Josep Ferret Mas

The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 exacerbated two distinct concerns about the independence of central banks: a concern about legitimacy and a concern about economic justice. This paper explores the legitimacy of independent central banks from the perspective of these two concerns, by presenting two distinct models of central banking and their different claims to political legitimacy and distributive justice. I argue primarily that we should avoid construing central bank independence in binary terms, such that central banks either are, or are not, independent. I will argue that we should instead construe central bank independence in scalar terms, so that independence admits of degree, thus allowing us to develop an account of independence in which central banks can retain it to the extent necessary for economic efficiency, while meeting reasonable concerns regarding democratic legitimacy and economic justice.

Philosophers have distinguished at least three different interpretations of Rawls’s difference principle. This principle claims that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. My aim in this paper is to show that according to the most attractive and plausible interpretation of that principle, which I call the reciprocity view, Rawls’s difference principle allows us to limit economic growth in order to preserve nature and protect the interests of future generations, while still meeting the demands of justice concerning the least advantaged members of society.

This article asks how the costs and benefits of operating a monetary union should be distributed amongst its more and less competitive members, taking as an example the operation of the European Monetary Union (EMU or Eurozone). Drawing on existing domestic and transnational justice debates, I resist both a purely procedural and a purely distributive view. The former assumes treaties against a fair background can make any distribution fair and disregards how individual citizens are likely to fare depending on how a monetary union is organized. The latter requires justice amongst Eurozone co-citizens, neglecting the value of member states’ choices and attitudes towards risk. Instead, I defend a view of the EMU as an association of free self-determining states. I also argue that a variety of factors are relevant to this problem, including the need to protect less competitive states from ‘domination,’ or inappropriate forms of control by their co-members, and to protect citizens from various forms of deprivation even if their own governments are willing to expose them to the relevant risks.

Philosophers distinguish between at least two kinds of intergenerational climate justice principles. There are principles that tell us to mitigate climate change, and principles that tell us how to share mitigation costs fairly. Some authors argue (a) that central banks can, and should, serve intergenerational climate justice by implementing policies that cut emissions and thereby reduce the climate burden on future generations. Others also argue (b) that some of these policies justly shift some of the financial costs of mitigation onto future generations. First, I will present the case for Green Quantitative Easing as a policy that serves both kinds of principles of intergenerational climate justice. Secondly, I will review the normative issues raised by the move of “making our grandchildren pay.”Different economists have presented a range of policy options that a green central bank can implement to meet these principles. The first part of the chapter will offer these policy options, starting with milder proposals and ending with the more radical but realistic ones that are intergenerational in scope, and which should be seen as instances of borrowing from the future. Moreover, some claim that Green Quantitative Easing is superior to alternative strategies, such as a global carbon tax or a World Climate Bank, given the power of central banks to create money and buy bonds that can be kept in their balance sheet. Furthermore, in order to justify the moral acceptability of these policies, I will examine normative arguments for making our grandchildren pay. I will proceed by distinguishing between concessive and enthusiastic arguments in favor of borrowing from the future. Concessive arguments involve a normative claim: that making our grandchildren pay is unjust, and an empirical claim: that borrowing from the future is a more feasible way to take climate action now and avoid further harm to future generations. In contrast, enthusiastic defenses of borrowing from the future, as a guiding principle to share the burden of climate change mitigation and adaptation across generations, claim that it provides a better state of affairs or a more just world. I will start by analyzing the best-known concessive argument proposed by Broome and Foley, and their defense of efficiency without sacrifice, as well as various criticisms of that principle. Finally, I will critically examine an important objection raised by Gardiner: that making our grandchildren pay is a case of intergenerational extortion or moral corruption.