Unknown
Department Of Philosophy
Alumnus
Amherst, Massachusetts, United States of America
  •  824
    Epistemic Bootstrapping
    Journal of Philosophy 105 (9): 518-539. 2008.
  •  359
    Reliabilism leveled
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (11): 602-623. 2000.
  •  344
  •  297
    Skeptical arguments
    Philosophical Issues 14 (1). 2004.
  •  275
    The exorcist's nightmare: A reply to Crispin Wright
    with Thomas Tymoczko
    Mind 101 (403): 543-552. 1992.
    Crispin Wright tried to refute classical 'Cartesian' skepticism contending that its core argument is extendible to a reductio ad absurdum (_Mind<D>, 100, 87-116, 1991). We show both that Wright is mistaken and that his mistakes are philosophically illuminating. Wright's 'best version' of skepticism turns on a concept of warranted belief. By his definition, many of our well-founded beliefs about the external world and mathematics would not be warranted. Wright's position worsens if we take 'warra…Read more
  •  263
    Sklar on methodological conservatism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 125-131. 1992.
    In an important study, Lawrence Sklar has defended a doctrine of methodological conservatism (very roughly, the principle that a proposition derives some sort of epistemic warrant from being believed). I argue that Sklar's careful formulation of methodological conservatism remains too strong, and that a yet weaker version of the doctrine cannot be successfully defended. I also criticize Sklar's argument that the rejection of methodological conservatism would result in total skepticism. Finall…Read more
  •  241
    Is Cartesian Skepticism Too Cartesian?
    In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations, Brill. pp. 24-45. 2018.
    A prominent response is that Cartesian skepticism is too Cartesian. It arises from outmoded views in epistemology and the philosophy of mind that we now properly reject. We can and should move on to other things. §2 takes up three broadly Cartesian themes: the epistemic priority of experience, under-determination, and the representative theory of perception. I challenge some common assumptions about these, and their connection to skepticism. §3 shows how skeptical arguments that emphasize causa…Read more
  •  236
    Luminosity and indiscriminability
    Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 547-572. 2010.
  •  230
    Subjunctivitis
    Philosophical Studies 134 (1). 2007.
    Subjunctivitis is the doctrine that what is distinctive about knowledge is essential modal in character, and thus is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One principal formulation of subjunctivism invokes a ``sensitivity condition'' (Nozick, De Rose), the other invokes a ``safety condition'' (Sosa). It is shown in detail how defects in the sensitivity condition generate unwanted results, and that the virtues of that condition are merely apparent. The safety condition is untenable also, …Read more
  •  229
    Skepticism and Foundationalism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 22 11-28. 1997.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the sor…Read more
  •  177
    Accident, Evidence, and Knowledge
    In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, Oxford University Press. pp. 117-133. 2017.
    I explore and develop the idea that (NA) knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. The applicable notion of non-accidentality differs from that of ‘epistemic luck’ discussed by Pritchard. Safety theories may be seen as a refinement of, or substitute for, NA but they are subject to a fundamental difficulty. At the same time, NA needs to be adjusted in order to cope with two counterexamples. The Light Switch Case turns on the ‘directionof-fit’ between a belief and the facts, while the Meson Case …Read more
  •  168
    Externalism Resisted
    Philosophical Studies 131 (3): 729-742. 2006.
  •  148
    Inference to the Best Explanation
    Philosophical Review 102 (3): 419. 1993.
  •  139
    BonJour on explanation and skepticism
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4): 413-421. 2010.
    Laurence BonJour, among others, has argued that inference to the best explanation allows us to reject skeptical hypotheses in favor of our common-sense view of the world. BonJour considers several skeptical hypotheses, specifically: our experiences arise by mere chance, uncaused; the simple hypothesis which states merely that our experiences are caused unveridically; and an elaborated hypothesis which explains in detail how our unveridical experiences are brought about. A central issue is whethe…Read more
  •  103
    Counting Minds and Mental States
    In David J. Bennett & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 393-400. 2014.
    Important conceptual and metaphysical issues arise when we try to understand the mental lives of “split-brain” subjects. How many distinct streams of consciousness do they have? According to Elizabeth Schechter’s partial unity model, the answer is one. A related question is whether co-consciouness, in general, is transitive. That is, if α and β are co-conscious experiences, and β and γ are co-conscious experiences, must α and γ be co-conscious? According to Schechter, the answer is no. The …Read more
  •  76
    Space, Structuralism, and Skepticism
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6. 2019.
    The chapter takes structuralism to be the thesis that if F and G are alike causally, then F and G are the same property. It follows that our beliefs about the world can be true in various brain-in-a-vat scenarios, giving us refuge from skeptical arguments. The trouble is that structuralism doesn’t do justice to certain metaphysical aspects of property identity having to do with fundamentality, intrinsicality, and the unity of the world. A closely related point is that the relation…lies-at-some-s…Read more
  •  59
    Reliabilism Leveled
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (11): 602. 2000.
  •  54
    Empirical Knowledge (review)
    Philosophical Review 101 (2): 428-430. 1992.
    This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing—a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist…Read more
  •  40
    Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology
    Philosophical Review 104 (4): 621. 1995.
    For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalis…Read more
  •  32
    Skepticism and Foundationalism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 22 11-28. 1997.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the sor…Read more
  •  30
    Judgement and Justification (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 233-236. 1993.
  •  29
    Evidence and Inquiry (review)
    Philosophical Review 104 (4): 621-623. 1995.
    For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalis…Read more
  •  26
    Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle
    In Michael David Roth & Glenn Ross (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29. 1990.
  •  24
    Externalism Resisted
    Philosophical Studies 131 (3). 2006.