•  732
    Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence made by Thomas Kelly.
  •  486
    How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View?
    In Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, Routledge. pp. 131-149. 2013.
    Much of the literature on the epistemology of disagreement focuses on the rational responses to disagreement, and to disagreement with an epistemic peer in particular. The Equal Weight View claims that in cases of peer disagreement each dissenting peer opinion is to be given equal weight and, in a case of two opposing equally-weighted opinions, each party should adopt the attitude which ‘splits the difference’. The Equal Weight View has been taken by both its critics and its proponents to have …Read more
  •  442
    Bergmann’s dilemma: exit strategies for internalists
    Philosophical Studies 152 (1): 55-80. 2011.
    Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of ‘‘weak awareness internalism’’ that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the ‘‘Subject’s Perspective Objection’’ horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of ‘‘strong awareness internalism’’ that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s ‘‘vicious regress’’…Read more
  •  425
    Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday
    In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, Oxford University Press. pp. 315-330. 2014.
    While puzzles concerning the epistemic significance of disagreement are typically motivated by looking at the widespread and persistent disagreements we are aware of, almost all of the literature on the epistemic significance of disagreement has focused on cases idealized peer disagreement. This fact might itself be puzzling since it doesn’t seem that we ever encounter disagreements that meet the relevant idealized conditions. In this paper I hope to somewhat rectify this matter. I begin by c…Read more
  •  386
    Skeptical Theism and Phenomenal Conservatism
    In Trent Dougherty Justin McBrayer (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays, . pp. 3-20. 2014.
    Recently there has been a good deal of interest in the relationship between common sense epistemology and Skeptical Theism. Much of the debate has focused on Phenomenal Conservatism and any tension that there might be between it and Skeptical Theism. In this paper I further defend the claim that there is no tension between Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism. I show the compatibility of these two views by coupling them with an account of defeat – one that is friendly to both Phenome…Read more
  •  375
    Moral Experts, Deference & Disagreement
    In Nathan Nobis, Scott McElreath & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), Moral Expertise, Springer Verlag. 2018.
    We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue. The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more: • What would…Read more
  •  287
    Epistemic Relativism
    In Andrew Cullison (ed.), Continuum Companion to Epistemology, Continuum. pp. 161-179. 2012.
    In this paper I examine the case for epistemic relativism focusing on an argument for epistemic relativism formulated (though not endorsed) by Paul Boghossian. Before examining Boghossian’s argument, however, I first examine some preliminary considerations for and against epistemic relativism.
  •  258
    The Case for Rational Uniqueness
    Logic and Episteme 2 (3): 359-373. 2011.
    The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivati…Read more
  •  248
    Disagreement and Epistemic Peers
    Oxford Handbooks Online. 2015.
    An introduction to the debate of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. This article examines the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. It pursues the following questions: (1) How does discovering that an epistemic equal disagrees with you affect your epistemic justification for holding that belief? (e.g., does the evidence of it give you a defeater for you belief?) and (2) Can you rationally maintain your belief in the face of such disagreement? This article explains and motiva…Read more
  •  242
    Members of oppressed groups are often silenced. One form of silencing is what Kristie Dotson calls “testimonial smothering”. Testimonial smothering occurs when a speaker limits her testimony in virtue of the reasonable risk of it being misunderstood or misapplied by the audience. Testimonial smothering is thus a form of epistemic paternalism since the speaker is interfering with the audience’s inquiry for their benefit without first consulting them. In this paper, we explore the connections betw…Read more
  •  231
    Epistemic Norms and Self Defeat: A Reply to Littlejohn
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (2): 26-32. 2015.
  •  228
    Taking Issue: A Review of Bryan Frances' Disagreement (review)
    with Katelyn Hallman
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (1): 7-9. 2016.
  •  224
    The Equal Weight View is a view about the epistemic significance of disagreement that is thought to have significant skeptical consequences. In this paper I do two things: (i) apply the Equal Weight View to cases of religious disagreement, and (ii) evaluate some consequences of that application for the rationality of religious beliefs. With regard to (i), I argue that the Equal Weight View implies that awareness of the current state of disagreement over religious propositions, such as God exis…Read more
  •  211
    Religious Disagreement and Divine Hiddenness
    Philosophia Christi 20 (1): 215-225. 2018.
    In this paper, I develop and respond to a novel objection to Conciliatory Views of disagreement. Having first explained Conciliationism and the problem of divine hiddenness, I develop an objection that Conciliationism exacerbates the problem of divine hiddenness. According to this objection, Conciliationism increases God’s hiddenness in both its scope and severity, and is thus incompatible with God’s existence (or at least make God’s existence quite improbable). I respond to this objection by…Read more
  •  196
    Life is a group project. It takes a village. The same is true of our intellectual lives. Since we are finite cognitive creatures with limited time and resources, any healthy intellectual life requires that we rely quite heavily on others. For nearly any question you want to investigate, there is someone who is in a better epistemic position than you are to determine the answer. For most people, their expertise does not extend far beyond their own personal lives, and even here we can sometimes fi…Read more
  •  188
    Conscientiousness and Other Problems: A Reply to Zagzebski
    with Jensen Alex, Valerie Joly Chock, and Kyle Mallard
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (1): 10-13. 2018.
  •  159
    The Common Consent Argument
    In Colin Ruloff (ed.), Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology, Bloomsbury. forthcoming.
    In this paper, I will explain and motivate the common consent argument for theism. According to the common consent argument it is rational for you to believe that God exists because you know so many other people believe that God exists. Having motivated the argument, I will explain and motivate several pressing objections to the argument and evaluate their probative force. The paper will serve as both an accessible introduction to this argument as well as a resource for continued research on t…Read more
  •  144
    What's Wrong with Moral Deference?
    Florida Philosophical Review 17 (1): 1-6. 2019.
  •  143
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018.
    This article examines the central epistemological issues tied to the recognition of disagreement.
  •  135
    A Review of Linda Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority (review)
    with Valerie Joly Chock, Jensen Alex, and Kyle Mallard
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (10): 56-59. 2017.
  •  126
    Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating?
    Social Epistemology 29 (2): 145-159. 2015.
    Conciliatory views of disagreement are an intuitive class of views on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Such views claim that making conciliation is often required upon discovering that another disagrees with you. One of the chief objections to these views of the epistemic significance of disagreement is that they are self-defeating. Since, there are disagreements about the epistemic significance of disagreement, such views can be turned on themselves, and this has been thought to be p…Read more
  •  119
    Exploring Epistemic Vices: A Review of Cassam's Vices of the Mind (review)
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (8): 48-55. 2019.
    In Vices of the Mind, Cassam provides an accessible, engaging, and timely introduction to the nature of epistemic vices and what we can do about them. Cassam provides an account of epistemic vices and explores three broad types of epistemic vices: character traits, attitudes, and ways of thinking. Regarding each, Cassam draws insights about the nature of vices through examining paradigm instances of each type of vice and exploring their significance through real world historical examples. With h…Read more
  •  106
    Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1-18. forthcoming.
    In this paper I explore an epistemic asymmetry that sometimes occurs regarding the moral status of alternative actions. I argue that this asymmetry is significant and has ramifications for what it is morally permissible to do. I then show how this asymmetry often obtains regarding three moral issues: vegetarianism, abortion, and charitable giving. In doing so, I rely on the epistemic significance of disagreement and the existence of moral controversy about these issues.
  •  106
    Is there a well-founded solution to the generality problem?
    Philosophical Studies 172 (2): 459-468. 2015.
    The generality problem is perhaps the most notorious problem for process reliabilism. Several recent responses to the generality problem have claimed that the problem has been unfairly leveled against reliabilists. In particular, these responses have claimed that the generality problem is either (i) just as much of a problem for evidentialists, or (ii) if it is not, then a parallel solution is available to reliabilists. Along these lines, Juan Comesaña has recently proposed solution to the gener…Read more
  •  105
    Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution
    Topoi 1-13. forthcoming.
    The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argumentation theory in a way that will advance the relevant debates. While these literatures can intersect in many ways, I will explore how some of views pertaining to deep disagreements in argumentation theory can act as an objection to a prominent view of the epistemology of disagreement—the Equal Weight View. To do so, I will explain the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement and show how it entails …Read more
  •  90
    Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement
    Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2): 120-141. 2016.
    In this article, I propose, defend, and apply a principle for applied ethics. According to this principle, we should exercise moral caution, at least when we can. More formally, the principle claims that if you should believe or suspend judgment that doing an action is a serious moral wrong, while knowing that not doing that action is not morally wrong, then you should not do that action. After motivating this principle, I argue that it has significant application in applied ethics. The applicat…Read more
  •  84
    The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social (edited book)
    with Rico Vitz
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    How do people form beliefs, and how should they do so? This book presents seventeen new essays on these questions, drawing together perspectives from philosophy and psychology. The first section explores the ethics of belief from an individualistic framework. It begins by examining the question of doxastic voluntarism-i.e., the extent to which people have control over their beliefs. It then shifts to focusing on the kinds of character that epistemic agents should cultivate, what their epistemic …Read more
  •  79
    Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology—that the more plausible one of these views is, the less plausible the other is. In this paper I explain Dougherty’s argument and develop an account of defeaters which removes the alleged tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology.
  •  65
    Debating the Significance of Disagreement: A Review of John Pittard's Diagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment (review)
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (7): 36-44. 2020.
    Richard Feldman’s “Reasonable Religious Disagreements” launched debates about the epistemic significance of disagreement that have been a dominant point of discussion in epistemology as of late. While most of these debates have been concerned with disagreement more generally, Feldman’s original focus was religious disagreement, and John Pittard returns the focus to religious disagreement in Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. Pittard’s book delves deeply into debates about the sig…Read more