• Comparing Existence and Non-Existence
    In Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich & Ketan Ramakrishnan (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit, Oxford University Press. 2022.
  •  63
    How Stable Is Objective Chance?
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3): 613-629. 2022.
    This paper examines the stability of objective chance. I defend the stable chance thesis : that in any given possible world, any pair of intrinsic duplicate physical setups with the same chances of being subject to the same external influences must yield the same chances. I argue that SCT compares favourably to rivals in the literature. I then consider a challenge to SCT involving time travel and causal loops. I argue that SCT survives this challenge, but that such cases expose chance as less st…Read more
  •  340
    The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2): 410-432. 2018.
    The A-theory and the B-theory advance competing claims about how time is grounded. The A-theory says that A-facts are more fundamental in grounding time than are B-facts, and the B-theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. It follows that if either the A-theory or the B-the…Read more
  •  548
    Logic: The Drill
    Princeton University Press. 2012.
    Contains exercises and solutions to accompany Logic: The Laws of Truth by Nicholas J. J. Smith (Princeton University Press, 2012).
  •  45
    A consequentialist account of Narveson’s dictum
    with Robyn Kath
    Philosophical Studies 176 (7): 1693-1709. 2019.
    In population ethics, Narveson’s dictum states: morality favours making people happy, but is neutral about making happy people. The thought is intuitively appealing; for example, it prohibits creating new people at the expense of those who already exist. However, there are well-known obstacles to accommodating Narveson’s dictum within a standard framework of overall betterness: any attempt to do so violates very plausible formal features of betterness. Therefore, the prevailing view is that the …Read more
  •  47
    Acting on Essentially Comparative Goodness
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2): 73-83. 2017.
    Temkin's Essentially Comparative View of moral ideals says that goodness is comparison set dependent: the goodness of an outcome is relativized to a set of outcomes. This view does not entail that betterness is intransitive; indeed, it provides the resources for maintaining transitivity. However, it does entail that the structure of goodness is more complex than is standardly supposed. It thereby demands a modification of the standard connection between goodness and decision. I set out this chal…Read more
  •  910
    Cognitive science has recently made some startling discoveries about temporal experience, and these discoveries have been drafted into philosophical service. We survey recent appeals to cognitive science in the philosophical debate over whether time objectively passes. Since this research is currently in its infancy, we identify some directions for future research
  •  844
    The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts
    with Kristie Millier
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1). 2017.
    The A-theory and the B-theory advance competing claims about how time is grounded. The A-theory says that A-facts are more fundamental in grounding time than are B-facts, and the B-theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. It follows that if either the A-theory or the B-the…Read more
  •  103
    Backwards Causation and the Chancy Past
    Mind 127 (505): 1-33. 2018.
    I argue that the past can be objectively chancy in cases of backwards causation, and defend a view of chance that allows for this. Using a case, I argue against the popular temporal view of chance, according to which chances are defined relative to times, and all chancy events must lie in the future. I then state and defend the causal view of chance, according to which chances are defined relative to causal histories, and all chancy events must lie causally downstream. The causal view replicates…Read more