Joseph Ciaudo

Cet article se propose d’étudier de quelle façon l’« Introduction à la métaphysique » de Henri Bergson fut traduite en chinois entre 1918 et 1921. En analysant trois traductions proposées successivement par Liu Shuya, Cai Yuanpei et Yang Zhengyu, l’auteur met en lumière différents enjeux de la traduction des œuvres philosophiques occidentales. En retraduisant en français ces textes chinois, il met en évidence les décalages linguistiques et culturels. Bien loin de condamner d’éventuelles maladresses des traducteurs, l’objectif est de rechercher les raisons et les conséquences de ces dernières. Ainsi, on constate que ces versions chinoises, réalisées par des intellectuels non francophones et non spécialistes de Bergson, ont été à l’origine, en Chine, d’une certaine moralisation du bergsonisme, et plus particulièrement de la notion d’intuition. Les échos culturels des mots employés ont déplacé le texte de Bergson vers de nouvelles problématiques.

Stating that Liang was a Bergsonian entails saying nothing unconventional or of much profundity, lest one investigates into what “being a Bergsonian” meant at that time and in that place. The present chapter hence addresses several questions to clarify this label: Was Liang Bergsonian because he had read the philosopher, agreed with him on certain issues and gave a positive evaluation of his work? Was Liang a specialist of Bergson, or did he contribute to his introduction in China? Was he a Bergsonian because contemporaneous thinkers regarded him as such? Did Liang elaborate his own philosophy or thought in discussion with Bergsonism, or by employing some of its key concepts? I argue that the problem of Bergson’s place within Liang Shuming’s life and thought is in fact interlaced with the issue of his dual identity as a Confucian and a Buddhist. From a Buddhist point of view, Bergsonism was not enough: it failed at establishing a proper metaphysics. But from the point of view of a Confucian, it was bringing water to the mill by giving emphasis to the idea of life being in perpetual transformation and that intuitive modes of cognition and actions should be privileged. It is as if Liang’s evaluation and uses of Bergson could be understood as a form of upāya (fangbian 方便), an ‘expedient means.’ Bergsonism was not a truth, but it raised the awareness towards important elements in both the Chinese and the Indian intellectual traditions. It helped Liang characterize both of them. Henceforth, one can say that Bergson was an intellectual crossroad for Liang Shuming.