• What is the myth of the given?
    In Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning & Søren Overgaard (eds.), In the light of experience: new essays on perception and reasons, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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    In the light of experience: new essays on perception and reasons (edited book)
    with Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning, and Søren Overgaard
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    How does perception provide reasons for our empirical judgements? This volume offers a set of new essays which in different ways address this fundamental question, and investigate the implications for our understanding of perceptual experience.
  •  4
    Pseudoerzieherische Diskurspraxis. Platons Verständnis der Sophistik
    with Morten Thaning
    Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 44 (2). 2019.
    This article aims to reconstruct the normative distinction between sophistry and dialectics developed in Plato’s treatment of sophistry. We begin by describing Plato’s notion of sophistry as a knack of persuasion that succeeds by masquerading itself as truth-oriented and by providing gratification for its listeners. We then argue that the stringency of Plato’s arguments becomes clear by using his definition of sophistry as a guideline for the interpretation of the dialogues Protagoras and Gorgia…Read more
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    Intuitively, when all goes well, we adopt beliefs based on inference because we realize that their truth is established by the truth of the involved premises. If this intuitive picture of our successful reasoning is correct, then it must be possible that our reasoning is motivated by our sensitivity to the soundness of the involved inference. This paper argues that such a view of ideal reasoning can only be upheld if we accept the minority view that the proper inferential role of our thoughts is…Read more
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    What can Socratic philosophy achieve? Plato’s conception of care in the light of Christine Korsgaard’s self-constitution
    with Morten Sørensen Thaning
    International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 81 (3): 227-245. 2020.
    Can rational arguments convince a person to change from a commitment to living an unvirtuous life into striving after virtue? Or can rationality, even in the best cases, only help preserve an alrea...
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    How to infer what persistent things are up to – a Fregean puzzle for traditional Fregeans
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (1): 92-121. 2023.
    How do we inferentially unify separately acquired empirical information into a single comprehensive picture of the lives of persistent particulars? This paper argues that hidden in such inferences is a Fregean puzzle that can only be solved by individuating our demonstratives thoughts in terms of object-dependent Fregean Senses. I begin by characterizing some constraints on a non-skeptical account of our inferential unification of empirical information. I then go on to show that traditional Freg…Read more
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    What Motivates Fregean Anti-Individualism?
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2): 153-172. 2017.
    In Anti-Individualism and Knowledge Jessica Brown criticises views of content that combine Fregean Sense and anti-individualism. Brown assumes that all Fregean theories are motivated by a picture of the rational thinker as someone who will always have transparent access to the simple inferential consequences of his thoughts. This picture, Brown argues, is incompatible with anti-individualism about content. While traditional Fregean theories have indeed had such motivation, Brown’s mistake is in …Read more
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    Please mind the gappy content
    Philosophical Studies 176 (1): 219-239. 2019.
    Representationalist theories of experience face the problem that two sets of compelling intuitions seem to support the contrary conclusions that we should ascribe, respectively, singular contents and general contents to experience. Susanna Schellenberg has, in a series of articles, argued that we can conserve both sets of intuitions if we award a central explanatory role to the notions of gappy-contents and content-schemas in our theory of experience. I argue that there is difficulty in seeing h…Read more
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    In Light of Experience: Essays on Reason and Perception (edited book)
    with Thybo Jensen Rasmus, M. Thaning, and S. Overgaard
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
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    McDowell’s new conceptualism and the difference between chickens, colours and cardinals
    with Rasmus Thybo Jensen and Morten S. Thaning
    Philosophical Explorations 20 (1): 88-105. 2017.
    McDowell recently renounced the assumption that the content of any knowledgeable, perceptual judgement must be included in the content of the knowledge grounding experience. We argue that McDowell’s introduction of a new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge is incompatible with the main line of argument in favour of conceptualism as presented in Mind and World [McDowell, John. 1996. Mind and World. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]. We reconstruct the original line of…Read more
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    What capacities for discrimination must a subject possess in order to entertain singular thoughts? Evans has suggested that a subject must be able to discriminate his referent from all other entities in order to be able to do so; what he calls Russell's Principle. Evans' view has few followers, and he has been repeatedly accused of presenting no argument in its favour. In this paper I present what I take to be Evans' argument. I suggest that he has been misinterpreted as introducing Russell's Pr…Read more