John Corvino

This book's thirty essays explore philosophically the nature and morality of sexual perversion, cybersex, masturbation, homosexuality, contraception, same-sex marriage, promiscuity, pedophilia, date rape, sexual objectification, teacher-student relationships, pornography, and prostitution. Authors include Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Nagel, Alan Goldman, John Finnis, Sallie Tisdale, Robin West, Alan Wertheimer, John Corvino, Cheshire Calhoun, Jerome Neu, and Alan Soble, among others. A valuable resource for sex researchers as well as undergraduate courses in the philosophy of sex

At first glance, it seems difficult to object to any program that merits the label “harm reduction.” If harm is bad, as everyone recognizes, then surely reducing it is good. What’s the problem? The problem, we submit, is twofold. First, there’s more to “harm reduction,” as that term is typically used, than simply the reduction of harm. Some of the wariness about harm-reduction programs may result from the nebulous “more.” Thus, part of our task is to provide a clear definition of harm reduction. Next, we turn to a second problem: a worry about complicity. Those who object to harm reduction programs fear that participation in such programs would make them complicit in activities they deem immoral. In this paper we argue that this fear is largely unwarranted. We use supervised injection sites —safe spaces for the use of risky drugs—as our paradigmatic case of harm reduction. These SISs are generally offered in the hope of reducing harm to both the drug user and the public. For this reason, our analysis focuses on complicity in harm. We draw upon the work of Gregory Mellema as our framework. Mellema offers three ways one can be complicit in harm caused by another: by enabling, facilitating or condoning it. We argue that one who operates an SIS is not complicit in any of these ways, while also laying out the conditions that must be met if one is to argue that harm reduction entails complicity in non-consequentialist wrongdoing.

In June 2018 the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, in which baker Jack Phillips refused to provide a cake for a same-sex wedding. The Court decided the case on fairly narrow grounds; in particular, it set aside the question of whether Phillips illegally discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation by refusing to sell the same cake to a gay couple that he would sell to a heterosexual couple. Concurring opinions by Justices Kagan and Gorsuch do address that question, however, and in this paper I explore the debate between them. By distinguishing between design-based and use-based refusals of service and then arguing that some use-based refusals are tantamount to discrimination on the basis of protected traits, I argue that Jack Phillips did indeed discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. I also argue that another baker, who refused to create a “Leviticus 18:22 ‘Homosexuality is a detestable sin’ ” cake, did not discriminate on the basis of religion. I thus side with Justice Kagan against Justice Gorsuch on the question of whether the Colorado commission treated the two bakers inconsistently.

In 2012, baker Jack Phillips of Masterpiece Cakeshop refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, citing religious beliefs. Colorado Public Accommodations law prohibits business owners from denying the “full and equal enjoyment” of their services on the basis of sexual orientation, and Phillips refused to sell the couple the very same items he would sell to a heterosexual couple. But Phillips, who fashions himself as a “cake artist,” argues that applying the law here would interfere with his free-speech rights. Moreover, he argues that he is not actually discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation but on the basis of a particular understanding of marriage; he is happy to sell Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender people a wide range of other items. In this chapter, I evaluate both arguments. In the postscript, I briefly explain the US Supreme Court's June 2018 ruling on the case.

David Hume has been variously interpreted as an emotivist , a subjectivist , a projectivist , a realist , all of the above , and none of the above . In my dissertation I attempt to clear up this confusion. I argue that Hume is a moral realist who embraces a secondary-quality model for moral value. As such, he believes that there are true moral propositions, that their truth is to some extent independent of human beliefs, attitudes, and desires, and that, nevertheless, moral qualities cannot be understood apart from their effect on human perceivers. I defend this account against both exegetical objections by Hume scholars and substantive objections by contemporary moral realists, quasi-realists, and anti-realists

In his “Why be Moral? A Different Rationale for Managers,” (Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 4, April, 1994), La Rue Tone Hosmer argues that managers should be moral because “acting in ways that can be considered to be ‘right’ and ‘just’ and ‘fair’ is absolutely essential to the long-term competitive success of the firm.” According to Hosmer, moral behavior generates trust among stakeholders, which leads to stakeholder commitment, which leads to increased stakeholder effort, which ultimately leads to corporate success. Though we agree with Hosmer’s causal reasoning, we are concerned about an ancient loophole, namely, cases where the mere appearance of morality will generate the same trust, and commitment, and so on, and will thus enable managers to reap the material benefits of morality while nevertheless engaging in immoral practices. We conclude that a virtue ethics perspective will strengthen Hosmer’s model so as to cover such cases.

In his “Why be Moral? A Different Rationale for Managers,” , La Rue Tone Hosmer argues that managers should be moral because “acting in ways that can be considered to be ‘right’ and ‘just’ and ‘fair’ is absolutely essential to the long-term competitive success of the firm.” According to Hosmer, moral behavior generates trust among stakeholders, which leads to stakeholder commitment, which leads to increased stakeholder effort, which ultimately leads to corporate success. Though we agree with Hosmer’s causal reasoning, we are concerned about an ancient loophole, namely, cases where the mere appearance of morality will generate the same trust, and commitment, and so on, and will thus enable managers to reap the material benefits of morality while nevertheless engaging in immoral practices. We conclude that a virtue ethics perspective will strengthen Hosmer’s model so as to cover such cases

This paper revisits the “morality pays” approach to answering the “Why be moral?” question in business. First I argue that “morality pays” is weakest when it needs to be strongest, and thus inadequate to the task. Then I examine and reject a proposed virtue-ethics alternative, arguing that it either collapses into “morality pays” or else introduces a new problem. After sketching an account of moral reasons, I go on to argue that “morality pays” can be reframed, not so much as an answer to “Why be moral,” but as a prescription for reforming corporate institutions.

Discussions of loyalty in business typically assume that employees have a prima facieduty of loyalty to their companies, one that sometimes conflicts with other duties, such as the duty to blow the whistle in response to dangerous or unethical practices. Ronald Duska, however, denies the existence of any such duty. According to Duska, one does not have an duty of loyalty to a company, even a prima facieone, because companies are not proper objects of loyalty. He bases this conclusion on two premises: first, that loyalty is appropriate only in relationships that demand self-sacrifice without expectation of reward, and second, that the employee-company relationship does not demand such sacrifice.In this paper I pose a dilemma for Duska. Briefly put: one can interpret Duska''s phrase relationships that demand self-sacrifice without expectation of reward" either narrowly or broadly. If one interprets it narrowly, then Duska''s first premise is false; if broadly, then his second premise is false. Either way, Duska''s argument is unsound. However, after rejecting his conclusion about loyalty in business, I go on to argue that Duska is right to deny that the duty of loyalty conflicts with the duty to blow the whistle. More generally, the paper is an attempt to elucidate the proper application of loyalty in business.

In this paper I consider Hume's position on the analogy between moral qualities and secondary qualities. Although some have suggested that Hume's use of the analogy is important to his moral philosophy, others have disputed its significance to Hume. My position in this paper is that Hume believes there are indeed similarities between moral and secondary qualities that illuminate the nature of virtue. This paper is divided into two parts. In the first, I consider Hume's point(s) in raising the analogy by arguing for four similarities between moral qualities and secondary qualities that he likely had in mind; and in the second, I respond to various objections alleging that Hume did not, and indeed, could not, rely on the analogy in any substantial way