Jonathan Edwards

John Campbell proposed a so-called simple view of colours according to which colours are categorical properties of the surfaces of objects just as they normally appear to be. I raised an invertion problem for Campbell's view according to which the senses of colour terms fail to match their references, thus rendering those terms meaningless—or so I claimed. Gabriele de Anna defended Campbell's view against my example by contesting two points in particular. Firstly, de Anna claimed that there is no special problem here for the simple view of colours, a similar invertion story could apply to primary qualities terms for shapes. Secondly, de Anna purported to give an account of the senses and references of colour terms in my invertion story which renders the senses and references of those terms mutually consistent. In this paper I contested both of de Anna's claims. Regarding the first, I argue that his imagined invertion of apparent shapes is not epistemically stable, in contrast to the invertion of apparent shapes is not epistemically stable, in contrast to the invertion of apparent colours. Hence the victims of apparently inverted shapes would be able to discover the mismatch of senses and refences of their shape terms, in contrast to the victims of apparent invertions of colours. Regarding the second, I argue that de Anna's account of the victim's colour terms itself uses and not merely mentions so-called colours terms. Hence de Anna' account of them is itself meaningless due to a mismatch of sense and reference. So I conclude that my objection to Campbell's simple view of colours stands

The idea that individual nerve cells might have conscious experiences has been around ever since cells were identified in the seventeenth century, but in the era of modern neuroscience the case for individual human neuronal experience has received little attention. A series of arguments will be presented suggesting that all the human conscious experiences that we talk about are events in individual neurons, not global to the brain or organism. We conclude that cellular consciousness is the only plausible way to explain ‘our’ experiences within current physics and biology, however implausible it might at first seem. This implies that our experiences are multiple in space as well as time, consistent with the neuroscience watchword that there is ‘no single place where everything comes together in the brain’. The central argument is that events of experience must involve rich integration of information and individual neurons are the only places in brains where integration of information occurs. Any more global ‘binding’ is neither required nor physically possible. The detailed nature of events of integration of signals in a neuron’s dendrites remains uncertain but recent developments provide some candidates.