•  45
    Fair equality of opportunity and the gendered division of labor
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (1): 283-289. 2023.
  •  19
    The Morality of Defensive Force: Replies to Christie, Hecht, and Parry
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (5-6): 461-482. 2023.
    This article offers a brief synopsis of some of the main claims from The Morality of Defensive Force, and replies to the symposium contributions of Lars Christie, Lisa Hecht, and Jonathan Parry.
  •  17
    On the Idea of Public Reason
    In Jon Mandle & David A. Reidy (eds.), A Companion to Rawls, Wiley. 2013.
    The idea of public reason is at the center of John Rawls's political philosophy. Public reason is a standard by which we measure laws and political institutions. This chapter discusses the practice of public reason, the moral basis of public reason, and the challenge posed by religious critics of public reason. It provides three possible answers to the question: What is the moral basis for endorsing this particular conception of democratic politics – public reason? It is Rawlsian concept of just…Read more
  •  42
    Debate: Legitimate injustice: A response to Wellman
    Journal of Political Philosophy 31 (2): 222-232. 2023.
    Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  41
  •  13
    On Flanigan’s Pharmaceutical Freedom
    HEC Forum 34 (3): 257-268. 2022.
    This paper discusses Jessica Flanigan’s book, _Pharmaceutical Freedom_. The paper advances two main claims. First, the paper argues that, despite what Flanigan claims, there is a coherent way to endorse the Doctrine of Informed Consent while resisting the view that there is a right to self-medicate. Second, the paper argues that Flanigan is committed to a more radical conclusion than she acknowledges in the book; namely, that under some conditions it is morally permissible for people to take med…Read more
  •  9
    The Morality of Defensive Force
    Oxford University Press. 2020.
    When is it morally permissible to engage in self-defense or the defense of others? Jonathan Quong gives an original philosophical account of the central moral principles that should regulate the use of defensive force. The morality of defensive force needs to be understood in the context of a more general account of justice and moral rights.
  •  41
    On Laborde’s Liberalism
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (1): 47-59. 2019.
    This paper discusses Cécile Laborde’s book, Liberalism’s Religion. First, I pose some questions about how Laborde’s central proposal—disaggregating religion—is meant to solve the two most serious challenges that she argues confront existing liberal egalitarian theories. Second, I respond to some of the objections Laborde presses against my conception of political liberalism. Third, I argue that Laborde is mistaken in adopting accessibility as the appropriate standard for reasons within public ju…Read more
  •  1440
    The rights of unreasonable citizens
    Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (3). 2004.
  •  220
    What is the point of public reason?
    Philosophical Studies 170 (3): 545-553. 2014.
    Jerry Gaus is the most important philosopher of public reason since John Rawls. His path-breaking work on this topic has deeply influenced a large group of moral and political philosophers, a group to which I happily belong. In this short paper I examine one feature of the account developed in his incredibly rich and illuminating book, The Order of Public Reason.Gaus (2011), cited hereafter as OPR. I argue Gaus’s theory struggles to resolve a crucial question: how can we be confident that public…Read more
  •  71
    Liberalism Without Perfection
    Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Liberalism without Perfection offers an introduction to the debate between liberal perfectionism and political liberalism. This book is a new account and defence of Rawlsian political liberalism, one of the most discussed, but widely misunderstood and criticized theories in contemporary political theory.
  •  18
    Symposium on Settlement, Borders, and Violence
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (4): 349-350. 2017.
  •  141
    Liability to Defensive Harm
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (1): 45-77. 2012.
  •  62
    Proportionality, Liability, and Defensive Harm
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (2): 144-173. 2015.
  •  63
    Liberalism Without Perfection. A Précis
    Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 2 (1). 2012.
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  •  92
    Political liberalism famously requires that fundamental political matters should not be decided by reference to any controversial moral, religious or philosophical doctrines over which reasonable people disagree. This means we, as citizens, must abstain from relying on what we believe to be the whole truth when debating or voting on fundamental political matters. Many critics of political liberalism contend that this requirement to abstain from relying on our views about the good life commits po…Read more
  •  11
  •  22
    A Comment on Ripstein's Reclamation
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (1): 32-37. 2017.
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  •  35
    Equality, Responsibility, and Culture: A Comment on Alan Patten’s Equal Recognition
    Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 10 (2): 157-168. 2015.
    Jonathan Quong | : Alan Patten presents his account of minority rights as broadly continuous with Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources. This paper challenges this claim. I argue that, contra Patten, Dworkin’s theory does not provide a basis to offer accommodations or minority rights, as a matter of justice, to some citizens who find themselves at a relative disadvantage in pursuing their plans of life after voluntarily changing their cultural or religious commitments. | : Alan Patten…Read more
  •  74
    I—Rights against Harm
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1): 249-266. 2015.
    Some philosophers defend the fact-relative view of moral rights against harm:Whether B infringes A's right not to be harmed by ϕ-ing depends on what will in fact occur if B ϕs. B's knowledge of, or evidence about, the exact consequences of her ϕ-ing are irrelevant to the question of whether her ϕ-ing constitutes an infringement of A's right not to be harmed by B.In this paper I argue that the fact-relative view of moral rights is mistaken, and I argue for an alternative view whereby our rights a…Read more
  •  42
    Disputed practices and reasonable pluralism
    Res Publica 10 (1): 43-67. 2004.
    This paper addresses the problem of disputed cultural practices within liberal, deliberative democracies, arguing against the currently dominant view, advocated by Susan Okin among others, that such problems represent a fundamental tension between two liberal values: gender equality and cultural autonomy. Such an approach, I argue, requires the state to render normative judgements about conceptions of the good life, something which is both arbitrary and unfair in societies characterised by reaso…Read more
  •  141
    Justice Beyond Equality
    Social Theory and Practice 36 (2): 315-340. 2010.
    This essay reviews G.A. Cohen’s final major work, Rescuing Justice and Equality. In the book, Cohen challenges the Rawlsian account of the content and the concept of justice. This essay offers a summary of Cohen’s main arguments, and develops objections to several of those arguments, particularly Cohen’s claim that his proposed egalitarian ethos is not vulnerable to a well-known trilemma (liberty, equality, efficiency) that might be pressed against it. The essay’s final section offers critical r…Read more