•  804
    The Private Language Argument and a Second-Person Approach to Mindreading
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (4): 75--86. 2013.
    I argue that if Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument is correct, then both Theory Theory and Simulation Theory are inadequate accounts of how we come to know other minds since both theories assume the reality of a private language. Further, following the work of a number of philosophers and psychologists, I defend a ‘Second-Person Approach’ to mindreading according to which it is possible for us to be directly aware of at least some of the mental states of others. Because it is not necessary…Read more
  •  222
    In Defense of Emergent Individuals: A Reply to Moreland
    Faith and Philosophy 31 (1): 91-104. 2014.
    J. P. Moreland has recently raised a number of metaphysical objections to the theory of Emergent Individuals that is defended by Timothy O’ Connor, Jonathan Jacobs, and others. Moreland argues that only theism can provide a sufficient explanation for human consciousness, and he considers the theory of Emergent Individuals to offer a competing naturalistic explanation that must be refuted in order for his argument to be successful. Moreland focuses his objections on the account of emergence advoc…Read more