My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: Platonism Again, I don't put much weight on spookiness objections, which seems to be the only main complaint against non-nominalism ("Platonism" just seems derogatory!).
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism The question is too unclear to answer If rationalism is just the denial of empiricism (where this is the view that all knowledge is in some sense grounded in sensory experience or impressions), then I suppose I'm probably a rationalist. But if we assume a much broader notion of experience (as some seem to), then I'd hesitate.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Lean toward: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism I'm assuming "internalism" here means the relatively strong, traditional version that making a moral judgment necessarily entails possession of the corresponding (though defeasible) motivation. But if "internalism" means something weaker, then I'd lean toward it (like what Michael Smith calls "the practicality requirement," according to which making the moral judgment entails the existence of the motivation unless the agent is practically irrational).
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Lean toward: one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: further-fact view The further fact needn't be a soul or anything. I just think the other two views have serious problems while the only main complaint about the further-fact view just seems to be that it's mysterious or something. In general I don't put much weight on spookiness objections.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Agnostic/undecided
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Millian
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival I'm assuming the new matter is arranged and whatnot the same as the old matter so that my psychology and biology are the same.
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Agnostic/undecided The question seems to imply that either switching is morally required or not switching is. But I'm not sure this isn't just a false dichotomy. It's a tough situation; I guess I lean toward counting each action as permissible.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible I may even lean toward metaphysically possible, but that's only if we assume some odd notion of qualia (as is usually assumed). But then I'm not so sure qualia matter or even exist.