Some regard harms to currently existing persons as a basis for reparations for historical injustice. By focusing on corrective justice as the basis for repairing wrongful harm, this thesis aims to clarify and strengthen the harm-based approach to reparations. I defend a version of the conformity account as the moral basis of corrective justice, critiquing various versions of this argument by Joseph Raz and John Gardner. I argue that the notion of harm relevant to corrective justice is a counterf…
Read moreSome regard harms to currently existing persons as a basis for reparations for historical injustice. By focusing on corrective justice as the basis for repairing wrongful harm, this thesis aims to clarify and strengthen the harm-based approach to reparations. I defend a version of the conformity account as the moral basis of corrective justice, critiquing various versions of this argument by Joseph Raz and John Gardner. I argue that the notion of harm relevant to corrective justice is a counterfactual comparative one and respond to various objections to that conception. I then consider two different cases in which compensation for an historical injustice might be thought appropriate. First, I examine an argument developed independently by Bernard Boxill and George Sher. I analyze Andrew Cohen’s critique of the argument, clarifying the problems it faces before offering some tentative solutions. Second, I examine and critique Judith Jarvis Thomson’s proposal to solve the non-identity problem in the case of the Risky Policy. I explain why her argument fails and offer my own solution.
