Joshua Mills-Knutsen

In 1979, Audre Lorde delivered a paper at a conference celebrating feminism that proceeded to undermine the self-congratulatory tone of the participants by alerting them to the ways that they too were in need of radical critique. In this paper I explore the nature and importance of what it means to be radical by analyzing Lorde’s place within the broader trend of philosophical self-criticism as it specifically relates to the feminist movement. My goal is to argue that while radical theory must always stretch out toward the world, it must always turn back on itself in order to avoid the very injustices it seeks to correct

Rousseau’s influence on Kant in the realm of ethical theory is well established. Just as Kant credits Hume with inspiring his critique of metaphysics, Kant admits a debt to Rousseau as an inspiration for his egalitarian approach to ethics. There is reason to suspect, however, that Rousseau’s influence extends beyond the realm of ethics, and into Kant’s Critique of Judgment. While ostensibly a work about aesthetic and teleological judgment stemming from the line of aesthetic thought that includes the Earl of Shaftsbury, some commentators, most notably Hannah Arendt, have read the third Critique as a political treatise. In doing so, she attributes to Kant the first truly democratic political theory by heralding the egalitarianism within his theory of judgment as a true revolution in the realm of political philosophy. Unfortunately, such politically minded commentators have failed to spot the Rousseauian heritage of the concepts that permeate the book. This heritage is especially problematic for Arendt who understands Rousseau’s philosophy as justifying the kind of tyranny found in modern day despotism. In neglecting to explore the link between Rousseau and Kant’s theory of judgment, Arendt’s analysis of Kant overreaches. This paper seeks to temper her championing of Kant by demonstrating the extent of Rousseauian influence on the third Critique in order to better understand Kant’s place in the history of political theory