•  636
    Introduction As its title indicates, this book is intended to provide an introduction to the main topics currently discussed under the rather unclear ...
  •  337
    Ethics Without Principles
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining that moral reas…Read more
  •  325
    Moral Reasons
    Blackwell. 1993.
    This book attempts to place a realist view of ethics (the claim that there are facts of the matter in ethics as elsewhere) within a broader context. It starts with a discussion of why we should mind about the difference between right and wrong, asks what account we should give of our ability to learn from our moral experience, and looks in some detail at the different sorts of ways in which moral reasons can combine to show us what we should do in the circumstances. The second half of the book u…Read more
  •  259
    I start by examining Robert Audi's positive suggestions about moral perception, and then attempt to point out some challengeable assumptions that he seems to make, and to consider how things might look if those assumptions are abandoned
  •  256
    Should we pass the buck?
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47 159-173. 2000.
    My topic is the relation between the right and the good. I introduce it by relating some aspects of the debate between various British intuitionists in the first half of the present century. In Principia Ethica G. E. Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest good. He wrote ‘This use of “right”, as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it be also good as an end, is indeed the use to which I shall confine the word’ . By the time he wrote his Ethics he seems to h…Read more
  •  237
    Response to Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the passions (review)
    Philosophical Studies 157 (3): 455-462. 2012.
    Response to Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the passions Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9656-3 Authors Jonathan Dancy, The University of Reading, Reading, UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
  •  237
    Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 1-18. 1995.
    To the extent, then, that we set our face against admitting the truth of Humeanism in the theory of motivation, to that extent we are probably going to feel that there is no such thing as the theory of motivation, so conceived, at all. And that will be the position that this paper is trying to defend, though not only for this reason. It might seem miraculous that so much can be extracted from the little distinction with which we started, between the reasons why an action was right and the agent'…Read more
  •  205
    In Defense of Thick Concepts
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1): 263-279. 1995.
  •  169
    Practical Reality
    Oxford University Press. 2000.
    Practical Reality is a lucid original study of the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. Jonathan Dancy maintains that current philosophical orthodoxy bowdlerizes this relation, making it impossible to understand how anyone can act for a good reason. By giving a fresh account of values and reasons, he finds a place for normativity in philosophy of mind and action, and strengthens the connection between these areas and ethics
  •  164
    Normativity (edited book)
    Blackwell. 2000.
    This volume is built on the papers given at the 1998" Ratio" conference on normativity.
  •  163
    Acting in ignorance
    Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3): 345-357. 2011.
    This paper considers and rejects the arguments that have been given in favour of the view that one can only act for the reason that p if one knows that p . The paper contrasts it with the view I hold, which is that one can act for the reason that p even if it is not the case that p
  •  159
    Moral Particularism
    In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Center For the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. 2009.
  •  158
    In this paper I consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp's distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don't here consider what other particularists might want to say; I certainly don't think t…Read more
  •  150
    Intuition and Emotion
    Ethics 124 (4): 787-812. 2014.
    I start with a brief look at what the classic British intuitionists (Ewing, Broad, Ross) had to say about the relation between judgment and emotion. I then look at some more recent work in the intuitionist tradition and try to develop a conception of moral emotion as a form of practical seeming, suggesting that some moral intuitions are exactly that sort of emotion. My general theme is that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake and that intuitionism can happily accommo…Read more
  •  149
    On moral properties
    Mind 90 (359): 367-385. 1981.
  •  148
    Particularism in question: An interview with Jonathan Dancy
    with Andreas Lind and Johan Brannmark
    Jonathan Dancy works within almost all fields of philosophy but is best known as the leading proponent of moral particularism. Particularism challenges “traditional” moral theories, such as Contractualism, Kantianism and Utilitarianism, in that it denies that moral thought and judgement relies upon, or is made possible by, a set of more or less well-defined, hierarchical principles. During the summer of 2006, the Philosophy Departments of Lund University (Sweden) and the University of Reading (E…Read more
  •  146
    Can a Particularist Learn the Difference Between Right and Wrong?
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1 59-72. 1999.
    This paper is an attempt to answer the charge that extreme moral particularism is unable to explain the possibility of moral concepts and our ability to acquire them. This charge is based on the claim that we acquire moral concepts from experience of instances, and that the sorts of similarities that there must be between the instances are ones that only a generalist can countenance. I argue that this inference is unsound
  •  142
    Practical Reality is about the relation between reasons for acting in the sense of good reasons, reasons why we should act or reasons in favour of acting, and reasons for acting in the sense of the reasons why someone did what he did—his reasons for acting as he did. This distinction I take to be mere commonsense. It is sometimes expressed by talking about motivating or explanatory reasons as opposed to normative or justifying reasons. Though I do use the motivating/normative distinction, I am w…Read more
  •  132
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    ABSTRACTThis paper responds to Christopher Hookway’s article, “Reasons for Belief, Reasoning, Virtue.”
  •  119
    Berkeley's active self
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1): 5-20. 2005.
    The Author considers the strengths and weaknesses of Berkeley’s account of what he calls indifferently the soul, mind, spirit or self. Such an account deserves far more credit than he has standardly been awarded for a significantly modern position, most of which has mistakenly been credited to Schopenhauer. The Aauthor relates Berkeley’s views to those recently expressed by Bill Brewer and attempts to isolate the crucial difference between Berkeley and Schopenhauer.
  •  115
    On how to be a moral rationalist
    Philosophical Books 47 (2): 103-110. 2006.
  •  113
    In my Practical Reality I argued that the reasons for which we act are not to be conceived of as psychological states of ourselves, but as real states of the world. The main reason for saying this was that only thus can we make sense of the idea that it is possible to act for a good reason. The good reasons we have for doing this action rather than that one consist mainly of features of the situations in which we find ourselves; they do not consist in our believing certain things about those sit…Read more
  •  107
  •  105
    Reasons and rationality
    In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 93--112. 2009.
  •  105
    The Logical Conscience
    Analysis 37 (2). 1977.