My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept both
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: libertarianism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept both
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: relativism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept both
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes The question is too unclear to answer
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: qualia theory
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept: psychological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Fregean
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Accept both
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch The question is too unclear to answer
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: metaphysically possible