Joseph Martin Jose

In this paper, I will argue that embodied presence and ultimate commitments are not necessary for the authenticity of online relationships. In the first section, I will present Hubert Dreyfus’s Kierkegaardian analysis of the Internet. In the second, I will show the different positions that disagree with Dreyfus. And finally, in the third, I will look into the distinction between human to human and human to nonhuman online interactions, the continuity or discontinuity of the online and the offline relationships of persons, and the forms of the relationship that occurred. From that analysis, I will derive some cases that will show the inadequacies and problems of the conditions presented by Dreyfus.

In this paper, I endeavor to provide a critical examination of a recent pioneering work that engages Jean-Paul Sartre’s insights in analyzing social media interactions – Michael Lopato’s “Social media, love, and Sartre’s look of the other: Why online communication is not fulfilling?”. I shall show that in so far as Sartrean insights are concerned in Being and Nothingness, Lopato misconstrued what Sartre really meant with the Look of the Other and love, and is mistaken in appropriating such insights in arguing that online interactions are not fulfilling. I shall proceed by first discussing Sartre’s third region of being which is being-for-others which will comprise of the Look of the Other and the two attitudes to retrieve one’s freedom. Second, I shall flesh out the arguments of Lopato. Lastly, I shall present my critique of Lopato’s arguments which constitutes my reply to his work.

In this paper, we contend that the “Smith case” in Gettier’s attempt to refute the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge does not work. This is because the said case fails to satisfy the truth condition, and thus is not a case of JTB at all. We demonstrate this claim using the framework of Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. Accordingly, the truth value of Smith’s proposition “The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” partly depends on how Smith uses the definite description “the man who will get the job” when he utters the proposition. Since, upon uttering the proposition, Smith has in mind a particular individual, namely Jones, and not just whoever will fit the attribute specified in the definite description, Smith uses the definite description referentially. And so when it turns out that it is Smith who eventually gets the job, the definite description fails to refer to Jones as intended by Smith, thereby making Smith’s proposition false. To think that Smith’s proposition is still true, in this regard, is to use the definite description attributively—that it is about whoever will fit the definite description. Apparently, when Gettier claims that Smith’s proposition is still true, to demonstrate that it is a case of JTB, he, in effect, imposes his attributive understanding of Smith’s usage of the definite description on Smith’s own epistemic situation.

Internet technology brings exciting benefits as well as alarming dangers to our everyday life. The way Internet technology affects our relationship with our own self and with our fellow human beings is a pressing concern. Hence, there is a need for an ethical reflection and analysis on problems confronting the online community and the relationships established and maintained therein. Considering the alarming dangers, addressing ethical concerns becomes urgent. And since these dangers confront the online community every day, we might as well turn to a philosopher, whose wisdom was attuned to the everyday concrete ethical concerns of his time: Confucius. In this paper, I shall argue that a Confucian ethics of humane online relations/interactions in the online community can be formulated. Such an ethics can aid in addressing the present malaise of the online community especially problems confronting human relations/interactions established therein. I shall argue for such claim in three steps. First, I shall establish that indeed the online world/online realm can be treated or viewed as a community, hence, an online community. Second, I shall establish that as a community it has certain problems that need to be addressed. Third, I shall establish that these problems may be addressed or seen in a different light by formulating a Confucian ethics of humane online relations/interactions.

Dharma is one of the foundational concepts of Hindu philosophy and religion. Some recent scholars argued that a more nuanced understanding of it could be based on the Itihasas: the Mahabharata and Ramayana. Such an understanding moves away from dharma’s traditional cosmic and formalistic analysis. However, a closer examination of these recent efforts shows that this kind of analysis is more philological rather than philosophical. It returns to a formalistic understanding of the concept, defeating the analysis’s original purpose. In light of this, this paper aims to mend the nuanced understanding of dharma by focusing on the character of Sita in the Ramayana. Through Carol Gilligan’s ethics of care, Sita will be shown to have a different moral voice and a unique way of approaching her moral/dharma dilemmas, contrasting with how Rama approaches his own. This difference can pave the way for understanding dharma as a gendered concept, thus contributing to a more nuanced understanding of dharma.