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87Sartre’s Exclusion Claim: Perception and Imagination as Radically Distinct ConsciousnessesEuropean Journal of Philosophy. 2024.Abstract: In The Imaginary Jean-Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience - I call this the exclusion claim. This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre’s exclusion claim. First, it frames the claim in terms of cross-modal attention distribution, such that it is not possible to simultaneously attend to what one is imagining and what one is perceiving. However, this leaves it open that a sub…Read more
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4In correlated electron materials, electrons often self-organize and form a variety of patterns with potential ordering of charges, spins, and orbitals, which are believed to be closely connected to many novel properties of these materials including superconductivity, metal-insulator transitions, and the CMR effect. How these real-space patterns affect the conductivity and other properties of materials is one of the major challenges of modern condensed matter physics. Moreover, although the prese…Read more
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190Towards Affective-Evaluativism: the Intentional Structure of Unpleasant Pain ExperiencePhilosophical Quarterly. 2024.Evaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. However, extant Evaluativist views do not pay enough attention to the affective dimension of pain experience and the complex relations between the affective, evaluative and sensory dimensions. This paper clarifies these relations and provides a view which more closely reflects the phenomenology of unpleasant pains. It argues that the intentional structure of paradigmatic unpleasant pain is as follows: u…Read more
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32The Horizonal Structure of Visual ExperienceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2): 428-448. 2024.How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspective? To make sense of this, such visual experiences must refer to occluded or presently unseen back-sides which are not sense-perceptually given, and which cannot be sense-perceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the object that they currently are—I call this the ho…Read more
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204The Horizonality of Visual ExperienceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Abstract: How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspective? To make sense of this, such visual experiences must refer to occluded or presently unseen back-sides which are not sense-perceptually given, and which cannot be sense- perceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the object that they currently are – I cal…Read more
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43A key claim of classical phenomenology is that intentional experiences involve a distinctive kind of implicit intentionality, which accompanies the relevant explicit intentionality. This implicit intentionality is purportedly co-constitutive of the object-presenting phenomenology of those intentional experiences. This implicit intentionality is often framed by Husserl and other classical phenomenologists in terms of horizonal intentionality or intentional horizons. Its most interesting form is l…Read more
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54On the temporality of the emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, by BerislavMarušić. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. ISBN: 0198851162, £55.00 (Hardcover) (review)European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2): 534-538. 2023.European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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23In this paper I focus on a subset of experiences in which action-properties are presented—namely, those in which objects in our perceptual surroundings or environment ‘demand’ that certain actions be carried out, as experienced mandates (EMs). The critical part of the paper argues that a complex contents view, which builds all of the distinctiveness of such experiences into their perceptual content, is unsatisfactory. As an alternative, I argue that EMs involve bodily potentiation, which is best…Read more
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28Affective representation and affective attitudesSynthese 198 (4): 3519-3546. 2021.Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as …Read more
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584Emotion and AttentionPhilosophical Studies (1): 1-27. 2022.This paper first demonstrates that recognition of the diversity of ways that emotional responses modulate ongoing attention generates what I call the puzzle of emotional attention, which turns on recognising that distinct emotions (e.g., fear, happiness, disgust, admiration etc.) have different attentional profiles. The puzzle concerns why this is the case, such that a solution consists in explaining why distinct emotions have the distinct attentional profiles they do. It then provides an accoun…Read more
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448Affective Persistence and the Normative Phenomenology of EmotionIn Christine Tappolet, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa, . 2022.This paper presents a detailed analysis of affective persistence and its significance – that is the persistence of affect in the face of countervailing or contradictory evaluative information. More specifically, it appeals to the phenomena of affective persistence to support the claim that a significant portion of the emotional experiences of adult humans involve a kind of normative phenomenology. Its central claim is that by appealing to a distinctive kind of normative phenomenology that emotio…Read more
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472The Phenomenal Contribution of AttentionInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 2022.Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds that there are also non content-based aspects or features which contribute to phenomenal character. Conscious attention is one such feature: arguably its contribution to the phenomenal character of a given conscious experience are not exhaustively captured in terms of what that experience represents, th…Read more
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617Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences: Affective imaginings and affective perceptionsEuropean Journal of Philosophy 30 (1): 307-325. 2021.European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 307-325, March 2022.
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715Affective Shifts: Mood, Emotion and Well-BeingSynthese (5-6): 1-28. 2021.It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, and that our emotions ‘diffuse’ into moods. Providing a detailed philosophical account of these affective shifts, as I will call them, is the central aim of this paper. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil, a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ account will be defended. I argue that we do best …Read more
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649Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the "Here-Replacement" AccountJournal of Philosophy 118 (4): 188-213. 2021.According to the Self-Location Thesis, certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person, spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-reflexive visual experiences, which involve the movement of an obj…Read more
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725The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional AwarenessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3): 659-675. 2021.According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encou…Read more
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89Emotion as Feeling Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional ExperienceOxford University Press. 2021.This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, it argues that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.
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42Review of the World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling (review)Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1): 218-221. 2021.Review of the World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. by müller jean moritz
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948The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotionPhilosophical Studies 178 (8): 2635-2663. 2020.This paper provides an assessment of the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotions, according to which emotions are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness. After providing a reconstruction of the view and clarifying its central commitments two objections are considered. An alternative object side interpretation of felt action readiness is then provided, which undermines the motivation for the bodily-attitudinal theory and creates problems for its claims concerning the content of emotional experie…Read more
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633Another Look at Mode IntentionalismErkenntnis 87 (6): 2519-2546. 2020.A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. This paper considers an alternative called Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. I assess a phenomenal contrast argument in support of this view, arguing that the cases appealed to allow for interpretations which do not require pos…Read more
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60Liking That It Hurts: The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain’s UnpleasantnessAmerican Philosophical Quarterly (2): 181-189. 2022.Recent work on pain focuses on the question ‘what makes pains unpleasant’. Second-order desire views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to second-order desire views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the second-order desire view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion…Read more
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71On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experienceSynthese 197 (7): 3087-3111. 2018.Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experi…Read more
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2784A Nietzschean Theory of Emotional Experience: Affect as Feeling Towards ValueInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 2020.This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constitu…Read more
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374Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. (review)Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling.
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482Review of Thomas Stern (ed.), The New Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, Cambridge (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. forthcoming.
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765The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional ExperiencePhilosophical Quarterly 70 (280): 524-546. 2020.According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such,…Read more
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866Emotional Experience and Propositional ContentDialectica 73 (4): 535-561. 2019.Those arguing for the existence of non-propositional content appeal to emotions for support, although there has been little engagement in those debates with developments in contemporary theory of emotion, specifically in connection with the kind of mental states that emotional experiences are. Relatedly, within emotion theory, one finds claims that emotional experiences per se have non-propositional content without detailed argument. This paper argues that the content of emotional experience is …Read more
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806Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist AccountCanadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4): 505-523. 2020.This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its …Read more
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97Pre-emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority ViewPhilosophical Quarterly 69 (277): 771-794. 2019.Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the central motivations of the view require a personal l…Read more
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