-
83Skeptical RealismThe Monist 77 (1): 3-26. 1994.There is an important family of philosophical positions which deserve the name “realism”, and there is a natural diagnosis of what all these positions share in common. There is also an important family of philosophical positions which deserve the name “antirealism”, and there is a natural diagnosis of what all these positions share in common. These two families are feuding, but the nature of the conflict between them is far from clear. When we extract the definition which realists would give for…Read more
-
92An analysis of indefinite probability statementsSynthese 73 (2). 1987.An analysis of indefinite probability statements has been offered by Jackson and Pargetter (1973). We accept that this analysis will assign the correct probability values for indefinite probability claims. But it does so in a way which fails to reflect the epistemic state of a person who makes such a claim. We offer two alternative analyses: one employing de re (epistemic) probabilities, and the other employing de dicto (epistemic) probabilities. These two analyses appeal only to probabilities w…Read more
-
39Notes on theIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
-
9Of MeaningIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. pp. 85. 2009.
-
523The big bad bug: What are the humean's chances?British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3): 443-462. 1993.Humean supervenience is the doctrine that there are no necessary connections in the world. David Lewis identifies one big bad bug to the programme of providing Humean analyses for apparently non-Humean features of the world. The bug is chance. We put the bug under the microscope, and conclude that chance is no special problem for the Humean.
-
95How not to be muddled by a meddlesome muggletonianAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4). 1997.Holton, we acknowledge, has given a good counter-example to a theory, and that theory is interesting and worth refuting. The theory we have in mind is like Smith's, but is more reductionist in spirit. It is a theory that ties value to Reason and to processes of reasoning, or inference - not to the recognition of reasons and acting on reasons. Such a theory overestimates the importance of logic, truth, inference, and thinking things through for yourself independently of any ideas about where you …Read more
-
186Possible worlds foundations for probabilityJournal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3): 299--320. 1976.
-
65The Emergence of a New Family of Theories of TimeIn Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.According to the new family of theories that emerged around the second half of the nineteenth century, time is more similar to space than it had been construed to be under the previous family of theories. These new theories of time treat time as being a “fourth dimension” that is much more like the three spatial dimensions than it was imagined to be under the older rival theories. Over the two centuries following Newton, the key concepts of graphs and the differential and integral calculus, tric…Read more
-
13Book Reviews (review)History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2): 225-260. 1992.N. Denyer, Language, thought and falsehood in ancient Greek philosophy. London and New York: Routledge, 1991. xi + 222 pp. £35.00 Luis Vega, La trama de la demostración.. Madrid: 1990, Alianza Editorial, 413 pp. No price stated Daniel D. Merrill, Augustus De Morgan and the logic of relations. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990. xi + 259 pp. Dfl. 185/$ 114.00/£64.00 Georg Cantor, Briefe. Edited by Herbert Meschkowski and Winfried Nilson. Berlin, etc: Springer‐Verlag, 1991, viii + 535 pp. DM 158. The selecte…Read more
-
6Book reviews (review)History and Philosophy of Logic 14 (2): 221-263. 1993.Stewart Shapiro, Foundations without foundationalism: A case for second-order logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. xvii + 277 pp. £35.00 A. Diaz, J, Echeverria and A. Ibarra, Structures in...
-
12Book reviews (review)History and Philosophy of Logic 14 (2): 221-263. 1993.Stewart Shapiro, Foundations without foundationalism: A case for second-order logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. xvii + 277 pp. £35.00 A. Diaz, J, Echeverria and A. Ibarra, Structures in...
-
235Re-acquaintance with qualiaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3). 2006.Frank Jackson argued, in an astronomically frequently cited paper on 'Epiphenomenal qualia '[Jackson 1982 that materialism must be mistaken. His argument is called the knowledge argument. Over the years since he published that paper, he gradually came to the conviction that the conclusion of the knowledge argument must be mistaken. Yet he long remained totally unconvinced by any of the very numerous published attempts to explain where his knowledge argument had gone astray. Eventually, Jackson d…Read more
-
120Believing in semanticsLinguistics and Philosophy 2 (1): 101--144. 1978.This paper concerns the semantics of belief-sentences. I pass over ontologically lavish theories which appeal to impossible worlds, or other points of reference which contain more than possible worlds. I then refute ontologically stingy, quotational theories. My own theory employs the techniques of possible worlds semantics to elaborate a Fregean analysis of belief-sentences. In a belief-sentence, the embedded clause does not have its usual reference, but refers rather to its own semantic struct…Read more
-
71Does science persecute women? The case of the 16th–17th century witch-HuntsPhilosophy 73 (2): 195-217. 1998.I. Logic, rationality and ideology Herbert Marcuse once claimed that the ‘“rational” is a mode of thought and action which is geared to reduce ignorance, destruction, brutality, and oppression.’ He echoed a widespread folk belief that a world in which people were rational would be a better world. This could be taken as an optimistic empirical conjecture: if people were more rational then probably the world would be a better place (a trust that ‘virtue will be rewarded’, so to speak). However, it…Read more
-
511The world as one of a kind: Natural necessity and laws of natureBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3): 371-388. 1992.
-
463The reality of numbers: a physicalist's philosophy of mathematicsOxford University Press. 1988.Challenging the myth that mathematical objects can be defined into existence, Bigelow here employs Armstrong's metaphysical materialism to cast new light on mathematics. He identifies natural, real, and imaginary numbers and sets with specified physical properties and relations and, by so doing, draws mathematics back from its sterile, abstract exile into the midst of the physical world.
-
20The knowledge argument can be introduced through a variety of differ-ent illustrations. Here are three.(i) Consider a complete physical theory of the light spectrum, including the effects different wavelengths of light have on the neural systems of humans. There are also the phenomenal properties we experience when we (review)In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Mit Press. pp. 179. 2004.
-
1PARSONS, T.: "Nonexistent Objects" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (n/a): 94. 1982.
-
18II. Land, well-being and compensationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3): 330-346. 1990.This Article does not have an abstract