•  399
    Agent-Regret and the Social Practice of Moral Luck
    Res Philosophica 94 (1): 95-117. 2017.
    Agent-regret seems to give rise to a philosophical puzzle. If we grant that we are not morally responsible for consequences outside our control, then agent-regret—which involves self-reproach and a desire to make amends for consequences outside one’s control—appears rationally indefensible. But despite its apparent indefensibility, agent-regret still seems like a reasonable response to bad moral luck. I argue here that the puzzle can be resolved if we appreciate the role that agent-regret plays …Read more
  •  172
    Self-Deception as a Moral Failure
    The Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
    In this paper, I defend the view that self-deception is a moral failure. Instead of saying that self-deception is bad because it undermines our moral character or leads to morally deleterious consequences, as has been argued by Butler, Kant, Smith, and others, I argue the distinctive badness of self-deception lies in the tragic relationship that it bears to our own values. On the one hand, self-deception is motivated by what we value. On the other hand, it prevents us from valuing those things p…Read more
  •  152
    Knowing Yourself and Being Worth Knowing
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2): 243-261. 2018.
    Philosophers have often understood self-knowledge's value in instrumentalist terms. Self-knowledge may be valuable as a means to moral self-improvement and self-satisfaction, while its absence can lead to viciousness and frustration. These explanations, while compelling, do not fully explain the value that many of us place in self-knowledge. Rather, we have a tendency to treat self-knowledge as its own end. In this article, I vindicate this tendency by identifying a moral reason that we have to …Read more
  •  22
    Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special Obligations
    with S. Matthew Liao
    Hastings Center Report 48 (3): 18-19. 2018.
  •  12
    We Should Widen Access to Physician-Assisted Death
    Journal of Moral Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Typical philosophical discussions of physician-assisted death (“PAD”) have focused on whether the practice can be permissible. We address a different question: assuming that PAD can be morally permissible, how far does that permission extend? We will argue that granting requests for PAD may be permissible even when the PAD recipient can no longer speak for themselves. In particular, we argue against the ‘competency requirement’ that constrains PAD-eligibility to presently-competent patients in m…Read more
  •  12
    Caring by lying
    Bioethics 35 (9): 877-883. 2021.
    Caring for loved ones with dementia can sometimes necessitate a loose relationship with the truth. Some might view such deception as categorically immoral, and a violation of our general truth-telling obligations. I argue that this view is mistaken. This is because truth-telling obligations may be limited by the particular relationships in which they feature. Specifically, within caregiving relationships, we are often permitted (and sometimes obligated) to deceive the people with whom we share t…Read more