•  4
    Commentators on John Broome's Tanner Lecture. The Tanner Lectures are a collection of educational and scientific discussions relating to human values. Conducted by leaders in their fields, the lectures are presented at prestigious educational facilities around the world.
  •  216
    What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?
    with Stéphane Zuber, Nikhil Venkatesh, Torbjörn Tännsjö, Christian Tarsney, H. Orri Stefánsson, Katie Steele, Dean Spears, Jeff Sebo, Marcus Pivato, Toby Ord, Yew-Kwang Ng, Michal Masny, William MacAskill, Nicholas Lawson, Kevin Kuruc, Michelle Hutchinson, Johan E. Gustafsson, Hilary Greaves, Lisa Forsberg, Marc Fleurbaey, Diane Coffey, Susumu Cato, Clinton Castro, Tim Campbell, Mark Budolfson, Alexander Berger, Nick Beckstead, and Geir B. Asheim
    Utilitas 1-5. forthcoming.
    The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.
  •  61
    Good, Fairness and QALYs
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 23 (1): 57-73. 1988.
    Counting QALYs has been proposed as a way of deciding how resources should be distributed in the health service: put resources where they will produce the most QALYs. This proposal has encountered strong opposition. There has been a disagreement between some economists favouring QALYs and some philosophers opposing them. But the argument has, I think, mostly been at cross-purposes. Those in favour of QALYs point out what they can do, and those against point out what they can't. There need be no …Read more
  •  19
    Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?1
    Philosophical Issues 15 (1): 321-337. 2005.
  •  155
    Against Denialism
    The Monist 102 (1): 110-129. 2019.
    Several philosophers deny that an individual person’s emissions of greenhouse gas do any harm; I call these “individual denialists.” I argue that each individual’s emissions may do harm, and that they certainly do expected harm. I respond to the denialists’ arguments.
  •  45
    Efficiency and future generations
    Economics and Philosophy 34 (2): 221-241. 2018.
  •  445
    The Value of a Person
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1). 1994.
    (for Adam Morton's half) I argue that if we take the values of persons to be ordered in a way that allows incomparability, then the problems Broome raises have easy solutions. In particular we can maintain that creating people is morally neutral while killing them has a negative value.
  •  156
    Reason versus ought
    Philosophical Issues 25 (1): 80-97. 2015.
  •  109
    Normative Practical Reasoning
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1). 2001.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious example is norm…Read more
  •  148
    More pain or less?
    Analysis 56 (2): 116-118. 1996.
  •  62
    Jean E. Hampton (1954-1996). Obituary
    with Christopher W. Morris and Philippe Mongin
    Economics and Philosophy 12 (2): 251-252. 1996.
    An obituary of Jean E. Hampton (1954-1996) by the editors of Economics and Philosophy. At the time of her premature death, Jean was serving as a member of the Editorial Board of the journal.
  •  146
    A philosopher at the IPCC
    The Philosophers' Magazine 66 11-16. 2014.
  •  83
    Kamm on Fairness (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 955. 1998.
  •  144
    This chapter surveys some of the issues that arise in policy making when the wellbeing of future generations must be taken into account. It analyses the discounting of future wellbeing, and considers whether it is permissible. It argues that the effects of policy on the number of future people should not be ignored, and it considers what is an appropriate basis for setting a value on these effects. It considers the implications of the non-identity effect for intergenerational justice and for the…Read more
  •  1899
    Since the last ice age, when ice enveloped most of the northern continents, the earth has warmed by about five degrees. Within a century, it is likely to warm by another four or five. This revolution in our climate will have immense and mostly harmful effects on the lives of people not yet born. We are inflicting this harm on our descendants by dumping greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. We can mitigate the harm a little by taking measures to control our emissions of these gases, and to adapt …Read more
  •  69
    The value of living longer
    In Sudhir Anand, Fabienne Peter & Amartya Sen (eds.), Public Health, Ethics, and Equity, Oxford University Press. pp. 243--260. 2004.
  •  99
    Practical reasoning
    In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, Oxford University Press. pp. 85--111. 2002.
  •  102
    Williams on Ought
    In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press, Usa. 2012.
    In 2002, Bernard Williams delivered a lecture that revisited the arguments of his article 'Ought and moral obligation', published in his Moral Luck. The lecture attributed to the earlier article the thesis that there are no ‘personal’ or (as I put it) ‘owned’ oughts. It also rejected this thesis. This paper explains the idea of an owned ought, and supports Williams’s lecture in asserting that there are owned oughts. It also examines the question of how accurately Williams’s later lecture interpr…Read more
  •  59
    The unity of reasoning
    In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  173
    Should We Value Population?
    Journal of Political Philosophy 13 (4): 399-413. 2005.
  •  583
    Most properties have comparatives, which are relations. For instance, the property of width has the comparative relation denoted by `_ is wider than _'. Let us say a property is reducible to its comparative if any statement that refers to the property has the same meaning as another statement that refers to the comparative instead. Width is not reducible to its comparative. To be sure, many statements that refer to width are reducible: for instance, `The Mississippi is wide' means the same as `T…Read more
  •  300
  •  8
    Reply to Bradley and McCarthy
    Philosophical Books 48 (4): 320-328. 2007.
  •  86
  •  398
    Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3): 349-374. 2007.
    Some philosophers think that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons, or alternatively in responding correctly to beliefs about reasons. This paper considers various possible interpretations of ‘responding correctly to reasons’ and of ‘responding correctly to beliefs about reasons’, and concludes that rationality consists in neither, under any interpretation. It recognizes that, under some interpretations, rationality does entail responding correctly to beliefs about reasons. Tha…Read more
  •  66
    Responses to Setiya, Hussain, and Horty
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1): 230-242. 2015.