Juan José Sanguineti

El artículo examina el pensamiento de Wittgenstein sobre el lenguaje del dolor en la primera y tercera persona. Se subrayan ciertas diferencias gramaticales importantes, según el típico método lingüístico de este filósofo, no sólo respecto a esas dos perspectivas, sino también con relación al uso de verbos cognitivos como “sentir” y “saber”. El examen de muchos textos sugiere ciertos puntos acerca de las relaciones entre las vivencias personales, la captación empática de las vivencias ajenas y su traducción conceptual. Una breve comparación con algunos textos de Tomás de Aquino completa la propuesta de la existencia de un conocimiento no intencional.

The Importance of Neuroscience in the Study of Religiosity The article aims to determine whether neuroscience is relevant for a better comprehension of religious activities. The answer to this problem emphasizes the distinction between mental operations and their intentional content. Neurobiological studies, I argue, can be important to evaluate the psychological and neural dimension of religious acts, with caution due to their great complexity, but not to evaluate the truth and genuineness of their content, neither to solve objective religious problems. Neuroscience may be helpful for the discernment of some extraordinary religious experiences and to study pseudo-religious pathologies as well.

Freedom in L. Polo’s transcendental anthropology is seen as equivalent to the human person, conceived as a peculiar act of existence different from the act of being attributed to the material universe. More precisely, freedom constitutes, together with co-existence, intellect and self-donating love, the four personal transcendentals of the being-person. The structure of self-donating love is the dynamics of giving and accepting. At the level of essence as a manifestation of the person, freedom appears as the self which is capable of voluntary acts. Voluntary actions perform, through many good works, what is originally required by self-donating love.