•  174
    The Sense of Agency in OCD
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2): 363-380. 2019.
    This paper proposes an integrated account of the etiology of OCD that accommodates both dysfunctional cognitions and sensorimotor features of compulsive action. It is argued that cognitive/metacognitive theories do not aspire to address all obsessive-compulsive phenomenal properties and that empirical evidence concerning some of these requires the incorporation of motor deficits as an independent factor in a plausible conception of OCD. The difference in agency attribution between obsessive-comp…Read more
  •  150
    The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy (edited book)
    with Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai, and Istvan Toth Oliver
    Eötvös Loránd University Press. 2017.
  •  29
    Agency and Mental States in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 23 (1): 47-59. 2016.
    The dominant philosophical conceptions of obsessive-compulsive behavior present its subject as having a deficiency, usually characterized as volitional, due to which she lacks control and choice in acting. Compulsions (mental or physical) tend to be treated in isolation from the obsessive thoughts that give rise to them. I offer a different picture of compulsive action, one that is, I believe, more faithful to clinical reality. The clue to (most) obsessive-compulsive behavior seems to be the way…Read more
  •  11
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1): 5-6. 2006.
  •  5
    Emotional content, cognitive precondition and phenomenology
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1): 101-107. 2006.
  • Individuum, közösség és jog Spinoza filozófiájában (review)
    Studia Spinozana: An International and Interdisciplinary Series 16 312-314. 2008.