•  3
    Knowledge Judgments in “Gettier” Cases
    In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Wiley. 2016.
    Knowledge sets the standard for appropriate assertion and recent evidence suggests that it might also set the standard for appropriate belief and decision‐making. Governments spend hundreds of millions of dollars to support the creation, transfer, and mobilization of knowledge. Philosophers have created a dizzying array of Gettier case thought experiments. In doing so, many have been guilty of experimenter bias. This includes some original players who helped set the agenda for decades to come. C…Read more
  •  20
    Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (edited book)
    with Matthias Steup
    Blackwell. 2013.
    Fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments and debates, the second edition of this highly influential text retains its unique combination of accessibility and originality. Second edition of a highly influential text that has already become a standard in the field, for students and professional researchers alike, due to its impressive line-up of contributors, and its unique combination of accessibility and originality Twenty-six essays in total, covering 13 essential topics Fe…Read more
  • You gotta believe
    In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, Oxford University Press. 2013.
  •  3
    From antiquity through the twentieth century, philosophers have hypothesized that, intuitively, it is harder to know negations than to know affirmations. This paper provides direct evidence for that hypothesis. In a series of studies, I found that people naturally view negations as harder to know than affirmations. Participants read simple scenarios and made judgments about truth, probability, belief, and knowledge. Participants were more likely to attribute knowledge of an outcome when framed a…Read more
  •  32
    Knowledge and belief in Korean
    with YeounJun Park
    Philosophical Psychology 35 (5): 742-756. 2022.
  •  33
    Reliabilism says that knowledge must be produced by reliable abilities. Abilism disagrees and allows that knowledge is produced by unreliable abilities. Previous research strongly supports the conclusion that abilism better describes how knowledge is actually defined in commonsense and science. In this paper, I provide a novel argument that abilism is ethically superior to reliabilism. Whereas reliabilism unethically discriminates against agents by excluding them from knowing, abilism virtuously…Read more
  •  8
    Lying by Omission: Experimental Studies
    with Ezri Chernak, Kurt Dietrich, Ashley Raspopovic, and Sarah Turri
    Filozofia Nauki 29 (2): 189-208. 2021.
  •  51
    The value of knowledge
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as justification or under…Read more
  •  12
    Evaluating objections to a factive norm of belief
    Synthese 199 (1-2): 2245-2250. 2020.
    According to the non-factive hypothesis, espoused by contemporary epistemologists, our ordinary practice of evaluating belief is insensitive to the truth. In other words, on the ordinary view, there is no evaluative connection between what someone should believe and whether their belief would be true. Contrary to that, the factive hypothesis holds that our ordinary practice of evaluating belief is sensitive to the truth. Results from recent behavioral studies strongly support the factive hypothe…Read more
  •  18
    A Non-puzzle about Assertion and Truth
    Logos and Episteme 11 (4): 475-479. 2020.
    It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) improper yet permissible, and (b) reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.
  •  1036
    Knowledge before belief
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44. 2021.
    Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations ofbeliefs,which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations ofknowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one does not even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide ra…Read more
  •  36
    Objective falsity is essential to lying: an argument from convergent evidence
    Philosophical Studies 178 (6): 2101-2109. 2020.
    This paper synthesizes convergent lines of evidence to evaluate the hypothesis that objective falsity is essential to lying. Objective accounts of lying affirm this hypothesis; subjective accounts deny it. Evidence from history, logic, social observation, popular culture, lexicography, developmental psychology, inference, spontaneous description, and behavioral experimentation strongly supports the hypothesis. Studies show that the only apparent evidence against the hypothesis is due to task sub…Read more
  •  836
    In Gettier's Wake
    In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology: The Key Thinkers, Continuum. 2012.
    A critical review of “Gettier” cases and theoretical attempts to solve “the” "Gettier" "problem".
  •  4
    Virtue epistemology
    with John Greco
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2017.
    This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary Virtue epistemology (hereafter 'VE') research program. These include novel attempts to resolve longstanding disputes, solve perennial problems, grapple with novel challenges, and expand epistemology’s horizons. In the process, it reveals the diversity within VE. Beyond sharing the two unifying commitments mentioned above, its practitioners diverge over the nature of intellectual virtues, which questions to ask, and whic…Read more
  •  1
    Introduction to Virtue Epistemology
    with John Greco
    In John Greco & John Turri (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. 2012.
    Virtue epistemology is by now a broad and varied field. Also by now, there are various helpful overviews of the field available, some of which are included in this volume (see especially Battaly 2008 and Baehr 2008).1 This introduction will not provide another. Rather, we will begin with a brief characterization of what virtue epistemology is (Section 1), and then briefly describe some of the topics that are treated in this volume (Section 2). Some of these are topics that have occupied ep…Read more
  •  295
    Satisficing
    In J. E. Crimmins & D. C. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism, Bloomsbury Academic. 2013.
    An encyclopedic entry on 'satisficing'.
  • An overview of recent trends in epistemology.
  •  2
    Introduction to Infinitism
    In John Turri & Peter D. Klein (eds.), Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    An introduction to infinitism.
  •  235
    Ernest Sosa
    In Robert Audi (ed.), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd Edition, Cambridge University Press. 2015.
    A lexicographical entry on "Ernest Sosa".
  •  773
    Assertion
    In Robert Audi (ed.), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd Edition, Cambridge University Press. 2015.
    A lexicographical entry on 'assertion'.
  •  294
    Thomas Reid
    In Margaret Cameron, Benjamin Hill & Robert Stainton (eds.), Sourcebook in history of philosophy of language, Springer. pp. 807-809. 2016.
    A brief introduction to Thomas Reid's philosophy on language.
  •  1
    The value of knowledge
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as justification or under…Read more
  •  10
    A collection of vigorous debates on some of the most controversial topics in recent theoretical epistemology.
  •  1
    A critical review of “Gettier” cases and theoretical attempts to solve “the” "Gettier" "problem".
  •  10
    Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs--an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning, responsibility, disagreement, and trust.
  •  167
    You gotta believe
    In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic norms: new essays on action, belief and assertion, Oxford University Press. pp. 193-199. 2014.
    Proper assertion requires belief. In support of this thesis, I provide an explanatory argument from linguistic patterns surrounding assertion and show how to handle cases of "selfless" assertion.
  •  200
    Creative reasoning
    In John Turri & Peter D. Klein (eds.), Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism, Oxford University Press. pp. 210-226. 2014.
    I defend the unpopular view that inference can create justification. I call this view inferential creationism. Inferential creationism has been favored by infinitists, who think that it supports infinitism. But it doesn’t. Finitists can and should accept creationism.
  •  252
    Linguistic intuitions in context: a defense of nonskeptical pure invariantism.
    In Anthony Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions, Oxford University Press. pp. 165-184. 2014.
    Epistemic invariantism is the view that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions don’t vary across contexts. Epistemic purism is the view that purely practical factors can’t directly affect the strength of your epistemic position. The combination of purism and invariantism, pure invariantism, is the received view in contemporary epistemology. It has lately been criticized by contextualists, who deny invariantism, and impurists, who deny purism. A central charge against pure invariantism is …Read more