•  27
    Tecendo uma teia: aquisição de conceitos e papel inferencial
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 57 (3): 138-162. 2012.
    Theories of concepts and concept acquisition are mutually constraining. How we envisage concept acquisition depends both on what we take concepts to be and what skills we can employ to acquire them. I argue that Ned Block’s cognitivist approach to concept acquisition is not compatible with his vision of conceptual role semantics. If concepts are defined by their conceptual roles, then the acquisition of new concepts will change the conceptual roles of concepts employed in any form of hypothesis …Read more
  •  5
    Kim Sterelny
    Journal of Cognition and Culture 14 (1-2): 153-155. 2014.
  •  7
    After the Ice: A Global History. 20,000-5000 BC
    Journal of Cognition and Culture 7 (1-2): 143-148. 2007.
  • Between Thought and Meaning: The Embodied Concept
    Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick. 2002.
    My dissertation is concerned with philosophical problems that attend to our capacity to acquire concepts. Philosophical problems with learning are not new, however, they are especially acute when applied to concept acquisition. What I hope to show is that we can offer an account of concepts which at once overcomes our concerns about first concept acquisition and is nevertheless compatible with the view that concepts are acquired through rational learning mechanisms. Towards this end I consider b…Read more
  •  85
    Cue fascination: A new vulnerability in drug addiction
    with Rebecca Traynor and Michael Clune
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4): 458-459. 2008.
    Redish et al. propose a constellation of vulnerabilities inherent in the brain's decision-making system. They allow over-attention to cues a minor role in drug addiction. We think this is inadequate. Using the established links among drug cues, dopamine, and novelty, we propose a fuller account of this key feature of addiction, which we call the phenomenon of cue fascination
  •  27
    Weaving a web: Concept acquisition and inferential role
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 57 (3). 2012.
  •  6
    No Title available: Dialogue
    Dialogue 44 (4): 809-811. 2005.
  •  74
    Sortals for Dummies
    Erkenntnis 69 (2): 145-164. 2008.
    Advocates of sortal essentialism have argued that concepts like “thing” or “object” lack the unambiguous individuative criteria necessary to play the role of genuine sortals in reference. Instead, they function as “dummy sortals” which are placeholders or incomplete designations. In disqualifying apparent placeholder sortals, however, these philosophers have posed insuperable problems for accounts of childhood conceptual development. I argue that recent evidence in psychology demonstrates that c…Read more
  •  67
    Developmental objections to evolutionary modularity
    Biology and Philosophy 22 (4): 529-546. 2007.
    Evolutionary psychologists argue that selective pressures in our ancestral environment yield a highly specialized set of modular cognitive capacities. However, recent papers in developmental psychology and neuroscience claim that evolutionary accounts of modularity are incompatible with the flexibility and plasticity of the developing brain. Instead, they propose cortical and neuronal brain structures are fixed through interactions with our developmental environment. Buller and Gray Hardcastle c…Read more
  •  40
    Why neanderthals hate poetry: A critical notice of Steven mithen's the prehistory of mind
    with Matthew Sponheimer
    Philosophical Psychology 15 (2). 2002.
    The significance of historical advances in human development has been widely debated within cognitive science. Steven Mithen's recent book, The prehistory of mind (London: Thames & Hudson, 1996), presents an archeologist's attempt to explain the details of cognitive development within the framework of modern anthropology and cognitive psychology. We argue that Mithen's attempt fails for a number of different reasons. The relationship between the archeological evidence he considers and his conclu…Read more
  •  30
    Reviews (review)
    with Bertram F. Malle, Christopher H. Ramey, and Marion Ledwig
    Philosophical Psychology 20 (4). 2007.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  53
    Hume variations (review)
    Dialogue 44 (4): 809-811. 2005.
  •  36
    Is natural kindness a natural kind?
    Philosophical Studies 90 (3): 245-264. 1998.
  •  1
    Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Psychology 22 (2): 237-241. 2009.
  •  23
    Content and contagion in yawning
    Philosophical Psychology 21 (6). 2008.
    Yawning has a well documented contagious effect: viewing or hearing a yawn—as well as talking or thinking about yawns—causes human subjects to yawn. While comparative ethological and neurological accounts suggest that yawning is a function of primitive biological structures in the brain stem, these analyses do not account for infectious yawning caused by representational and semantic states. Investigating the relationship between perceptual and cognitive avenues of yawn induction affords a uniqu…Read more
  •  76
    The multimedia mnd: An analysis of Prinz on concepts
    Philosophical Psychology 17 (3): 403-18. 2004.
    In his new book, Furnishing the mind, Jesse Prinz argues that a new form of empiricism can break the logjam that currently frustrates attempts to develop a theory of concepts. I argue that Prinz's new way with empiricism is ultimately unsuccessful. In maintaining that all cognition is reducible to perceptual constructs, Prinz is unable to provide an effective model of the nature of individual concepts or their role in thought. Three major problems are addressed in reverse order. Prinz does not s…Read more
  •  78
    Retracing our steps: Fodor’s new old way with concept acquisition (review)
    Acta Analytica 21 (40): 41-73. 2006.
    The acquisition of concepts has proven especially difficult for philosophers and psychologists to explain. In this paper, I examine Jerry Fodor’s most recent attempt to explain the acquisition of concepts relative to experiences of their referents. In reevaluating his earlier position, Fodor attempts to co-opt informational semantics into an account of concept acquisition that avoids the radical nativism of his earlier views. I argue that Fodor’s attempts ultimately fail to be persuasive. He mus…Read more