiving IntentionsIn Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Clarendon Press. 2003.This paper defends the view that knowledge about one's own intentions can be gained in part through perception, although not through introspection. The various kinds of misperception of one's intentions are discussed. The latter distinction is applied to the analysis of schizophrenic patients' delusion of control.
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60Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds?Philosophical Topics 27 (1): 203-232. 1999.Granted that a given species is able to entertain beliefs and desires, i.e. to have (epistemic and motivational) internal states with semantically evaluable contents, one can raise the question of whether the species under investigation is, in addition, able to represent properties and events that are not only perceptual or physical, but mental, and use the latter to guide their actions, not only as reliable cues for achieving some output, but as mental cues (that is: whether it can 'read minds'…Read more
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104Overlooking metacognitive experienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2): 158-159. 2009.Peter Carruthers correctly claims that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important functional differences
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Biology |