John Beaudoin

The thesis examines the natural theological enterprise of combining the separate evidence for theism into one cumulative case. I find that the cumulative approach represents the best available strategy for the natural theologian, but that the explanatory/interpretive form of cumulative argument cannot accomplish what some defenders of the argument have assumed. ;I begin with a short history of the cumulative approach, in which the emphasis is on giving the reader an idea of the great diversity among those cumulative arguments that have already been given. ;In Chapter 2, I discuss what I take to be some of the central logical aspects of the cumulative approach, such as the division of labor between the arguments in establishing distinct theistic claims. ;In Chapter 3, I consider two broad cumulative methods: the formalist approach, which involves applying a formal calculus of confirmation to the theistic evidence; and the informalist approach, according to which a formal apparatus is inadequate to capture the evidential force of various evidence. I find that particular reasons given to justify abandoning inverse-probability as a natural theological form of argument are uncompelling. ;In Chapter 4, I consider the prospects of using inverse-probability arguments to show that, on the total evidence, theism has higher epistemic probability than a naturalistic alternative, which I refer to as N. Given the difficulty in making assignments of prior probability based on the sole criterion of simplicity, and given the possibility of making the debate between the two views turn primarily on priors, the prospects for showing that N is untenable are dim. ;In the fifth Chapter I consider what I take to be a more fundamental problem with using natural theology in an offensive, as opposed to a merely defensive fashion. God's hiddenness is a fact typically explained by theists in ways that undermine natural theology used offensively. ;In the final chapter, I consider some issues connected with the philosophical defense of atheism, and the implications of my findings in Chapter 5 for how such a defense may be executed

According to the Doctrine of Divine Conservation, the world could not endure through time were God not actively sustaining its existence. An alternative to the conservationist view is one according to which the existence of whatever is the fundamental material of our universe is characterized by inertia, so that its continuance stands in no need of active causal intervention by some other being. In this article I develop in some detail the Doctrine of Existential Inertia and reply to some of the objections brought against it by conservationists.

Recent responses to evidential formulations of the argument from evil have emphasized the possible limitations on human cognitive access to the goods and evils that might be connected with various wordly states of affairs. This emphasis, I argue, is a twin-edged sword, as it imperils a popular form of natural theology. I conclude by arguing that the popularity enjoyed by Reformed Epistemology does not detract from the significance of this result, since Reformed Epistemology is not inimical to natural theology, and Reformists themselves concede the usefulness of theistic proofs

The gradual evolution of Homo sapiens from earlier hominid species raises for Christians several interrelated challenges. I focus here on the first emergence of creatures who could enjoy eternal life. In the first several sections I highlight what I take to be the outstanding difficulties facing a Christian anthropology when it comes to positing an historical boundary separating those creatures that can have eternal life from those that cannot. In the final section, I consider whether Christians can concede an element of arbitrariness in God’s choice about where to draw that boundary.

According to some, the historian must for working purposes assume that nature is uniform, i.e., that miracles do not occur. For otherwise, it is suggested, he may place no confidence in the historical reliability of the records and artifacts on which he relies: such confidence can exist only where it is assumed, for example, that ink marks in the form of words do not sometimes appear spontaneously on old bits of paper. In this article I spell out this methodological thesis in greater detail and determine to what extent it should be accepted.

That demonic agents can work wonders is a staple of much Judeo-Christian theology. Believers have proposed various means by which the Devil’s work can be distinguished from the miracles wrought by God, primarily so that no one is led astray by the Devil’s ’lying wonders.’ I consider the likelihood of our using the suggested criteria with any success. Given certain claims about the demonic nature and certain facts about the way theists often handle the problem of inscrutable evil, it seems unlikely that any of the criteria I examine can be relied upon