John P. Sullins

This book surveys and examines the most famous philosophical arguments against building a machine with human-level intelligence. From claims and counter-claims about the ability to implement consciousness, rationality, and meaning, to arguments about cognitive architecture, the book presents a vivid history of the clash between the philosophy and AI. Tellingly, the AI Wars are mostly quiet now. Explaining this crucial fact opens new paths to understanding the current resurgence AI (especially, deep learning AI and robotics), what happens when philosophy meets science, and the role of philosophy in the culture in which it is embedded. Organising the arguments into four core topics - 'Is AI possible', 'Architectures of the Mind', 'Mental Semantics and Mental Symbols' and 'Rationality and Creativity' - this book shows the debate that played out between the philosophers on both sides of the question, and, as well, the debate between philosophers and AI scientists and engineers building AI systems. Up-to-date and forward-looking, the book is packed with fresh insights and supporting material, including: - Accessible introductions to each war, explaining the background behind the main arguments against AI - Each chapter details what happened in the AI wars, the legacy of the attacks, and what new controversies are on the horizon. - Extensive bibliography of key readings

This paper uses the theory of technoscience to shed light on the current criticisms against the emerging science of Artificial Life. We see that the science of Artificial Life is criticized for the synthetic nature of its research and its over reliance on computer simulations which is seen to be contrary to the traditional goals and methods of science. However, if we break down the traditional distinctions between science and technology using the theory of technoscience, then we can begin to see that all science has a synthetic nature and reliance on technology. Artificial Life researchers are not heretical practitioners of some pseudoscience; they are just more open about their reliance on technology to help realize their theories and modeling. Understanding that science and technology are not as disparate as was once thought is an essential step in helping us create a more humane technoscience in the future.

In this paper I discuss whether Gödel's incompleteness theorems have any implications for studies in Artificial Life (AL). Since Gödel's incompleteness theorems have been used to argue against certain mechanistic theories of the mind, it seems natural to attempt to apply the theorems to certain strong mechanistic arguments postulated by some AL theorists. We find that an argument using the incompleteness theorems can not be constructed that will block the hard AL claim, specifically in the field of robotics. However, we will see that the beginnings of an argument casting doubt on our ability to create living systems entirely resident in a computer environment might be suggested by looking at the incompleteness theorems from the point of view of Gödel's belief in mathematical realism.

In this dissertation I take the position that an understanding of psychology, specifically evolutionary psychology and cognitive science, is required to study ethics and morality. A key argument in evolutionary psychology debate is the question of whether or not altruistic behavior is real or apparent. I will trace this debate in some detail. In order to apply these findings to the study of ethics and morality, I will argue that the naturalistic fallacy can be misused, and is not as strong as students in philosophy and the natural sciences are commonly taught. Additionally I will back the computational theory in its application to psychology. This is not unproblematic so I will present a number of arguments in favor of this approach. Lastly I will discuss the use of computational models using Artificial Life agents that work to advance the multilevel selection theory and the evolution of altruistic behavior

In this paper, we are going to describe a particular scheme for utilizing current web-based technologies for use in facilitating the understanding, and utilization, of a cooperative knowledge infrastructure. We will describe the reasons we feel our KnowledgeScape mapping system would be a valuable addition to any corporation's intranet. We begin with a description of the modern workplace. We find that there are certain problems within the modern workplace that we may be able to help address. Two of these problems are the recognition of the value of emergent communities, and the current inability of corporate organizational charting techniques to account for and nurture these informal, but potentially valuable, groups. Next, we will look at some of the interesting philosophical and sociological concepts that directly apply to the issues we raise. Once we have a clear conception of the philosophical background we will attempt to apply these ideas within the design of our proposed knowledge infrastructure mapping tool. Additionally, we will provide a description of the current technologies we surveyed for use in our project and the strengths and weaknesses we found in each of them. Here we will look at how to use current technologies in new ways that will address some of our concerns and ideas. We will conclude with a look at how the KnowledgeScape mapping technique could be of use in any endeavor that seeks to enable the use of large archives or stores of knowledge. We find that the KnowledgeScape mapping scheme would be useful in projects for representing competency, intellectual capital, etc., or any other project that has to do with creating digital archives or libraries.

A encyclopedia entry on the moral impacts that happen when information technologies are used to record, communicate and organize information. including the moral challenges of information technology, specific moral and cultural challenges such as online games, virtual worlds, malware, the technology transparency paradox, ethical issues in AI and robotics, and the acceleration of change in technologies. It concludes with a look at information technology as a model for moral change, moral systems and moral agents.

Roboethics is the recent offshoot of computer ethics that pays special attention to the alterations that need to be made to computer ethics when we give the computer mobility and a means to interact directly in the human environment. The closely related field of machine morality explores how ethical systems and behaviors may be programmed into social robotics applications. As robots move from the factory floor into our homes and work lives, they stand to change key aspects of the way our lives are lived. In order to be successful, these machines must be programmed with the ability to navigate the human life world without committing ethical faux pas or moral outrage. Thus, the roboethicist is tasked not only with critiquing the attempts of robots engineers to achieve the integration of these machines into our life world, but also, and more importantly, with suggesting means of achieving better results than what is presently on offer.

In this paper Sullins argues that in certain circumstances robots can be seen as real moral agents. A distinction is made between persons and moral agents such that, it is not necessary for a robot to have personhood in order to be a moral agent. I detail three requirements for a robot to be seen as a moral agent. The first is achieved when the robot is significantly autonomous from any programmers or operators of the machine. The second is when one can analyze or explain the robot's behavior only by ascribing to it some predisposition or 'intention' to do good or harm. And finally, robot moral agency requires the robot to behave in a way that shows and understanding of responsibility to some other moral agent. Robots with all of these criteria will have moral rights as well as responsibilities regardless of their status as persons

Telerobotically operated and semiautonomous machines have become a major component in the arsenals of industrial nations around the world. By the year 2015 the United States military plans to have one-third of their combat aircraft and ground vehicles robotically controlled. Although there are many reasons for the use of robots on the battlefield, perhaps one of the most interesting assertions are that these machines, if properly designed and used, will result in a more just and ethical implementation of warfare. This paper will focus on these claims by looking at what has been discovered about the capability of humans to behave ethically on the battlefield, and then comparing those findings with the claims made by robotics researchers that their machines are able to behave more ethically on the battlefield than human soldiers. Throughout the paper we will explore the philosophical critique of this claim and also look at how the robots of today are impacting our ability to fight wars in a just manner

Artificial Life has two goals. One attempts to describe fundamental qualities of living systems through agent based computer models. And the second studies whether or not we can artificially create living things in computational mediums that can be realized either, virtually in software, or through biotechnology. The study of ALife has recently branched into two further subdivisions, one is “dry” ALife, which is the study of living systems “in silico” through the use of computer simulations, and the other is “wet” ALife that uses biological material to realize what has only been simulated on computers, effectively wet ALife uses biological material as a kind of computer. This is challenging to the field of computer ethics as it points towards a future in which computer and bioethics might have shared concerns. The emerging studies into wet ALife are likely to provide strong empirical evidence for ALife’s most challenging hypothesis: that life is a certain set of computable functions that can be duplicated in any medium. I believe this will propel ALife into the midst of the mother of all cultural battles that has been gathering around the emergence of biotechnology. Philosophers need to pay close attention to this debate and can serve a vital role in clarifying and resolving the dispute. But even if ALife is merely a computer modeling technique that sheds light on living systems, it still has a number of significant ethical implications such as its use in the modeling of moral and ethical systems, as well as in the creation of artificial moral agents.

In this essay I discuss how I built a cognitive‐robotics lab using inexpensive LEGO® MINDSTORMS™ robot kits. The lab has provided pedagogical and research opportunities for a number of philosophy courses, and I briefly describe the results of those efforts. I also describe how one might build a similar lab. Philosophers need to be more directly involved in the field of robotics. There is much work to do in tidying up the philosophical debris left by the last wave of robotics research, which the researchers have been unwilling or unable to do themselves. The major barriers to participation have been hardware costs and a lack of technical expertise among most philosophers. In recent years, though, these barriers have become less of a problem. At the end, I present some ideas about the kinds of experiments that such kits make possible and how to expand beyond the limitations of the basic LEGO® hardware.