My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept another alternative Structural realism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: no
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism The question is too unclear to answer
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept an intermediate view
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept an intermediate view
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: physicalism Non-reductive physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept another alternative Ethics as a social technology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: further-fact view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept: Fregean
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept another alternative
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: B-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: deflationary
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: inconceivable Despite leaning toward inconceivable, I'd also like to stress that I don't accept conceivability as a guide to metaphysical possibility.