John Fisher

Natural environments differ from artworks in two ways: (a) they are surroundings filled with objects, processes, and the observer, (b) they are natural, not intentionally created to be appreciated. I show that this serious problem for accounts of aesthetic appreciation of nature has led many thinkers in environmental aesthetics (e.g., Carlson and Rolston) to claim that appreciators should be actively engaged with a natural environment. But how? One suggestion has been that appreciators play the role of creative performers in the arts. I explore this analogy, distinguishing three different kinds of performance. I argue that none is a good fit as a model of nature appreciation but that the analogy sheds considerable light on environmental art, especially the site-specific artworks of Andy Goldsworthy.

Searle's Chinese Room argument is a general argument that proves that machines do not have mental states in virtue of their programming. I claim that the argument expresses powerful but mistaken intuitions about understanding and the first person point of view. A distinction is drawn between a competence sense and a performance sense of ‘understanding texts’. It is argued that the Chinese Room intuition looks for a special experience (performance) of comprehension, whereas artificial intelligence is attempting to explain the knowledge (competence) required to understand texts. Moreover, a dilemma is sketched for the argument: either Searle hasn't identified the appropriate subject of understanding or he may understand after all. Finally, I question the underlying assumption that the general definition of mental states requires a projectable‐by‐us first person point of view.

It is difficult to place jazz within a philosophy of music dominated by the concepts and practices of classical music. One key puzzle concerns the nature and role, if any, of musical works in jazz. I briefly describe the debate between those who deny that there are musical works in jazz (Kania) and those who affirm that there are such (Dodd and others). I argue that musical works are performed in jazz but that jazz performance of works is very different from performance of classical music works. The first step toward resolving the puzzle is to embrace the descriptive concept of a musical work and reject inappropriate normative concepts of a musical work. In particular, I argue against the accounts of musical works by Kania and Goehr, each of which implies a no-works thesis for jazz performance. I contrast the norms governing work performance in classical music with the practices governing performances of works in jazz, which I call realization or staging. Finally, I propose a model of jazz appreciation that incorporates a role for jazz works and that differs from the appreciation of classical music.

The last twenty years or so have seen a surge of interest in the philosophy of music. However there is comparatively little philosophical literature devoted specifically to songs, singing and vocal music in general. This new collection of essays on the philosophical aspects of song and singing includes articles on the relationship between words and music in songs, the ontology of songs and recordings, meaning in songs, the metaphysics of vocal music in opera and the movies, and the ethical challenges raised in song performance. The essays discuss a large range of examples, including rock, lieder, jazz songs, blues, doo wop, and rap. New essays by leading philosophers of art, including Peter Kivy (on "realistic song" in film), Jerrold Levinson (on jazz singing), Lee B. Brown (on the "minstrel hypothesis" in popular music), and Ted Gracyk (on linguistic pragmatics and song meaning). Papers that offer ground-breaking theories of the appreciation of rock recordings, the ethical implications of popular songs, the ontology of ephemeral artworks, the ontological status of cover versions, and of how a genre of popular music can both express and be a function of its social context papers that challenge existing accounts of much-debated topics, including operatic metaphysics and of the ontology of recorded music. Interdisciplinary essays that cut across aesthetics, philosophy of music, cultural music studies and musicology. Essays that are clearly written and engaging.

Searle's Chinese Room argument is a general argument that proves that machines do not have mental states in virtue of their programming. I claim that the argument expresses powerful but mistaken intuitions about understanding and the first person point of view. A distinction is drawn between a competence sense and a performance sense of ‘understanding texts’. It is argued that the Chinese Room intuition looks for a special experience (performance) of comprehension, whereas artificial intelligence is attempting to explain the knowledge (competence) required to understand texts. Moreover, a dilemma is sketched for the argument: either Searle hasn't identified the appropriate subject of understanding or he may understand after all. Finally, I question the underlying assumption that the general definition of mental states requires a projectable‐by‐us first person point of view.