Wesleyan University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1977
Middletown, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  11
    Beyond Realism and Antirealism ---At Last?
    Spontaneous Generations 9 (1): 46-51. 2018.
    This paper recapitulates my four primary lines of argument that what is wrong with scientific realism is not realist answers to questions to which various anti-realists give different answers, but instead assumptions shared by realists and anti-realists in framing the question. Each strategy incorporates its predecessors as a consequence. A first, minimalist challenge, taken over from Arthur Fine and Michael Williams, rejects the assumption that the sciences have a general aim or goal. A second …Read more
  •  15
    Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science
    with Robert Ackermann
    Philosophical Review 99 (3): 474. 1990.
  •  30
    Intentionality and the Myths of the Given
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5): 766-770. 2015.
  • The Phenomenology of Observation in the Natural Sciences
    Dissertation, Northwestern University. 1977.
  • Review (review)
    History and Theory 28 125-132. 1989.
  • Two concepts of practices
    In Theodore R. Schatzki, K. Knorr-Cetina & Eike von Savigny (eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, Routledge. pp. 189--198. 2001.
  •  2
    4 From Realism or Antirealism to Science as Solidarity
    In Charles B. Guignon & David R. Hiley (eds.), Richard Rorty, Cambridge University Press. pp. 81. 2003.
  •  27
    Kierkegaard on Truth
    Idealistic Studies 18 (2): 145-171. 1988.
    Johannes Climacus’s reflections on truth in Concluding Unscientific Postscript have not fared well in subsequent philosophical discussion. Those who write about truth almost never pay attention to Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous account. Even those writing about Kierkegaard often ignore it, or discuss it only peripherally. Among those who do consider his position, two mistaken interpretations are common. Some critics regard Kierkegaard’s claim that truth is subjectivity as a bad answer to traditional…Read more
  •  27
    The narrative reconstruction of science
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (2). 1990.
    In contrast to earlier accounts of the epistemic significance of narrative, it is argued that narrative is important in natural scientific knowledge. To recognize this, we must understand narrative not as a literary form in which knowledge is written, but as the temporal organization of the understanding of practical activity. Scientific research is a social practice, whereby researchers structure the narrative context in which past work is interpreted and significant possibilities for further w…Read more
  • Power? Knowledge
    In Gary Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, Cambridge University Press. 2006.
  • Engaging Science: How to Understand Its Practices Philosophically
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 359-364. 1998.
  •  82
    Arguing for the Natural Ontological Attitude
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988. 1988.
    Arthur Fine has recently argued that standard realist and anti-realist interpretations of science should be replaced by "natural ontological attitude" (NOA). I ask whether Fine's own justification for NOA can meet the standards of argument that underlie his criticisms of realism and anti-realism. Fine vacillates between two different ways of advocating NOA. The more minimalist defense ("why not try NOA?") begs the question against both realists and antirealists. A stronger program, based on Fine…Read more
  •  25
    Policing knowledge: Disembodied policy for embodied knowledge
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (3-4). 1991.
    Steve Fuller's Social Epistemology offers a constructive program for integrating philosophy and sociology of science as normative knowledge policy, constrained by the linguistic, psychological, social, and political embodiment of knowledge. I endorse and elaborate upon Fuller's insistence that science studies should take seriously the embodiment of knowledge, but criticize his conception of knowledge policy on three grounds. Knowledge policy as Fuller conceives it seems committed to an untenable…Read more
  •  43
    Husserlian phenomenology and scientific realism
    Philosophy of Science 54 (2): 222-232. 1987.
    Husserl's (1970) discussion of "Galilean science" is often dismissed as naïvely instrumentalist and hostile to science. He has been explicitly criticized for misunderstanding idealization in science, for treating the lifeworld as a privileged conceptual framework, and for denying that science can in principle completely describe the world (because ordinary prescientific concepts are irreplaceable). I clarify Husserl's position concerning realism, and use this to show that the first two criticism…Read more
  •  5
    Cultural Collisions: Post-Modern Technoscience by Raphael Sassower (review)
    Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 87 582-583. 1996.
  •  46
    Why write histories of science?
    History of the Human Sciences 23 (4): 100-104. 2010.
  •  12
    Response to Vogel and Roberts
    Social Epistemology 5 (4). 1991.
  •  24
    Philosophical discussions of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have often been framed by contrast to laws and deductive-nomological explanation. A more adequate conception of lawfulness and nomological necessity, emphasizing the role of modal considerations in scientific reasoning, circumvents such contrasts and enhances understanding of mechanisms and their scientific significance. The first part of the paper sketches this conception of lawfulness, drawing upon Haugeland, Lange, and Rouse.…Read more
  •  21
    Engaging Science through Cultural Studies
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994. 1994.
    The paper introduces cultural studies of science as an alternative to the "legitimation project" in philosophy and sociology of science. The legitimation project stems from belief that the epistemic standing and cultural authority of the sciences need general justification, and that such justification (or its impossibility) arises from the nature or characteristic aim of the sciences. The paper considers three central themes of cultural studies apart from its rejection of these commitments to th…Read more
  •  14
    A response to Francis Remedios
    Social Epistemology 12 (2). 1998.