•  8
    Inferential Roles, Quine, and Mad Holism
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 283-301. 1993.
    Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an …Read more
  •  67
    Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted "Inner Speech" Picture of T…Read more
  •  39
    Referential attribution
    Philosophical Studies 96 (1): 73-86. 1999.
  •  8
    Holism: A Consumer Update
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 283-301. 1993.
  •  63
    When Fodor Met Frege
    Erkenntnis 80 (2): 467-476. 2015.
    In the third chapter of LOT 2—"LOT Meets Frege's Problem "—Jerry Fodor argues that LOT provides a solution to "Frege's Problem," as well as to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle . I argue that most of what Fodor says in his discussion of Frege's problem is mistaken.
  •  58
    First Person Authority, Externalism, and Wh-Knowledge
    Dialectica 52 (1): 41-44. 1998.
    SummaryThe apparent conflict between first person authority and externalism arises only from needlessly thinking of first person authority in terms of “knowing what.”
  •  14
    Replies to Davis, Everett, Jacquette, Nottelmann, and Smith
    Philosophia 45 (1): 107-124. 2017.
    Replies to comments by Wayne Davis, Anthony Everett, Dale Jacquette, Nikolaj Nottelmann, and Tiddy Smith, on my book Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief.
  •  74
    Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an …Read more
  •  1
    Pragmatics and the Semantics of Belief
    Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 1983.
    It is shown how the discussion of the semantics of sentences attributing belief, central to the philosophy of language since Frege, may benefit from consideration of pragmatic features of the context of utterance. ;The dissertation begins with a historical introduction to the problem of substitutivity in belief contexts. Traditional solutions advanced by Frege, Russell, and Carnap are reviewed, along with traditional objections to such solutions. It is then suggested that the traditional Quinian…Read more
  •  7
    First Person Authority, Externalism, and Wh‐Knowledge
    Dialectica 52 (1): 41-44. 1998.
    SummaryThe apparent conflict between first person authority and externalism arises only from needlessly thinking of first person authority in terms of “knowing what.”
  •  20
    Themes from Kaplan
    International Studies in Philosophy 23 (3): 92-94. 1991.
  •  6
    Inferential Roles, Quine, and Mad Holism
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 283-301. 1993.
    Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an …Read more
  •  26
    In Direct Belief I argue for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, I use Grice’s theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and go on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted “Inner Speech” Picture of Tho…Read more
  •  93
    Holism: A Consumer Update (edited book)
    Rodopi. 1993.
    Contents: Preface. Johannes BRANDL: Semantic Holism Is Here To Stay. Michael DEVITT: A Critique of the Case for Semantic Holism. Georges REY: The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and LePore. Joseph LEVINE: Intentional Chemistry. Louise ANTHONY: Conceptual Connection and the Observation/Theory Distinction. Gilbert HARMAN: Meaning Holism Defended. Kirk A. LUDWIG: Is Content Holism Incoherent? Anne BEZUIDENHOUT: The Impossibility of Punctate Mental Representations. Takashi YA…Read more