•  159
    Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations
    Theoria 19 (2): 155-172. 2004.
    Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both D…Read more
  •  124
    The mud of experience and kinds of awareness
    Theoria 22 (1): 5-15. 2007.
    In Authority and Estrangement Richard Moran takes some rather illuminating steps towards getting rid of the Cartesian picture of self-knowledge. I argue, however, that Moran’s crucial distinction between deliberative and theoretical attitude is seriously contaminated by that traditional picture. More specifically, I will point out why some crucial aspects of the phenomena that Moran describes in terms of the interplay between the theoretical and the deliberative attitude, should rather be interp…Read more
  •  119
    First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement
    European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3): 325-362. 2010.
    Abstract: There is much that I admire in Richard Moran's account of how first-person authority may be consistent with self-knowledge as an achievement. In this paper, I examine his attempt to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, which is surely that the patient should go beyond the mere theoretical acceptance of the analyst's interpretation, and requires instead a more intimate, first-personal, awareness by the patient of their psychological condition.I object, however, that the wa…Read more
  •  85
    To begin, I introduce an analysis of interlevel relations that allows us to offer an initial characterization of the debate about the way classical and connectionist models relate. Subsequently, I examine a compatibility thesis and a conditional claim on this issue.With respect to the compatibility thesis, I argue that, even if classical and connectionist models are not necessarily incompatible, the emergence of the latter seems to undermine the best arguments for the Language of Thought Hypothe…Read more
  •  63
    Presentation
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (1): 5-12. 2001.
    As I see bus no. 29 approaching, I raise my arm. The bus stops, I take a few steps and get on it. This happens because the driver, having seen my arm raised, interpreted the gesture as a conventional expression of my wish to get on the bus. If it had been bus no. 17, I would not have raised my arm because I know that that bus follows quite a different route. This is not, of course, the end of the story. I might also mention the reasons why I really wanted route 29, and so on. Fortunately, there …Read more
  •  60
    Observation, Character, and A Purely First-Person Point of View
    Acta Analytica 26 (4): 311-328. 2011.
    In Values and the Reflective Point of View (2006), Robert Dunn defends a certain expressivist view about evaluative beliefs from which some implications about self-knowledge are explicitly derived. He thus distinguishes between an observational and a deliberative attitude towards oneself, so that the latter involves a purely first-person point of view that gives rise to an especially authoritative, but wholly non-observational, kind of self-knowledge. Even though I sympathize with many aspects o…Read more
  •  51
    The relevance of moral disagreement. Some worries about nondescriptivist cognitivism
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1): 217-233. 2002.
    Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper,I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical framework Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Although I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am les…Read more
  •  45
    In this wholly original study, Josep Corbi asks how one should relate to a certain kind of human suffering, namely, the harm that people cause one another. Relying upon real life examples of human suffering--including torture, genocide, and warfare--as opposed to thought experiments, Corbi proposes a novel approach to self-knowledge that runs counter to standard Kantian approaches to morality.
  •  39
    Understanding, truth, and explanation
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1): 19-34. 1988.
    (1988). Understanding, truth, and explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 19-34. doi: 10.1080/02698598808573322
  •  32
    The Mud of Experience and Kinds of Awareness
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 5-15. 2007.
    In Authority and Estrangement Richard Moran takes some rather illuminating steps towards getting rid of the Cartesian picture of self-knowledge. I argue, however, that Moran’s crucial distinction between deliberative and theoretical attitude is seriously contaminated by that traditional picture. More specifically, I will point out why some crucial aspects of the phenomena that Moran describes in terms of the interplay between the theoretical and the deliberative attitude, should rather be interp…Read more
  •  27
    Subjetividad y valor en un mundo natural
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (2): 25-44. 1998.
    I discuss, in this paper, the view of value that is associated with Humean motivational theories. I argue that these theories unjustifiably constrain the kind of element that may contribute to our motivational economy and, thereby, unduly reduce our capacity to recognize certain sources of value. To this purpose, I will examine some axiological experiences that, if I am right, are inaccessible to a Humean analysis of our motivational structure. I will insist, for instance, on a sense in which so…Read more
  •  26
    The Insight of Empiricism: In Defence of a Hypothetical but Propositional Given
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2): 289-298. 2009.
    No abstract
  •  23
    Evidence and First-Person Authority
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 51-66. 2011.
  •  19
    In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicalist assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the nonphysical properties that participate in that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue agai…Read more
  •  16
    El refugio de la claridad
    Análisis Filosófico 30 (1): 89-121. 2010.
    La claridad y la argumentación sirven de refugio frente a la charlatanería en el filosofar, pero quienes enfatizan tales principios metodológicos tienden a identificar la claridad con la literalidad y la argumentación con la formalización. En este trabajo, considero los límites de una elucidación filosófica de nuestras prácticas morales que descanse en tal identificación; para ello, examino la relevancia de la posición original de John Rawls para la determinación de los principios de la justicia…Read more
  •  14
    Pragmatism, de Hilary Putnam
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (1): 114-118. 1996.
  •  11
    Self and Sense in a Natural World
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2): 87-116. 2001.
    A subject is a being who has a life to lead. In this paper, I explore the array of resources that are available to us (i.e., Westerners at the turn of the millennium) to articulate and assess our lives. Specifically, I shall reflect on the impact that such matters may have on our naturalist conviction that the world ultimately consists of a causal network where notions such as sense and value have no direct bearing. Sometend to assume that an implication of our naturalist world-view is that the …Read more
  •  9
    Habermas: pragmática universal y normatividad
    Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 1 39-57. 1989.
  •  7
    El principio de justificación inferencial, escepticismo y creencias causales
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 195-202. 2000.
  •  4
    On Richard Moran's Authority and estrangement. Author's reply
    with Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Josep L. Prades, Hilan Bensusan, Manuel de Pinedo, Carla Bagnoli, and Richard Moran
    Theoria 22 (58). 2007.
  •  3
    El arrullo de la lija. Una propuesta pedagógica
    with Lino San Juan Tamayo
    Dilema: Revista de Filosofía 12 (2): 117-120. 2008.
  • Sobre héroes, dioses y palabras: el siglo de Frege
    Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 6 131. 1993.
  • Conduct, Norms and Values
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 141-147. 2009.