Jozef Muller

Aristotle tells us that in order to develop virtue, one needs to come to love and hate the right sorts of things. However, his description of the virtuous person clearly privileges love to hate. It is love rather than hate that is the main driving force of a good life. It is because of her love of knowledge, truth and beauty that the virtuous person organizes her life in a certain way and pursues these rather than other things (such as pleasure). When hate comes into the picture, it is merely an unavoidable consequence of loving those noble and beautiful things. The virtuous person hates things that are contrary to her values, but does not concentrate on them, much less constructs her life in the pursuit of their destruction. But why privilege love over hate in this way? Why could not a good (happy) and virtuous life be a life driven primarily by hate (in particular, one aimed at eradicating what one (correctly) considers shameful and evil)? Without appealing to any consequences or harmful effects that hate might have on other People, the paper gives two answers to this question. First, allowing hate (rather than love) to dominate one’s life would undermine the right relationship between the two parts of the soul (the rational and the non-rational one) that Aristotle recognizes. Virtue involves establishing the right kind of internal ordering of one’s soul and this cannot be done if one’s soul is dominated by hate. Second, hate has negative cognitive effects insofar as it renders one insensitive to the beauty of human nature and behavior and actively precludes one from acquiring knowledge and understanding. Accordingly, if a good life is a life that involves virtue and knowledge, a life fueled by hate cannot but fall short of that ideal.

In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than the soul of the uncontrolled agent

In Alberts zweiten Kommentar zur Nikomachischen Ethik findet sich vor der Kommentierung des Aristoteles-Textes ein eigenständiger Traktat zum allgemeinen Begriff des Guten, der im Rahmen des Artikels erstmals in kritischer Edition zugänglich gemacht wird. In doktrinaler Sicht handelt es sich um einen Text von fundamentaler Bedeutung, insofern Albert verschiedene Definitionen und Bestimmungen des Guten in ihrer inhaltlichen Vereinbarkeit und Konvergenz aufweist. In nuce entwickelt Albert hier die für sein ganzes Werk maßgebliche Metaphysik des Guten, in welche sowohl die Transzendentalienlehre als auch die Grundmotive einer teleologischen Strebensethik aristotelischen Zuschnitts integriert werden. Der ethisch relevante Begriff des Guten findet dadurch seine ontotheologische Fundierung im höchsten Guten, also in Gott. Der vorliegende Artikel rekonstruiert im Anschluss an die kritische Edition die zentralen Argumente des Traktats und verortet diese durch Abgleich mit anderen Schriften in Alberts gesamten Oeuvre und Denken.Albert‘s second commentary on Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics is preceded by an independent treatise dealing with the general concept of the good, which is made accessible in a critical edition in this article for the first time. Regarding its doctrinal contents this treatise proves to be of fundamental importance because Albert demonstrates the compatibility and even the convergence of several different definitions and descriptions of the good, e.g. by Aristotle, Avicenna, Ps.-Dionysius and Boethius. Albert develops in a nutshell his metaphysics of goodness which is of overarching importance for his whole work and which integrates the theory of the transcendentals as well as the basic ideas of an ethical teleology in an Aristotelian vein. Thereby, the concept of the moral good finds its ultimate foundation in the highest good, i.e. in God. Drawing on the text of the presented critical edition the article retraces the central arguments of this treatise and compares them with other writings in order to show their place in Albert’s complete work and thought.