•  3
    Evaluating objections to a factive norm of belief
    Synthese 199 (1-2): 2245-2250. 2020.
    According to the non-factive hypothesis, espoused by contemporary epistemologists, our ordinary practice of evaluating belief is insensitive to the truth. In other words, on the ordinary view, there is no evaluative connection between what someone should believe and whether their belief would be true. Contrary to that, the factive hypothesis holds that our ordinary practice of evaluating belief is sensitive to the truth. Results from recent behavioral studies strongly support the factive hypothe…Read more
  •  13
    A Non-puzzle about Assertion and Truth
    Logos and Episteme 11 (4): 475-479. 2020.
    It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be improper yet permissible, and reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.
  •  434
    Knowledge before Belief
    with Jonathan Phillips, Wesley Buckwalter, Fiery Cushman, Ori Friedman, Alia Martin, Laurie Santos, and Joshua Knobe
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1-37. forthcoming.
    Research on the capacity to understand others’ minds has tended to focus on representations of beliefs, which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations of knowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one doesn't even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide …Read more
  •  29
    Objective falsity is essential to lying: an argument from convergent evidence
    Philosophical Studies 178 (6): 2101-2109. 2021.
    This paper synthesizes convergent lines of evidence to evaluate the hypothesis that objective falsity is essential to lying. Objective accounts of lying affirm this hypothesis; subjective accounts deny it. Evidence from history, logic, social observation, popular culture, lexicography, developmental psychology, inference, spontaneous description, and behavioral experimentation strongly supports the hypothesis. Studies show that the only apparent evidence against the hypothesis is due to task sub…Read more
  •  309
    In Gettier's Wake
    In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology: the key thinkers, Continuum. 2012.
    A critical review of “Gettier” cases and theoretical attempts to solve “the” "Gettier" "problem".
  •  3
    Virtue epistemology
    with John Greco
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2017.
    This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary Virtue epistemology (hereafter 'VE') research program. These include novel attempts to resolve longstanding disputes, solve perennial problems, grapple with novel challenges, and expand epistemology’s horizons. In the process, it reveals the diversity within VE. Beyond sharing the two unifying commitments mentioned above, its practitioners diverge over the nature of intellectual virtues, which questions to ask, and whic…Read more
  •  1
    Introduction to Virtue Epistemology
    with John Greco
    In John Greco & John Turri (eds.), Virtue epistemology: contemporary readings, Mit Press. 2012.
    Virtue epistemology is by now a broad and varied field. Also by now, there are various helpful overviews of the field available, some of which are included in this volume (see especially Battaly 2008 and Baehr 2008).1 This introduction will not provide another. Rather, we will begin with a brief characterization of what virtue epistemology is (Section 1), and then briefly describe some of the topics that are treated in this volume (Section 2). Some of these are topics that have occupied ep…Read more
  •  79
    In Encyclopedia of utilitarianism, Bloomsbury Academic. 2013.
    An encyclopedic entry on 'satisficing'.
  • An overview of recent trends in epistemology.
  •  1
    Introduction to Infinitism
    In John Turri & Peter Klein (eds.), Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    An introduction to infinitism.
  •  55
    Ernest Sosa
    In Robert N. Audi (ed.), Cambridge dictionary of philosophy (3rd ed.), Cambridge University Press. 2014.
    A lexicographical entry on "Ernest Sosa".
  •  140
    In Robert N. Audi (ed.), Cambridge dictionary of philosophy (3rd ed.), Cambridge University Press. 2014.
    A lexicographical entry on 'assertion'.
  •  44
    Thomas Reid
    In Margaret Cameron, Benjamin Hill & Robert Stainton (eds.), Sourcebook in history of philosophy of language, Springer. pp. 807-809. 2016.
    A brief introduction to Thomas Reid's philosophy on language.
  • The value of knowledge
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as justification or under…Read more
  •  7
    A collection of vigorous debates on some of the most controversial topics in recent theoretical epistemology.
  •  1
    A critical review of “Gettier” cases and theoretical attempts to solve “the” "Gettier" "problem".
  • Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism (edited book)
    with Peter D. Klein
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs--an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning, responsibility, disagreement, and trust.
  •  41
    You gotta believe
    In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic norms: new essays on action, belief and assertion, Oxford University Press. pp. 193-199. 2014.
    Proper assertion requires belief. In support of this thesis, I provide an explanatory argument from linguistic patterns surrounding assertion and show how to handle cases of "selfless" assertion.
  •  64
    Creative reasoning
    In John Turri & Peter Klein (eds.), Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism, Oxford University Press. pp. 210-226. 2014.
    I defend the unpopular view that inference can create justification. I call this view inferential creationism. Inferential creationism has been favored by infinitists, who think that it supports infinitism. But it doesn’t. Finitists can and should accept creationism.
  •  106
    Linguistic intuitions in context: a defense of nonskeptical pure invariantism.
    In Anthony Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions, Oxford University Press. pp. 165-184. 2014.
    Epistemic invariantism is the view that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions don’t vary across contexts. Epistemic purism is the view that purely practical factors can’t directly affect the strength of your epistemic position. The combination of purism and invariantism, pure invariantism, is the received view in contemporary epistemology. It has lately been criticized by contextualists, who deny invariantism, and impurists, who deny purism. A central charge against pure invariantism is …Read more
  •  172
    Appeals to ordinary thought and talk are frequent in philosophy, perhaps nowhere more than in contemporary epistemology. When an epistemological theory implies serious error in “commonsense” or “folk” epistemology, it is counted as a cost of the view. Similarly, when an epistemological theory respects or vindicates deep patterns in commonsense epistemology, it is viewed as a benefit of the view. Philosophers typically rely on introspection and anecdotal social observation to support their charac…Read more
  •  113
    Knowledge judgments in “Gettier” cases
    In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A companion to experimental philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 337-348. 2016.
    “Gettier cases” have played a major role in Anglo-American analytic epistemology over the past fifty years. Philosophers have grouped a bewildering array of examples under the heading “Gettier case.” Philosophers claim that these cases are obvious counterexamples to the “traditional” analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, and they treat correctly classifying the cases as a criterion for judging proposed theories of knowledge. Cognitive scientists recently began testing whether philosoph…Read more
  •  187
    I introduce an account of when a rule normatively sustains a practice. My basic proposal is that a rule normatively sustains a practice when the value achieved by following the rule explains why agents continue following that rule, thus establishing and sustaining a pattern of activity. I apply this model to practices of belief management and identifies a substantive normative connection between knowledge and belief. More specifically, I proposes one special way that knowledge might set the norm…Read more
  •  141
    Lying, uptake, assertion, and intent
    with Angelo Turri
    International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2): 314-333. 2016.
    A standard view in social science and philosophy is that a lie is a dishonest assertion: to lie is to assert something that you think is false in order to deceive your audience. We report four behavioral experiments designed to evaluate some aspects of this view. Participants read short scenarios and judged several features of interest, including whether an agent lied. We found evidence that ordinary lie attributions can be influenced by aspects of audience uptake, are based on judging that the …Read more
  •  227
    Exceptionalist naturalism: human agency and the causal order
    Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71 (2): 396-410. 2018.
    This paper addresses a fundamental question in folk metaphysics: how do we ordinarily view human agency? According to the transcendence account, we view human agency as standing outside of the causal order and imbued with exceptional powers. According to a naturalistic account, we view human agency as subject to the same physical laws as other objects and completely open to scientific investigation. According to exceptionalist naturalism, the truth lies somewhere in between: we view human agency…Read more
  •  400
    Personal identity and persisting as many
    with Sara Weaver
    In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, volume 2, Oxford University Press. pp. 213-242. 2018.
    Many philosophers hypothesize that our concept of personal identity is partly constituted by the one-person-one-place rule, which states that a person can only be in one place at a time. This hypothesis has been assumed by the most influential contemporary work on personal identity. In this paper, we report a series of studies testing whether the hypothesis is true. In these studies, people consistently judged that the same person existed in two different places at the same time. This result und…Read more
  •  159
    The non-factive turn in epistemology: some hypotheses
    In Veli Mitova (ed.), The factive turn in epistemology, Cambridge University Press. pp. 219-228. 2018.
    I evaluate non-factive or truth-insensitive accounts of the ordinary concepts used to evaluate beliefs, evidence, assertions, and decisions. Recent findings show that these accounts are mistaken. I propose three hypotheses regarding how philosophers defending these accounts got things so wrong. I also consider one potential consequence for the discipline.
  •  192
    Virtue epistemology and abilism on knowledge
    In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology, Routledge. pp. 209-316. 2019.
    Virtue epistemologists define knowledge as true belief produced by intellectual virtue. In this paper, I review how this definition fails in three important ways. First, it fails as an account of the ordinary knowledge concept, because neither belief nor reliability is essential to knowledge ordinarily understood. Second, it fails as an account of the knowledge relation itself, insofar as that relation is operationalized in the scientific study of cognition. Third, it serves no prescriptive purp…Read more
  •  146
    Primate social cognition and the core human knowledge concept
    In Masaharu Mizumoto, Stephen Stich & Eric McCready (eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world: linguistic and cultural diversity and epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 279-290. 2018.
    I review recent work from armchair and cross-cultural epistemology on whether humans possess a knowledge concept as part of a universal “folk epistemology.” The work from armchair epistemology fails because it mischaracterizes ordinary knowledge judgments. The work from cross-cultural epistemology provides some defeasible evidence for a universal folk epistemology. I argue that recent findings from comparative psychology establish that humans possess a species-typical knowledge concept. More spe…Read more