•  1295
    Identity and distinction in Spinoza's ethics
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2). 2005.
    In Ethics 1p5, Spinoza asserts that “In Nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute”. This claim serves as a crucial premise in Spinoza’s argument for substance monism, yet Spinoza’s demonstration of the 1p5 claim is surprisingly brief and appears to have obvious difficulties. This paper answers the principle difficulties that have been raised in response to Spinoza’s argument for 1p5. The key to understanding the 1p5 argument lies in a proper understanding of…Read more
  •  863
    It is sometimes claimed that as members of the species Homo sapiens we have a responsibility to promote the good of Homo sapiens itself (distinct from the good of its individual members). Lawrence Johnson has recently defended this claim as part of his approach to resolving the problem of future generations. We show that there are several difficulties with Johnson's argument, many of which are likely to attend any attempt to establish the moral considerability of Homo sapiens or species generall…Read more
  •  778
    Locke's theory of classification
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2). 2003.
    Locke is often cited as a precursor to contemporary natural kind realism. However, careful attention to Locke’s arguments show that he was unequivocally a conventionalist about natural kinds. To the extent that contemporary natural kind realists see themselves as following Locke, they misunderstand what he was trying to do. Locke argues that natural kinds require either dubious metaphysical commitments (e.g., to substantial forms or universals), or a question-begging version of essentialism. …Read more
  •  732
    Biological-mereological coincidence
    Philosophical Studies 161 (2): 309-325. 2012.
    This paper presents and defends an account of the coincidence of biological organisms with mereological sums of their material components. That is, an organism and the sum of its material components are distinct material objects existing in the same place at the same time. Instead of relying on historical or modal differences to show how such coincident entities are distinct, this paper argues that there is a class of physiological properties of biological organisms that their coincident mereolo…Read more
  •  671
    Species Concepts and Natural Goodness
    In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving nature at its joints: natural kinds in metaphysics and science, Mit Press. pp. 289. 2011.
    This chapter defends a pluralist understanding of species on which a normative species concept is viable and can support natural goodness evaluations. The central question here is thus: Since organisms are to be evaluated as members of their species, how does a proper understanding of species affect the feasibility of natural goodness evaluations? Philippa Foot has argued for a form of natural goodness evaluation in which living things are evaluated by how well fitted they are for flourishing as…Read more
  •  644
    Two approaches to natural kinds
    Synthese 199 (5-6): 12177-12198. 2021.
    Philosophical treatments of natural kinds are embedded in two distinct projects. I call these the philosophy of science approach and the philosophy of language approach. Each is characterized by its own set of philosophical questions, concerns, and assumptions. The kinds studied in the philosophy of science approach are projectible categories that can ground inductive inferences and scientific explanation. The kinds studied in the philosophy of language approach are the referential objects of a …Read more
  •  605
    On the metaphysics of species
    Philosophy of Science 71 (2): 156-173. 2004.
    This paper explains the metaphysical implications of the view that species are individuals (SAI). I first clarify SAI in light of the separate distinctions between individuals and classes, particulars and universals, and abstract and concrete things. I then show why the standard arguments given in defense of SAI are not compelling. Nonetheless, the ontological status of species is linked to the traditional "species problem," in that certain species concepts do entail that species are individuals…Read more
  •  54
    Natural, Artifactual, and Moral Goodness
    The Journal of Ethics 21 (3): 291-307. 2017.
    In Natural Goodness, Philippa Foot aims to provide an account of moral evaluation that is both naturalistic and cognitivist. She argues that moral evaluation is a variety of natural evaluation in the sense that moral judgments of human action and character have the same “grammar” or “conceptual structure” as natural judgments of the goodness of plants and animals. We argue that Foot’s naturalist project can succeed, but not in the way she envisions, because her central thesis that moral evaluati…Read more
  • Locke, Natural Kinds, and Essentialism
    Dissertation, Tulane University. 1999.
    "Locke, Natural Kinds, And Essentialism" argues for a minimalist theory of natural kinds. I begin with a historical treatment of Locke's account of natural kinds, which was a conventionalist view. I then build a theory of natural kinds that recognizes a restricted class of natural kinds, while remaining conventionalist in important respects, in the spirit of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. ;In Chapter 1, I argue that Locke clearly denies the existence of natural kinds, and I explai…Read more