Johannes Fischer

Der Beitrag befasst sich mit religiösen Deutungen von Krankheit und ihren ethischen Implikationen, und zwar aus einer christlichen Perspektive. Er problematisiert die verbreitete Auffassung, dass Religion es ermöglicht, Kontingenzerfahrungen wie eine Krankheit mit einem Sinn zu verbinden und dadurch in das eigene Leben zu integrieren. Das Spezifische religiöser Deutungen und Praktiken liegt eher darin, dass sie es ermöglichen, mit Sinnlosigkeit zu leben. Sie haben dabei ethische Implikationen in Bezug auf den Umgang mit Krankheit und Sterben

The author defends the distinction between active and passive euthanasia. A characteristic feature of passive euthanasia is that it preserves the situation of waiting for death. Active euthanasia is characterised by the fact that it terminates this situation or anticipates its occurrence in a phase when death has not yet announced itself. Provided the situation of waiting for death is preserved, passive euthanasia may very weil include actively life-shortening measures such as dehydration. The situation of waiting for death has primarily a ritual significance. It has the effect of leaving the participants with the consciousness that death as a definitive separation from a person was fate and not an act for which responsibility must be tak:en. This consciousness is important for the integrity of the personal relation to the deceased. Active euthanasia can therefore be considered only in extreme situations which leave no alternative. The author criticises the fact that the ritual aspect of medical action receives too little consideration in the discussion on euthanasia. Finally, conclusions relating to theological ethics are drawn.

ZusammenfassungIst es Aufgabe der Medizinethik und medizinethischer Kommissionen, moralische Urteile von der Art zu fällen, dass eine Handlung oder Praktik, wie der assistierte Suizid, moralisch richtig oder legitim ist? Der folgende Beitrag argumentiert dafür, dass sich die Medizinethik solcher Urteile enthalten sollte. Seine These ist, dass die Aufgabe der Medizinethik nicht in moralischen Bewertungen, sondern in der Reflexion auf diejenigen Güter, Tugenden und Pflichten besteht, die bei einer solchen Handlung oder Praktik auf dem Spiel stehen. In diesem Sinne übt er Kritik an einer verbreiteten Auffassung von Moral und Ethik.

The prevalence of nonpaternity in human societies is difficult to establish. To obtain a current and fairly unbiased estimate of the nonpaternity rate in Germany, we analysed a dataset consisting of 971 children and their parents in whom human leukocyte antigen (HLA) typing had been carried out in the context of bone marrow transplantation. In this sample, nine exclusions (0.93%) could be identified on the basis of more than 300 HLA-haplotypes defined by four HLA genes. Given this number of exclusions, a maximum likelihood estimate of the nonpaternity rate in the population of 0.94% was obtained with asymptotic 95% confidence limits of 0.33% and 1.55%, respectively. This result is in accordance with recent surveys as well as findings from Switzerland for a comparable sample, and it suggests that earlier estimates of the nonpaternity rate which were often in excess of 10% may have been largely exaggerated.

A main condition for medical treatment is considered to be the »informed consent« of the patient. This criterion protects his/her autonomy. In certain cases, however, it is not applicable, since the patient is not able to give his consent. This may lead to the discrimination of a considerable group of patients, where medical interventions must be refrained from, because of the lacking consent of the persons in question. This concems especially research for the benefit of others and euthanasia. Basing on the concept of the person, this paper develops criteria which should be applied if »informed consent« is not applicable

What is the concept of human dignity derived from? Does it have its foundation in the emotions or in reason? By dint of a differentiation between a premoral, sittliche orientation in acting and a moral orientation, which is due to an external evaluating moral community, the author comes to the conclusion that human dignity finds its foundation in both the emotions and rationality. This has important implications for the task of a theological ethics insofar it is concerned with the concept of human dignity and its enforcement

The essay discusses two different conceptions of human dignity. According to the first conception, ›respecting the dignity of a human being‹ means to respect something specific that is given by her being human. According to the second conception, however, ›respecting the dignity of a human being‹ means to respect her as a human being. With regard to the first understanding, one is bound to respect human dignity, whereas on the basis of the second conception, we owe respect to the human being herself. The duty to respect human dignity serves as a foundation for duties we have with regard to human beings as such. The duty to respect someone as the human being she is, however, is a duty towards her. This duty therefore justifies a right she may claim, namely the right to be respected as a human being. The core of human dignity, then, is this rights-conferring status of being human. This article reacts to the German debate on human embryonic research. Participants in this debate argue that human dignity depends on being human in a generic sense. According to them, the early embryo participates in this sense of being human, which allows them to apply the concept of human dignity, including the absolute protection it entails, to human embryos. The author criticizes this view, claiming that it undermines the very idea of human dignity by neglecting the rights-conferring status of being a particular human being which is at its core. Rather, a »decent society« is characterized by the fact that its members are treated and respected as rights-holders.

What is the concept of human dignity derived from? Does it have its foundation in the emotions or in reason? By dint of a differentiation between a premoral, sittliche orientation in acting (differentiated in premoral goods, duties and virtues) and a moral orientation, which is due to an external evaluating moral community, the author comes to the conclusion that human dignity finds its foundation in both the emotions and rationality. This has important implications for the task of a theological ethics insofar it is concerned with the concept of human dignity and its enforcement