| Question |
Answer |
Comments |
| A priori knowledge: yes and no |
Accept: yes |
And lots of it! |
| Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism |
Lean toward: Platonism |
|
| Aesthetic value: objective and subjective |
Accept both |
Both exists. VERY roughly: what makes us merry is subjective; what inspires awe is objective - yet not necessarily the same for each of us (not uniform). A real explanation would not fit in this margin.. |
| Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no |
Accept: yes |
|
| Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism |
Other |
I don't quite understand the terms. Some beliefs are given bij God and properly basic; others follow from other beliefs, and others again from beliefs plus experience. |
| External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism |
Lean toward: non-skeptical realism |
The world is there insofar God thinks it, and we have a priori knowledge of its existence. |
| Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will |
Accept: libertarianism |
|
| God: theism and atheism |
Accept: atheism |
|
| Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism |
Accept: rationalism |
We have quite a bit of a priori knowledge, including knowledge that allows us to accept sense data as informative of the external world. |
| Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
|
| Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean |
Accept: non-Humean |
Again, a law exists if it is God's intention. We can discover the law because we have a priori knowledge of the low information content of the world - so the shortest description is the most likely. |
| Logic: classical and non-classical |
Accept an intermediate view |
Something akin to intuitionism: the finiteness of our world leads to infinite information content - if everything were computable no need for Gödel-like axioms would be necessary. God lives beyond this limit and has absolute truth, but we can't get at that (by rational means, at least, and never at all of it). |
| Mental content: internalism and externalism |
Lean toward: internalism |
All that is really needed is, again, God's intention. Is a transcendent being external? Nothing immanent and external is needed. |
| Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism |
Accept: moral realism |
|
| Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism |
Accept: non-naturalism |
Taking naturalism to contradict transcendentalism. |
| Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism |
Accept: non-physicalism |
|
| Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism |
Accept: cognitivism |
|
| Moral motivation: internalism and externalism |
Accept: internalism |
Hope I understand this one. The world has a "moral arrow", part of creation. We have a priori knowledge of that fact, and an inclination to follow the arrow. Other inclinations may and will couter that wish, of course. |
| Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes |
Accept: one box |
|
| Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics |
Lean toward: deontology |
On the absolute level. We may not know moral laws in their exact form (just as we don't know scientific laws in their final form), so in practice virtue ethics may result when my ethical intuition transcends the laws as I know them. |
| Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
I know what I believe on this, but haven't read enough to know what some of the terms above mean. |
| Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view |
Reject one, undecided between others |
Again, I don't know quite what the terms mean. Identity follows, not surprisingly, from God's intention - see the teleport question. |
| Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism |
Lean toward: egalitarianism |
Egalitarianism = treating people as of equal worth. The individual is definitely worth more than the state, but the state may infringe on liberty to avoid prisoners' dilemmas. |
| Proper names: Fregean and Millian |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
|
| Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism |
Accept: scientific realism |
Based on our a priori knowledge of the low information content of our world, and assuming science means finding the shortest explantion of things. (And that realism implies knowing that further research will probably yield ever refined theories - possibly forever.) |
| Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death |
Accept another alternative |
Identity follows from God's intention. If God means the teleported person to be the same, it is. Otherwise, not. |
| Time: A-theory and B-theory |
Lean toward: B-theory |
I suppose that means the B-series is primary. God being "outside time", we are dreamt "at once" (wrong term) at each moment, and at each moment we have a different A-series. |
| Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch |
Lean toward: don't switch |
Now if probabilities get involved it becomes a different matter, and they always do, of course. |
| Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic |
Lean toward: correspondence |
Both truth and reality follow from God's intention (like dream truth and reality from the intention of the dreamer). Insofar there is a single intention truth and reality correspond. |
| Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible |
Accept: metaphysically possible |
|
