•  61
  •  5
    Response to Commentaries on ‘The Tractatus on Unity’
    Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3): 343-354. 2018.
    Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018, Page 343-354.
  •  11
    The Tractatus On Unity
    Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3): 250-271. 2018.
    ABSTRACTI argue that some of the central doctrines of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be seen as addressing the twin problems of semantic unity and...
  •  3
    The Primacy of Practice
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86 181-199. 2019.
    I argue that our procedures for determining whether ascriptions of a predicate represent things as being a certain way are ultimately pragmatic. Pragmatic procedures are not subject to validation by the referential procedure – determining whether there is a property playing the role of its referent. Predicates can represent even if we can't provide an independent identification of its referent. For these predicates, the speakers’ knowledge of how they represent objects as being would have to be …Read more
  •  6
    Belief, desire and the prediction of behaviour
    Philosophical Issues 29 (1): 295-310. 2019.
    Philosophical Issues, EarlyView.
  •  16
    Logic without metaphysics
    Synthese 1-28. forthcoming.
    Standard definitions of logical consequence for formal languages are atomistic. They take as their starting point a range of possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, each of which generates a unique truth value for each sentence. In modal logic, these possible assignments of semantic values are generated by Kripke-style models involving possible worlds and an accessibility relation. In first-order logic, they involve the standard structures…Read more
  •  11
    Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth
    Disputatio 8 (43): 147-171. 2016.
    I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I …Read more
  •  51
    Wittgenstein on accord
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3). 2003.
    The paper deals with the interpretation of Wittgenstein's views on the power of occurrent mental states to sort objects or states of affairs as in accord or in conflict with them, as presented in the rule-following passages of the Philosophical Investigations. I shall argue first that the readings advanced by Saul Kripke and John McDowell fail to provide a satisfactory construal of Wittgenstein's treatment of a platonist account of this phenomenon, according to which the sorting power of occurre…Read more
  •  41
    Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    This volume comprises nine lively and insightful essays by leading scholars on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on his early work
  •  60
    Wright on Moore
    In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford University Press. 2012.
    To the sceptic's contention that I don't know that I have hands because I don't know that there is an external world, the Moorean replies that I know that there is an external world because I know that I have hands. Crispin Wright has argued that the Moorean move is illegitimate, and has tried to block it by limiting the applicability of the principle of the transmission of knowledge by inference—the principle that recognising the validity of an inference from known premises generates knowledge …Read more
  •  62
    Wittgenstein's Nonsense Objection to Russell's Theory of Judgment
    In Michael Campbell & Michael O’Sullivan (eds.), Wittgenstein and Perception, Routledge. pp. 126-151. 2015.
    I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that Russell's theory of judgment fails to show that it's not possible to judge nonsense.
  •  123
    The Tractatus on Logical Consequence
    European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3): 425-442. 2010.
    I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary proposi…Read more
  •  31
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    Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief
    Philosophical Explorations 13 (1). 2010.
    The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman.
  •  49
    Scepticism and Reliable Belief
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are rendered illegitimate by reliabilist accounts. The goal of this book is to assess the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and its conclusions challenge this consensus. The book articulates and defends a theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition, and argu…Read more
  •  23
    Safety, sensitivity and differential support
    Synthese 1-10. forthcoming.
    The paper argues against Sosa’s claim that sensitivity cannot be differentially supported over safety as the right requirement for knowledge. Its main contention is that, although all sensitive beliefs that should be counted as knowledge are also safe, some insensitive true beliefs that shouldn’t be counted as knowledge are nevertheless safe.
  •  50
    Semantic Normativity and Naturalism
    In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Continuum International. 2012.
    The paper addresses the question whether semantic naturalism is undermined by the thought that semantic concepts are normative.
  •  15
    “The world is all that is the case”
    Philosophy Now 103 12-14. 2014.
  •  33
    Many interpreters of the Tractatus accept that the book endorses an argument for simples based on the reflection that, since complexes exist only contingently, if names referred to complexes the propositions in which they figure would lack sense if their referents went out of existence. More specifically, most interpreters read 2.0211-2.0212 as putting forward this argument. My main goal in this paper is to attack this reading and to put forward an alternative. I argue that there is no good reas…Read more
  •  200
    Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem
    Analysis 75 (4): 615-627. 2015.
    I argue that Epistemic Disjunctivism doesn’t sustain a successful anti-sceptical strategy. I contend, in particular, that the treatment of scepticism that Duncan Pritchard puts forward on behalf of Epistemic Disjunctivism is unsatisfactory.
  •  8
    Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein's Tractatus
    Oxford University Press UK. 2015.
    José L. Zalabardo puts forward a new interpretation of central ideas in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus concerning the structure of reality and our representations of it in thought and language. He presents the picture theory of propositional representation as Wittgenstein's solution to the problems that he had found in Bertrand Russell's theories of judgment. Zalabardo then attributes to Wittgenstein the view that facts and propositions are ultimate indivisible units, not the resu…Read more
  •  149
    Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1). 2008.
    I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be use…Read more
  •  124
    One strand in the rule-following considerations
    Synthese 171 (3): 509-519. 2008.
    I argue that a target of the rule - following considerations is the thought that there are mental episodes in which a consciously accessible item guides me in my decision to respond in a certain way when I follow a rule. I contend that Wittgenstein’s position on this issue invokes a distinction between a literal and a symbolic reading of the claim that these processes of guidance take place. In the literal sense he rejects the claim, but in the symbolic sense he sees nothing wrong with it. I con…Read more
  •  34
    Inference and Scepticism
    In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    I focus on a family of inferences that are intuitively incapable of producing knowledge of their conclusions, although they appear to satisfy sufficient conditions for inferential knowledge postulated by plausible epistemological theories. They include Moorean inferences and inductive-bootstrapping inferences. I provide an account of why these inferences are not capable of producing knowledge. I argue that the reason why these inferences fail to produce knowledge of their conclusions is that inf…Read more
  •  93
    Putting Reference Beyond Belief
    Philosophical Studies 91 (3): 221-257. 1998.
    The paper deals with Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. It considers the objections to the argument raised by David Lewis, Mark Heller, James van Cleve, Anthony Brueckner and others, to the effect that Putnam's reasoning fails to undermine versions of metaphysical realism which construe reference along externalist lines. I argue that the version of Putnam's argument that his critics have attacked is indeed powerless against externalist accounts of reference, b…Read more
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  •  43
    I take issue with Robert Brandom's claim that on an analysis of knowledge based on objective probabilities it is not possible to provide a stable answer to the question whether a belief has the status of knowledge. I argue that the version of the problem of generality developed by Brandom doesn't undermine a truth-tracking account of noninferential knowledge that construes truth-tacking in terms of conditional probabilities. I then consider Sherrilyn Roush's claim that an account of knowledge ba…Read more
  •  39
    Realism detranscendentalized
    European Journal of Philosophy 8 (1). 2000.
    The paper develops an account of semantic notions which occupies a middle ground between antirealism and traditional forms of realism, using some ideas from the work of John McDowell. The position is based on a contrast between two points of view from which we might attempt to characterize our linguistic practices from the cosmic exile s point of view and from the midst of language as a going concern. The contrast is drawn in terms of whether our characterization of our linguistic practices is t…Read more