•  37
    The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging: Reply to Grundmann
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (8): 36-42. 2021.
    In “The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging” (2021), Thomas Grundmann examines nudging as applied to doxastic attitudes. Grundmann argues that given the right presuppositions about knowledge, justified beliefs, and the relevant belief-forming processes, doxastic nudging can result in justified beliefs and even knowledge in the nudgee. In this short response we will raise some critical concerns for Grundmann’s project as well as open up a path for epistemic nudges (nudges that result in justified be…Read more
  •  63
    The Virtue of Epistemic Autonomy
    In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy, Routledge. pp. 173-194. 2021.
    In this chapter I develop and motivate and account of epistemic autonomy as an intellectual character virtue. In Section one, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue and character intellectual virtues in particular. In Section two, I clear away some misconceptions about epistemic autonomy to better focus on our target. In Section three, I examine and evaluate several extant accounts of the virtue of epistemic autonomy, noting problems with each. In Section four, I provide my positive acc…Read more
  •  36
    Introduction: Puzzles Concerning Epistemic Autonomy
    In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy, Routledge. pp. 1-17. 2021.
    In this introduction we explore a number of puzzles that arise concerning epistemic autonomy, and introduce the sections and chapters of the book. There are four broad types of puzzles to be explored, corresponding to the four sections of the book. The first set of puzzles concerns the nature of epistemic autonomy. Here, questions arise such as what is epistemic autonomy? Is epistemic autonomy valuable? What are we epistemically autonomous about? The second set of puzzles concern epistemic pater…Read more
  •  106
    Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1-18. forthcoming.
    In this paper I explore an epistemic asymmetry that sometimes occurs regarding the moral status of alternative actions. I argue that this asymmetry is significant and has ramifications for what it is morally permissible to do. I then show how this asymmetry often obtains regarding three moral issues: vegetarianism, abortion, and charitable giving. In doing so, I rely on the epistemic significance of disagreement and the existence of moral controversy about these issues.
  •  196
    Life is a group project. It takes a village. The same is true of our intellectual lives. Since we are finite cognitive creatures with limited time and resources, any healthy intellectual life requires that we rely quite heavily on others. For nearly any question you want to investigate, there is someone who is in a better epistemic position than you are to determine the answer. For most people, their expertise does not extend far beyond their own personal lives, and even here we can sometimes fi…Read more
  •  65
    Debating the Significance of Disagreement: A Review of John Pittard's Diagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment (review)
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (7): 36-44. 2020.
    Richard Feldman’s “Reasonable Religious Disagreements” launched debates about the epistemic significance of disagreement that have been a dominant point of discussion in epistemology as of late. While most of these debates have been concerned with disagreement more generally, Feldman’s original focus was religious disagreement, and John Pittard returns the focus to religious disagreement in Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. Pittard’s book delves deeply into debates about the sig…Read more
  •  19
    Epistemic Autonomy (edited book)
    Routledge. 2021.
    This is the first book dedicated to the topic of epistemic autonomy. It features original essays from leading scholars that promise to significantly shape future debates in this emerging area of epistemology. While the nature of and value of autonomy has long been discussed in ethics and social and political philosophy, it remains an underexplored area of epistemology. The essays in this collection take up several interesting questions and approaches related to epistemic autonomy. Topics include…Read more
  •  8
    Moral Experts, Deference & Disagreement
    In Jamie Carlin Watson & Laura K. Guidry-Grimes (eds.), Moral Expertise: New Essays From Theoretical and Clinical Bioethics, Springer Verlag. 2018.
    We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue.The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more:What would it ta…Read more
  •  241
    Members of oppressed groups are often silenced. One form of silencing is what Kristie Dotson calls “testimonial smothering”. Testimonial smothering occurs when a speaker limits her testimony in virtue of the reasonable risk of it being misunderstood or misapplied by the audience. Testimonial smothering is thus a form of epistemic paternalism since the speaker is interfering with the audience’s inquiry for their benefit without first consulting them. In this paper, we explore the connections betw…Read more
  •  64
    Robust Justification
    In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles, Routledge. forthcoming.
    According to evidentialism, a subject is justified in believing a proposition at a time, just in case their evidence on balance supports that proposition at that time. Evidentialist justification is thus a property of fit – fitting the subject’s evidence. However, evidentialism does not evaluate the subject’s evidence beyond this relation of fit. For instance, evidentialism ignores whether the subject was responsible or negligent in their inquiry. A number of objections have been raised to evide…Read more
  •  159
    The Common Consent Argument
    In Colin Ruloff (ed.), Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology, Bloomsbury. forthcoming.
    In this paper, I will explain and motivate the common consent argument for theism. According to the common consent argument it is rational for you to believe that God exists because you know so many other people believe that God exists. Having motivated the argument, I will explain and motivate several pressing objections to the argument and evaluate their probative force. The paper will serve as both an accessible introduction to this argument as well as a resource for continued research on t…Read more
  •  117
    Exploring Epistemic Vices: A Review of Cassam's Vices of the Mind (review)
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (8): 48-55. 2019.
    In Vices of the Mind, Cassam provides an accessible, engaging, and timely introduction to the nature of epistemic vices and what we can do about them. Cassam provides an account of epistemic vices and explores three broad types of epistemic vices: character traits, attitudes, and ways of thinking. Regarding each, Cassam draws insights about the nature of vices through examining paradigm instances of each type of vice and exploring their significance through real world historical examples. With h…Read more
  •  144
    What's Wrong with Moral Deference?
    Florida Philosophical Review 17 (1): 1-6. 2019.
  •  224
    The Equal Weight View is a view about the epistemic significance of disagreement that is thought to have significant skeptical consequences. In this paper I do two things: (i) apply the Equal Weight View to cases of religious disagreement, and (ii) evaluate some consequences of that application for the rationality of religious beliefs. With regard to (i), I argue that the Equal Weight View implies that awareness of the current state of disagreement over religious propositions, such as God exis…Read more
  •  63
    Science Communication and Epistemic Injustice
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (1): 1-9. 2019.
    Epistemic injustice occurs when someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower.[1] More and more attention is being paid to the epistemic injustices that exist in our scientific practices. In a recent paper, Fabien Medvecky argues that science communication is fundamentally epistemically unjust. In what follows we briefly explain his argument before raising several challenges to it.
  •  211
    Religious Disagreement and Divine Hiddenness
    Philosophia Christi 20 (1): 215-225. 2018.
    In this paper, I develop and respond to a novel objection to Conciliatory Views of disagreement. Having first explained Conciliationism and the problem of divine hiddenness, I develop an objection that Conciliationism exacerbates the problem of divine hiddenness. According to this objection, Conciliationism increases God’s hiddenness in both its scope and severity, and is thus incompatible with God’s existence (or at least make God’s existence quite improbable). I respond to this objection by…Read more
  •  36
  •  31
    Knowledge and Entailment (review)
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (10): 55-58. 2018.
  •  62
    In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
  •  104
    Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution
    Topoi 1-13. forthcoming.
    The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argumentation theory in a way that will advance the relevant debates. While these literatures can intersect in many ways, I will explore how some of views pertaining to deep disagreements in argumentation theory can act as an objection to a prominent view of the epistemology of disagreement—the Equal Weight View. To do so, I will explain the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement and show how it entails …Read more
  •  1
    Review: The Norm of Belief (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263). 2016.
  • Review: Hard Luck (review)
    Metapsychology 18 (30). 2014.
  • Review: Knowledge (review)
    Metascience 22 (2): 471-474. 2013.
  •  1
    Review: The Nature of Normativity (review)
    Metapsychology 16 (48). 2012.
  •  59
    The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
    Palgrave Macmillan. 2015.
    Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.
  •  79
    Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology—that the more plausible one of these views is, the less plausible the other is. In this paper I explain Dougherty’s argument and develop an account of defeaters which removes the alleged tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology.