John J. McCall

This article surveys arguments for the claim that employees have a right to strong forms of decision-making participation. Itconsiders objections to employee participation based on shareholders' property rights and it claims that those objections are flawed. In particular, it argues the employee participation rights are grounded on the same values as are property rights. The articlesuggests that the conflict between these two competing rights claims is best resolved by limiting the scope of corporate property rightsand by recognizing a strong employee right to co-determine corporate decisions.

This paper argues that ethical evaluation of leadership requires standards of assessment that are independent of the definition of "leader." It suggests that Stakeholder Theory is incapable of providing a substantive standard of assessment. It suggests an alternative model for adjudicating between stakeholders' conflicting claims of right and it applies that method to determine what responsibilities corporate management might have to employees and how management might be held accountable for discharging those responsibilities.

The United States is distinctive among advanced economies in that its employment laws and practices are governed byEmployment at Will (EAW). Most other nations have variations on Just Cause dismissal rules. I argue that the U.S. preference for EAW is unsupported by concerns about net social or economic consequences. More centrally, I argue that the basic moral commitments that underlie the U.S. system of private property and freedom of contract are commitments that lend support to Just Cause over EAW.

The economics of search is a prominent component of economic theory, and it has a richness and elegance that underpins a host of practical applications. In this book Brian and John McCall present a comprehensive overview of the economic theory of search, from the classical model of job search formulated 40 years ago to the recent developments in equilibrium models of search. The book gives decision-theoretic foundations to seemingly slippery issues in labour market theory, estimation theory and economic dynamics in general, and surveys the entire field of the economics of search, including its history, theory, and econometric applications. Theoretical models of the economics of search are covered as well as estimation methods used in search theory and topics covered include job search, turnover, unemployment, liquidity, house selling, real options and auctions. The mathematical methods used in search theory such as dynamic programming are reviewed as well as structural estimation methods and econometric methods for duration models. The authors also explore the classic sequential search model and its extensions in addition to recent advances in equilibrium search theory