•  744
    A fruitful way to approach The Idea of Phenomenology is through Husserl’s claim that consciousness is not a bag, box, or any other kind of container. The bag conception, which dominated much of modern philosophy, is rooted in the idea that philosophy is restricted to investigating only what is really immanent to consciousness, such as acts and sensory contents. On this view, what Husserl called “the riddle of transcendence” can never be solved. The phenomenological reduction, as Husserl develops…Read more
  •  602
  •  285
    Moral phenomenology and moral intentionality
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1): 35-49. 2008.
    This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “ phenomenology ”: a narrow sense and a broader sense. It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the pheno…Read more
  •  171
    The transcendental and the psychological
    Husserl Studies 24 (3): 193-204. 2008.
    This paper explores the emergence of the distinctions between the transcendental and the psychological and, correlatively, between phenomenology and psychology that emerge in The Idea of Phenomenology. It is argued that this first attempt to draw these distinctions reveals that the conception of transcendental phenomenology remains infected by elements of the earlier conception of descriptive psychology and that only later does Husserl move to a more adequate—but perhaps not yet fully purified—c…Read more
  •  146
    Moral Objectivity: Husserl’s Sentiments of the Understanding
    Husserl Studies 12 (2): 165-183. 1995.
    This paper explores two perspectives in Husserl's recently published writings on ethics and axiology in order to sketch anew a phenomenological account of practical reason. The paper aims a) to show that a phenomenological account of moral intentionality i) transcends the disputes between intellectualist-emotivist and intellectualist-voluntarist disputes and ii) points toward a position in which practical reason has an emotive content or, conversely, the emotions have a cognitive content, and th…Read more
  •  137
    This is done through a chronology, an introductory essay, an extensive bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on key terms and ...
  •  135
    'Cognitive impenetrability' and the complex intentionality of the emotions
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11): 109-126. 2004.
    When a young boy playing in a wooded area, I tripped over exposed roots extending from the trunk of a tree. I threw my arms out in front of me to break my fall and disturbed a nest of bees. As I lay on the ground, I was repeatedly stung by bees until I could regain my feet and run away. Frightened and in a great deal of pain - that is what I remember most vividly - I walked home. My mother took me to the doctor, who undoubtedly gave me some sort of treatment and medication, but this has been los…Read more
  •  109
    Self-identity and personal identity
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2): 235-247. 2021.
    The key to understanding self-identity is identifying the transcendental structures that make a temporally extended, continuous, and unified experiential life possible. Self-identity is rooted in the formal, temporalizing structure of intentional experience that underlies psychological continuity. Personal identity, by contrast, is rooted in the content of the particular flow of experience, in particular and primarily, in the convictions adopted passively or actively in reflection by a self-iden…Read more
  •  98
    Phenomenology: Neither auto- nor hetero- be
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 57-74. 2007.
    Dennett’s contrast between auto- and hetero-phenomenology is badly drawn, primarily because Dennett identifies phenomenologists as introspective psychologists. The contrast I draw between phenomenology and hetero-phenomenology is not in terms of the difference between a first-person, introspective perspective and a third-person perspective but rather in terms of the difference between two third-person accounts – a descriptive phenomenology and an explanatory psychology – both of which take the f…Read more
  •  84
    Frege and Husserl: Another look at the issue of influence
    Husserl Studies 2 (3): 245-265. 1985.
    This paper argues that frege did not significantly influence husserl's departure from psychologism by (1) examining husserl's early logical reflections, Especially those concerning the meaning of the term ""vorstellung"," and (2) determining which parts of husserl's "philosophy of arithmetic", Criticized for its psychologism by frege, Were psychologistic and when husserl rejected them. It concludes that the logical writings show an independent movement toward a non-Psychologistic position and th…Read more
  •  77
    This book seems to us potentially as important as any work that has appeared in the last few decades for the purpose of understanding Hussefl's thought in its relation to other recent philosophical traditions, especially certain aspects of the analytical tradition. Yet there is a distinct danger that it will not receive the attention it amply merits. One reason for this danger is the unfortunate tendency we all have of dismissing ideas by pidgeonholing them.
  •  75
    This chapter addresses the issues that motivate representationalist accounts, and it describes the different versions of representationalism as responses to these issues. It argues that the representationalist views do not adequately respond to the epistemological problems that motivate them and that they engender some ontological problems. The chapter presents an alternative ‘presentationalist’ account that preserves the straightforward sense of the mind's openness to the world. While represent…Read more
  •  70
    Phenomenological method and contemporary ethics
    Continental Philosophy Review 54 (2): 123-138. 2021.
    Following a brief summation of the phenomenological method, the paper considers three metaethical positions adopted by phenomenologists and the implications of those positions for a normative ethics. The metaethical positions combine epistemological and ontological viewpoints. They are non-intellectualism and strong value realism as represented by the axiological views of phenomenologists such as Scheler, Meinong, Reinach, Stein, Hartmann, von Hildebrand, and Steinbock; non-intellectualism and a…Read more
  •  64
    The rift which has long divided the philosophical world into opposed schools-the "Continental" school owing its origins to the phenomenology of Husserl and the "analytic" school derived from Frege-is finally closing.
  •  55
    Fred Kersten: 'Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice'. (review)
    Husserl Studies 9 (3): 219-226. 1992.
    This very ambitious and remarkably detailed book examines some of the most fundamental themes in Husserl's philosophy. As is evident from the title, the book has two parts, the first of which (pp. 1-101) discusses Husserl's methodology, esp. the phenomenological reduction, and the second of which (pp. 103-347) investigates the themes of space, time, and other. These themes are selected because they are central to our mundane and embodied experience of an objective, physical and animate wor…Read more
  •  55
    Phenomenological Epistemology (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1): 134-136. 2002.
  •  53
    Cet article maintient que l’intérêt de Husserl pour le développement d’une logique pure en tant que théorie de la science limite sa conception de l’ontologie. L’ontologie formelle est, pour Husserl, une théorie formelle des objets de connaissance, dont les catégories fondamentales sont celles de substance, propriété et relation. En outre, les ontologies régionales évoluent au sein des limites catégorielles définies par l’ontologie formelle. Mais une telle ontologie laisse de côté les activités e…Read more
  •  52
    Personal Perspectives
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 28-44. 2007.
    This paper attempts to clarify how one might understand philosophy as necessarily involving both third-person and first-person perspectives. It argues, first, that philosophy must incorporate the first-person perspective in order to provide an adequate account of consciousness and the prereflective awareness of the self and, second, in opposition to Dennett’s hetero-phenomenology that this incorporation is possible only within a transcendental perspective. The paper also attempts to meet the cha…Read more
  •  51
    Pure logical grammar: Anticipatory categoriality and articulated categoriality
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (2). 2003.
    In reworking his Logical Investigations Husserl adopts two positions that were not actually incorporated into later editions of the Investigations but do appear in other writings: a new distinction between signitive and significative intentions, and the claim that even naming and perceiving acts are categorially formed. This paper investigates Husserl's notion of noematic sense and the pure grammatical ' categories ' intimated therein in order to shed light on these new positions. The paper argu…Read more
  •  49
    Can we have objective knowledge of the world? Can we understand what is morally right or wrong? Yes, to some extent. This is the answer given by Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl. Both rejected David Hume’s skeptical account of what we can hope to understand. But they held his empirical method in high regard, inquiring into the way we perceive and emotionally experience the world, into the nature and function of human empathy and sympathy and the role of the imagination in processes of intersubjecti…Read more
  •  46
    A Critique of Gurwitsch’s “Phenomenological Phenomenalism”
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 9-21. 1980.
  •  46
    Self, Other, and Moral Obligation
    Philosophy Today 49 (Supplement): 39-47. 2005.
    This paper (1) questions the manner in which James Mensch's <I>Ethics and Selfhood: Alterity and the Phenomenology of Obligation<D> characterizes the alternatives among moral theories provided, for example, by Kant and Aristotle; (2) considers and criticizes the notion of "inherent alterity" that Mensch uses to articulate a middle ground in moral theory; and (3) offers an alternative phenomenology of obligation. The notion of "inherent alterity," standing on apparently opposed Husserlian and Lev…Read more
  •  44
    Self-Responsibility and Eudaimonia
    In Carlo Ierna, Hanne Jaccobs & Filip Mattens (eds.), PHILOSOPHY PHENOMENOLOGY SCIENCES, Springer. pp. 441--460. 2010.