Unknown
Department Of Philosophy
Alumnus
Amherst, Massachusetts, United States of America
  •  3
    Space, Structuralism, and Skepticism
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6. 2019.
    The chapter takes structuralism to be the thesis that if F and G are alike causally, then F and G are the same property. It follows that our beliefs about the world can be true in various brain-in-a-vat scenarios, giving us refuge from skeptical arguments. The trouble is that structuralism doesn’t do justice to certain metaphysical aspects of property identity having to do with fundamentality, intrinsicality, and the unity of the world. A closely related point is that the relation…lies-at-some-s…Read more
  •  31
    Empirical Knowledge
    Philosophical Review 101 (2): 428-430. 1992.
    This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing—a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist…Read more
  • Accident, Evidence, and Knowledge
    In Peter Klein, Rodrigo Borges & Claudio Almeida (eds.), explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem, Oxford University Press. pp. 117-133. 2017.
  •  2
    Nutrient dynamics of the southern and northern BOREAS boreal forests
    with S. E. Trumbore, S. T. Gower, A. Hunter, J. Campbell, H. Veldhuis, J. Harden, J. M. Norman, and C. J. Kucharik
    The objective of this study was to compare nutrient concentration, distribution, and select components of nutrient budgets for aspen, jack pine, and black spruce forest ecosystems at the BOReal Ecosystem Atmosphere Study, southern and northern study areas near Candle Lake, Saskatchewan and Thompson, Manitoba, Canada, respectively. The vegetation in the aspen, black spruce, and jack pine stands contained 70-79%, 53-54%, and 58-67% of total ecosystem carbon content, respectively. Soil nitrogen, ca…Read more
  • Cartesian Skepticism and Epistemic Principles
    Dissertation, Yale University. 1986.
    This dissertation begins with a general discussion of the role of epistemic principles in arguments for and against Cartesian skepticism . The skeptic may be viewed as trying to establish that, according to non-arbitrary epistemic principles we ordinarily accept, we have no knowledge of the external world. So construed, the skeptic's challenge cannot be dismissed. It can, however, be refuted, particularly if the epistemic principles invoked by the skeptic prove to be invalid. ;One epistemic prin…Read more
  •  57
    The exorcist's nightmare: A reply to Crispin Wright
    with Thomas Tymoczko
    Mind 101 (403): 543-552. 1992.
    Crispin Wright tried to refute classical 'Cartesian' skepticism contending that its core argument is extendible to a reductio ad absurdum (_Mind, 100, 87-116, 1991). We show both that Wright is mistaken and that his mistakes are philosophically illuminating. Wright's 'best version' of skepticism turns on a concept of warranted belief. By his definition, many of our well-founded beliefs about the external world and mathematics would not be warranted. Wright's position worsens if we take 'warrante…Read more
  •  33
    Reliabilism Leveled
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (11): 602. 2000.
  •  154
    Externalism Resisted
    Philosophical Studies 131 (3): 729-742. 2006.
  •  7
    The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism”: Two Recent Views
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 875-887. 1993.
  •  22
    Skepticism and Foundationalism: A Reply to Michael Williams
    Journal of Philosophical Research 22 11-28. 1997.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism.. I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the sort of situation the skeptic describes. This point can be upheld without embracing any substantial foundationalist tenet, such as the existence of basic be…Read more
  •  192
    Luminosity and indiscriminability
    Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 547-572. 2010.
  •  24
    Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction In Epistemology
    Philosophical Review 104 (4): 621-623. 1995.
    For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalis…Read more
  •  12
  •  197
    Subjunctivitis
    Philosophical Studies 134 (1). 2007.
    Subjunctivitis is the doctrine that what is distinctive about knowledge is essential modal in character, and thus is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One principal formulation of subjunctivism invokes a ``sensitivity condition'' (Nozick, De Rose), the other invokes a ``safety condition'' (Sosa). It is shown in detail how defects in the sensitivity condition generate unwanted results, and that the virtues of that condition are merely apparent. The safety condition is untenable also, …Read more
  •  238
  •  16
    Review: Externalism Resisted (review)
    Philosophical Studies 131 (3). 2006.
  •  18
    Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology
    Philosophical Review 104 (4): 621. 1995.
    For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalis…Read more
  •  107
    BonJour on explanation and skepticism
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4): 413-421. 2010.
    Laurence BonJour, among others, has argued that inference to the best explanation allows us to reject skeptical hypotheses in favor of our common-sense view of the world. BonJour considers several skeptical hypotheses, specifically: our experiences arise by mere chance, uncaused; the simple hypothesis which states merely that our experiences are caused unveridically; and an elaborated hypothesis which explains in detail how our unveridical experiences are brought about. A central issue is whethe…Read more
  •  16
  •  239
    Skeptical arguments
    Philosophical Issues 14 (1). 2004.
  •  56
    Inference to the Best Explanation
    Philosophical Review 102 (3): 419. 1993.
  •  3
    Can skepticism be refuted
    In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 72--84. 2005.
  •  47
    Sklar on methodological conservatism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 125-131. 1992.