John R. Cook

Wittgenstein has often been criticized, and even dismissed, for being a patron of ordinary language, a champion of the vernacular, a defender of the status quo. One critic has written: 'When Wittgenstein set up the actual use of language as a standard, that was equivalent to accepting a certain set up of culture and belief as a standard ... It is lucky no such philosophy was thought of until recently or we should still be under the sway of witch doctors ...' In what follows I want to show just how wide of the mark criticisms of this sort are

This thesis is an examination and partial defense of Donald Davidson's claim in "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" that there is no such thing as a language . In chapter 1, I argue that there is a common view of language in circulation in which it is regarded as an entity independent of the speaker's communicative-intentions and beliefs about what her words mean. Certain externalist theories put forward by Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge and Saul Kripke as well the conventionalist theories endorsed by David Lewis and Michael Dummett are attempts to explain how it is that the supposed gap between a speaker and this common, public language is bridged. In chapter 2, I argue that by rejecting this idea of a language we are able to shrink this supposed gap between a speaker and meaning. Following Davidson, I reject the idea that conventions play any necessary role in a theory of communication and meaning. I also argue that the debates between Davidson and these externalists revolve around their reliance on the notion of a common public language. A weaker form of externalism is suggested in which we can maintain our allegiance to the theory that external and social factors in part individuate the meanings of words and sentences, without at the same time having to give an account of how we stand related to this common public language. In chapter 3, I defend Davidson's argument against claims that he has mischaracterized both what interpretation actually consists in and the psychological status of a theory of meaning. In chapter 4, I compare Davidson's recent account of meaning with the work of Paul Grice. Despite the seeming convergence of their views, the Gricean theory fails to recognize the autonomy of meaning, to provide an extensional semantics, and to present a non-circular account of the relation between thought and language. In chapter 5, I show that Davidson is not contradicting his earlier views about language by presenting evidence that his no-language thesis is a natural consequence of the views of his earliest essays. I also consider Noam Chomsky's recent no-language thesis and compare it with Davidson's. Some experimental results from developmental psychology are presented that in part corroborate Davidson's emphasis on the role of triangulaton and communication-intentions and show where Chomsky and Davidson part ways

RÉSUMÉ : Dans son récent recueil d’articles Language, Truth and History, Donald Davidson semble pencher en faveur d’une philosophie du langage mettant l’accent sur la notion de l’intention communicative du sujet parlant; en quoi il se rapproche du point de vue de Paul Grice. Si cela est juste, la pensée de Davidson se serait dégagée de l’approche sémantique formelle qu’il soutenait dans ses Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Dans cet article, je soutiens que, bien qu’il y ait beaucoup de similitudes entre ces deux penseurs, Davidson n’a pas abandonné ses précédentes vues sur le langage.

This paper reviews some of the arguments put forward by some psychologists in which they come to the conclusion that autistic individuals suffer from mindblindness, and also looks at one particular implication these sorts of individuals pose for Donald Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation. It has been claimed that a particular manifestation of mindblindness in autistic people serves as a counter example to claims Davidson has made about the relation between belief and intention in linguistic competence.