Brown University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2003
Adelaide, South Australia, Australia
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
  •  1
    Self-Referential Memory and Mental Time Travel
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1-18. forthcoming.
    Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can shed some light on the exp…Read more
  •  1
    Self-Referential Memory and Mental Time Travel
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1-18. forthcoming.
    Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can shed some light on the exp…Read more
  •  47
    Memory: A Self-Referential Account
    Oxford University Press. 2019.
    Table of contents PART I. The nature of memory 1. Problems of memory 2. The metaphysics of memory 3. The intentionality of memory PART II. The phenomenology of memory 4. The experience of time 5. The experience of ownership PART III. The epistemology of memory 6. Immunity to error through misidentification 7. Memory as a generative epistemic source // Click on title above for the abstract of each chapter
  •  39
    The functional character of memory
    In Denis Perrin Dorothea Debus Kourken Michaelian (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. pp. 52-72. 2018.
    The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something? The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining which features those mental states which qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states which do not qualify as such typically lack. In sections 2 and 3, I will…Read more
  •  41
    Intentional objects of memory
    In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. pp. 88-100. 2017.
    Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental enti…Read more
  •  37
    Self-referential memory and mental time travel
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1-18. forthcoming.
    Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can shed some light on the exp…Read more
  •  3
    Replies to my critics
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (1): 149-160. 2015.
    Jordi Fernández.
  •  1
    Memory and Perception: Remembering Snowflake
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 21 (2): 147-164. 2010.
    Memories have the power to elicit certain beliefs in us. These are beliefs about time and beliefs about perception. The aim of this paper is to propose a notion of mnemonic content that can account for the rationality of forming those beliefs on the basis of our memories.
  •  4
    Memory and Perception: Remembering Snowflake
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (2): 147-164. 2006.
    If I remember something, I tend to believe that I have perceived it. Similarly, if I remember something, I tend to believe that it happened in the past. My aim here is to propose a notion of mnemonic contentaccounts for these facts. Certain proposals build perceptual experiences into the content of memories. I argue that they Have trouble with the second belief. Other proposals build references to temporal locations into mnemonic content. I argue that they have trouble with the second one. I pro…Read more
  •  20
    Externalism, self-knowledge and memory
    In S. Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 197-213. 2015.
    Jordi Fernandez.
  •  20
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
  •  71
    Epistemic Generation in Memory
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2). 2016.
    Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For tha…Read more
  •  88
    This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.
  •  49
    What are the benefits of memory distortion?
    Consciousness and Cognition 33 536-547. 2015.
    Jordi Fernández
  •  14
    Schizophrenia and the estranged self
    Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 22 (4): 615-621. 2016.
  •  30
    Mental Causation, by Anthony Dardis
    with S. Bliss
    Mind 119 (474): 468-471. 2010.
    (No abstract is available for this citation)
  •  184
    Thought insertion and self-knowledge
    Mind and Language 25 (1): 66-88. 2010.
    I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schi…Read more
  •  197
    Privileged access naturalized
    Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212): 352-372. 2003.
    The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does not posit any mysterious faculty of intros…Read more
  •  9
    Memory
    In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Blackwell. 2014.
    This chapter discusses interesting connections that hold between time and memory. It helps to pull temporal aspects of memory apart, and to tries to clarify them. Discussions in the chapter focus on memory for events, concentrating on a specific kind of memory for events, the “episodic” memory. The chapter first addresses a question on the metaphysics of memory. Then, it tries to specify which conditions an experience must fulfill in order to count as a memory experience. Next, the chapter tries…Read more
  •  45
    Causal Inheritance and Second-order Properties
    Abstracta 4 (2): 74-95. 2008.
    We defend Jaegwon Kim’s ‘causal inheritance’ principle from an objection raised by Jurgen Schröder. The objection is that the principle is inconsistent with a view about mental properties assumed by Kim, namely, that they are second-order properties. We argue that Schröder misconstrues the notion of second-order property. We distinguish three notions of second-order property and highlight their problems and virtues. Finally, we examine the consequence of Kim’s principle and discuss the issue of …Read more
  •  79
    Explanation by computer simulation in cognitive science
    Minds and Machines 13 (2): 269-284. 2003.
    My purpose in this essay is to clarify the notion of explanation by computer simulation in artificial intelligence and cognitive science. My contention is that computer simulation may be understood as providing two different kinds of explanation, which makes the notion of explanation by computer simulation ambiguous. In order to show this, I shall draw a distinction between two possible ways of understanding the notion of simulation, depending on how one views the relation in which a computing s…Read more
  •  72
    Schopenhauer’s Pessimism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3). 2006.
    My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer's grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer's grounds for other premises in the argument. I shall then propose a way o…Read more
  •  64
    Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions
    European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1): 17-37. 2004.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
  •  142
    The intentionality of memory
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1): 39-57. 2006.
    The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, and I shall a…Read more
  •  87
    Privileged Access Revisited
    Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218). 2005.
    Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.