247Agent-Regret and the Social Practice of Moral LuckRes Philosophica 94 (1): 95-117. 2017.Agent-regret seems to give rise to a philosophical puzzle. If we grant that we are not morally responsible for consequences outside our control, then agent-regret—which involves self-reproach and a desire to make amends for consequences outside one’s control—appears rationally indefensible. But despite its apparent indefensibility, agent-regret still seems like a reasonable response to bad moral luck. I argue here that the puzzle can be resolved if we appreciate the role that agent-regret plays …Read more
107Knowing Yourself and Being Worth KnowingJournal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2): 243-261. 2018.Philosophers have often understood self-knowledge's value in instrumentalist terms. Self-knowledge may be valuable as a means to moral self-improvement and self-satisfaction, while its absence can lead to viciousness and frustration. These explanations, while compelling, do not fully explain the value that many of us place in self-knowledge. Rather, we have a tendency to treat self-knowledge as its own end. In this article, I vindicate this tendency by identifying a moral reason that we have to …Read more
18Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special ObligationsHastings Center Report 48 (3): 18-19. 2018.
14Thomason, Krista K. Naked: The Dark Side of Shame and Moral Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 256. $90.00 (review)Ethics 130 (2): 267-271. 2019.
Virginia TechDepartment of PhilosophyAssistant Professor
University Of North Carolina
Department Of Philosophy
New York, New York, United States of America