Jørn Sønderholm

This paper addresses an important question in normative political theory—Main Question: In a representative democracy, can a member of a legislature legitimately flip-flop and vote in accordance with the majority view on Issue when she—prior to getting knowledge, through a referendum result, of what the majority view is on Issue—has defended and recommended to voters a view that is logically inconsistent with the majority view? This paper defends an affirmative answer to the Main Question. The last section raises the question of whether the trustee view of what obligations a legislator has in a representative democracy toward her constituents is mistaken. An alternative to the trustee view is presented and discussed, and it is concluded that this alternative view is implausible.

In the literature on global justice, there has been a lengthy debate about what the world’s rich owe to the world’s poor. Some have argued that rich individuals have positive duties of beneficence to help the poor, while others have argued that rich individuals only have negative duties not to harm them. A common objection to the former view is that once it is accepted that positive duties exist, fulfilling these duties will be overdemanding since rich individuals can almost always help a little more. Some have tried to overcome this overdemandingness objection by setting cut-off points for how demanding morality is. In this article, we aim to show that it is problematic to be committed to the following propositions: (1) Positive duties to aid exist; (2) The overdemandingness objection is a serious challenge for anyone who accepts that positive duties to aid exist; and (3) Setting cut-off points for how demanding morality is constitutes a plausible way to overcome the overdemandingness objection. Showing that a commitment to (1), (2) and (3) is problematic is of interest given that several influential theorists are committed to this set of views. This set of views is simply a bad theoretical cocktail.

In this paper, we argue that because of the advent of Artificial Intelligence, the secret ballot is now much less effective at protecting voters from voting related instances of social ostracism and social punishment. If one has access to vast amounts of data about specific electors, then it is possible, at least with respect to a significant subset of electors, to infer with high levels of accuracy how they voted in a past election. Since the accuracy levels of Artificial Intelligence are so high, the practical consequences of someone inferring one’s vote are identical to the practical consequences of having one’s vote revealed directly under an open voting regime. Therefore, if one thinks that the secret ballot is at least partly justified because it protects electors against voting related social ostracism and social punishment, one should be morally troubled by how Artificial Intelligence today can be used to infer individual electors’ past voting behaviour.

This thesis contains a critical discussion of two metaethical theories: expressivism, as developed in the works of Simon Blackburn, and Cornell realism, as presented by Richard Boyd and David Brink. In the introduction, a distinction is made between external and internal accommodation projects for moral discourse and it is argued that the external accommodation project should be guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. Expressivism and Cornell realism are then subjected to an extended comparative evaluation, and an answer is sought to the question of which of the two should be favoured. The main conclusion of the thesis is that Cornell realism is rationally preferable to expressivism. This conclusion is arrived at by looking at how well the two theories, respectively, explain various deeply embedded features of moral discourse. Explaining such features is what the internal accommodation project for moral discourse consists in. The assertoric surface-form of moral discourse and the supervenience of moral predicates on natural predicates receive special attention in the study. It is argued that expressivism and Cornell realism do equally well on the issue of moral supervenience. But whereas expressivism is still vulnerable to a particular argument from the philosophy of language, Cornell realism can fend off the criticism that most persistently has been directed at it from this area of philosophy. In a comparative evaluation involving the selected issues, Cornell realism therefore fares better than expressivism.

One objection that has been consistently raised for theorists who are committed to the idea that we have a positive duty to aid the global poor is the overdemandingness objection. This article is a critical discussion of this objection. First, the objection is laid out in some detail. A number of influential attempts to meet the overdemandingness objection are then discussed, and it is argued that they all fail in their intended purpose. The conclusion of the article is not that the overdemandingness objection cannot be met. Rather, the conclusion is that the overdemandingness objection constitutes a serious challenge to anyone who accepts the objection and goes beyond the standard libertarian doctrine and commits herself to the existence of positive duties to aid the global poor

Jeff Wisdom has recently defended the proposition that any view of moral supervenience worth its salt must incorporate a diachronic view of base property exemplification. Let us call the proposition defended by Wisdom p. In this paper, I try to show that Wisdom has offered no good reasons for accepting p. My argumentative strategy proceeds along two separate tracks. First, I try to show that the thought experiment Wisdom employs in order to underwrite p does not offer the intended support for the proposition. Secondly, I try to show that even if the problems with the thought experiment in question are ignored, there is at least one other reason for thinking that Wisdom has not offered a convincing argument in favor of p

Simon Blackburn’s supervenience argument against moral realism has been widely discussed since its first appearance more than thirty years ago. A number of different suggestions have been made as to how the argument can be countered. In a review of Blackburn’s Spreading the Word, Crispin Wright comments on the argument and rather briefly points out some technical difficulties with it that arise from the formula used in the definition of supervenience. In this paper, I try to show, building on Wright’s criticism and taking a number of new objections into consideration, that the Moorean realist can meet Blackburn’s explanatory charge.

Nicole Hassoun has recently defended the view that the relatively affluent members of the world’s population are, prima facie, obligated to ensure that the global institutional system enables all people to meet their basic needs. This paper is a critical discussion of Hassoun’s argument in favor of this view. Hassoun’s argument is first presented. In sections three and four, I try to bring out a number of formal and informal problems with the argument. Section five discusses a number of possible replies to the worries raised in section four. The conclusion of the paper is that Hassoun’s argument should be rejected. There are two independent and individually sufficient reasons for this conclusion: the argument is invalid and contains at least one false premise.

This paper deals with the question of how to price drugs for tropical diseases. The thesis defended in the paper is: (i) there should be no legal constraints on the profits pharmaceutical companies can make on their products for tropical diseases. In essence, (i) expresses the idea that drugs for tropical diseases should be treated as any other product on the free market and that the producers of these drugs should be allowed to sell their products at whatever price the market can bear. The main argument in favour of (i) is first outlined. Five common arguments against (i) are thereafter discussed, and it is argued that all of these fail in their intended purpose

This article is about exit polls. It addresses the question of whether or not it is morally permissible to publish exit poll results. The conclusion of the article is that an affirmative answer should be given to this question. In section 2, the master argument in favor of the moral permissibility of the publication of exit poll results is introduced. This is a strong argument. It is, however, argued that it might be the case that the conclusion of this argument should be rejected if there are other, and weightier, arguments against the idea that the publication of exit poll results is morally permissible. In section 3, the strongest arguments against the moral permissibility of the publication of exit poll results are outlined and discussed. The conclusion of this section is that all these arguments fail in their intended purpose. The conclusion of the article is therefore justified.

The aim of this paper is to show that David Brink’s influential version of moral realism cannot give a convincing explanation of moral supervenience. Section twocontains an outline and discussion of Brink’s view of moral properties. Section three explicates Brink’s notions of strong and weak supervenience. In sections four and five, Brink’s explanation of moral supervenience is discussed. It is argued that his functionalist view of moral properties means that the explanation of moral supervenience that he explicitly offers is not satisfactory. A suggestion is also made about what the exact nature is of the explanatory challenge that Brink faces inrelation to moral supervenience. Finally, it is argued that Brink cannot meet this challenge.

This article is concerned with Mark Timmons and Terence Horgan's influential twin - earth argument against the semantic views of that school of thought in metaethics that has come to be known as “Cornell realism”. The semantic views of Cornell realism have been developed in greatest detail by Richard Boyd, and it is Boyd's view that is targeted by Timmons and Horgan. In the first part of the article, the twin - earth argument is introduced and two versions of it are disentangled. Thereafter, a defensive strategy is developed against the most powerful version of the argument. The conclusion of the article is that Timmons and Horgan's argument does not succeed in showing that the semantic views associated with Cornell realism are false

In a paper from 2001, Michael C. Rea considers the question of what pornography is. First, he examines a number of existing definitions of ‘pornography’ and after having rejected them all, he goes on to present his own preferred definition. In this short paper, I suggest a counterexample to Rea’s definition. In particular, I suggest that there is something that, on the one hand, is pornography according to Rea’s definition, but, on the other hand, is not something that we would intuitively describe as being an instance of pornography.

This article is a critical discussion of the Advance Market Commitment (AMC) proposal for how to incentivize research and development of drugs for neglected diseases. The main claim of the article is that the ‘winner-takes-all’ problem that mars a simple prize proposal for how to incentivize research and development of drugs for neglected diseases also tarnishes the AMC proposal. The conclusion of the article is that the AMC proposal should be rejected as an incentivizing scheme for research and development of drugs for neglected diseases. This conclusion follows from the main claim of the article together with two plausible assumptions that are not argued for in the article

Nicole Hassoun has recently defended the view that the relatively affluent members of the world’s population are, prima facie, obligated to ensure that the global institutional system enables all people to meet their basic needs. This paper is a critical discussion of Hassoun’s argument in favor of this view. Hassoun’s argument is first presented. In sections three and four, I try to bring out a number of formal and informal problems with the argument. Section five discusses a number of possible replies to the worries raised in section four. The conclusion of the paper is that Hassoun’s argument should be rejected. There are two independent and individually sufficient reasons for this conclusion: the argument is invalid and contains at least one false premise.

This paper is concerned with the expressivist account of moral supervenience that Simon Blackburn has offered. First, the account is presented, and an objection to it is thereafter discussed. In short, the objection is that the supervenience constraint in moral discourse is mysterious, given that no similar constraint governs speech and thought in other areas of discourse that seem to be prime candidates for an expressivist analysis. The conclusion of the paper is that this objection can be fended off

Global poverty is a huge problem in today's world. This survey article seeks to be a first guide to those who are interested in, but relatively unfamiliar with, the main issues, positions and arguments in the contemporary philosophical discussion of global poverty. The article attempts to give an overview of four distinct and influential normative positions on global poverty. Moreover, it seeks to clarify, and put into perspective, some of the key concepts and issues that take center stage in the philosophical discussion of global poverty. The four positions to be discussed are labeled the Maximalist Position, the Minimalist Position, Intermediate Position I and Intermediate Position II. After an account of these four distinct positions, we turn, in the conclusion, to a discussion of what role empirical sciences such as economics and political science should play in normative considerations about global poverty

This paper deals with an aspect of the commitment-theoretic account of evaluative compounds that Simon Blackburn has recently offered. The main point of the paper is that the special account of disjunction is flawed because it fails to validate certain very simple patterns of inference. This point is brought out by considering two examples. A reply on behalf of Blackburn is considered, but it is shown that this reply is defective because it makes use of an unacceptable inference-rule. In the last section, the relatively technical point about disjunction is placed in a broader context. It is argued that without an acceptable account of disjunction, expressivism entails revisionism about everyday moral discourse

Infectious and parasitic diseases cause enormous health problems in the developing world whereas they leave the developed one relatively unscathed. Research and development (R&D) of drugs for diseases that mainly affect people in developing countries is limited. The problem that relatively few drugs are available for diseases that cause an enormous burden of disease in the developing world is called the 'availability problem'. In recent years, the availability problem has received quite a bit of attention. A number of proposals have been fielded as to how this problem might be minimized. Wild-card patent extensions, advance market commitments, cash prizes and the Health Impact Fund are prominent examples of such proposals. These proposals can be thought of as pull-mechanisms for R&D of drugs for neglected diseases. What has been coined a 'priority review voucher' is another pull-mechanism. This paper is a critical discussion of this pull-mechanism. First, the original priority review voucher scheme, as proposed by Ridley et al. (2006), is described. A number of objections to this scheme are thereafter presented. A few amendments to the original scheme are then suggested, and it is argued that with these amendments in place, the priority review voucher scheme constitutes an attractive way of stimulating R&D of drugs for neglected diseases.

In two recent essays, Thomas Pogge addresses the question of how research and development of essential drugs should be incentivized. Essential drugs are drugs for diseases that ruin human lives. The current incentivizing scheme for such drugs is, according to Pogge, a significant causal factor in bringing about a state of affairs in which millions of people die or suffer from lack of access to essential drugs. Pogge, therefore, suggests a reform plan for how to incentivize research and development of these drugs, and he is of the opinion that implementation of this plan will have a significant positive impact on the global disease burden. This paper is a critical examination of Pogge's reform plan. In the first part of the paper, Pogge's reasons for being dissatisfied with the current incentivizing scheme are spelled out. The reform plan is then presented, and in the final part of the paper, it is argued that the reform plan is flawed at a number of levels

Antibiotic resistance is a serious public health problem on a global scale. In both developed and developing countries, the unpleasant consequences of the phenomenon are being felt. This paper discusses wild-card patent extensions as a means to incentivize research and development of new antibiotics. The thesis defended in the paper is that the implementation of such patent extensions is an appropriate legislative response to the problem of antibiotic resistance. The general idea of wild-card patent extensions is presented in the first part of the paper. A number of objections to the idea are thereafter discussed and rejected

In 2004, Garrett Cullity made a significant contribution to the literature on what the world’s relatively affluent owe to the world’s relatively poor through the publishing of The Moral Demands of Affluence. In this discussion note, I draw attention to a logical problem in Cullity’s master argument in favor of the view that affluent individuals are justified in spending monetary resources on themselves at a level that lies well above what Peter Singer finds justified. The proposition I defend is that the premises leading to Cullity’s conclusion about the moderate, and not extremely demanding, nature of his position are inconsistent. These premises license any conclusion, including the negation of the one preferred by Cullity

Much of today’s international trade is conducted according to trade agreements that involve substantial and uniform protections of intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights are a socio‐economic tool that create a temporary monopoly for inventor firms and enable such firms to charge prices for their innovations that are many times higher than the marginal cost of production of the innovations. This allows the inventor firms to salvage their research‐costs and secure a profit on their innovations. A large body of contemporary philosophical and interdisciplinary literature suggests that intellectual property rights give rise to a number of ethical problems. This review paper seeks to give an overview of what these problems are. It also offers an outline of proposals as to how these problems might be alleviated, and it briefly explains the two classical defenses of the ethical permissibility of intellectual property rights. The ethical issues surrounding intellectual property rights are most pertinent when it is socially valuable goods that are given intellectual property protection. The discussions in this paper revolve around just one product type in order to bring out the broader ethical issues surrounding intellectual property rights. In line with much contemporary literature on the ethical dimensions of intellectual property rights, the product type in question is life‐saving medicines

Thomas Pogge has recently argued that the way in which research and development of essential medicines is incentivized, under existing World Trade Organization rules, should be supplemented with an additional incentivizing mechanism. One might hold a stronger view than the one that Pogge currently holds, namely that patent rights for essential medicines are morally unjustified per se. Throughout this paper, ‘the strong view’ refers to this view. The strong view is one that enjoys considerable support both within and outside the academic community. This paper critically discusses one specific argument in favor of the strong view. This argument is named the ‘Poggean argument’. This denominator is appropriate because a number of the essential premises of the argument are constituted by propositions that Pogge at some point has defended. The Poggean argument is valid, and defenders of the strong view also have some grounds for believing that the argument is sound. This belief comes, however, with what is arguably a too high cost, namely that the global institutional order becomes very demanding on taxpaying citizens of high-income countries if it is to be just. One may find acceptance of this cost relatively unproblematic, but this cost is, it is argued, unacceptable to anyone who has views on distributive justice that are sympathetic to the core tenets of libertarianism

In a paper from 2005, Gerhard Overland defends the thesis that one's responsibility to render assistance is not affected by having contributed to the situation by causing harm. Overland applies this thesis to the issue of what duties relatively well-off people have in terms of rendering assistance to the global poor and argues for the sub-conclusion that contribution carries little momentum when assessing our duty to assist people in severe need if we can do so at a little cost. In this paper, I discuss Overland's argument in favor of the sub-conclusion and try to show that it is not sound.