Jules Coleman

Constructor University
Florida State University
  •  684
    'Law'
    Legal Theory 9 (1): 1-41. 2003.
    We explore the relationship between jurisprudential theories pertaining to the nature of law and semantic and metasemantic theories pertaining to the meaning of ‘law’ in the wake of Dworkin’s notorious Semantic Sting argument in Law’s Empire (HUP 1986). Along the way we delineate various aspects of the semantic and metasemantic underpinnings of ‘law’ as an artifact term and advance the general methodological point that jurisprudential inquiry is only negligibly constrained by the findings of sem…Read more
  •  261
    US Senate is considering legislation designed to immunize small businesses from lawsuits brought by customers alleging to have been infected with COVID-19 while on the premises. The legislation seeks to subsidize reopening small businesses by reducing their vulnerability to liability. I argue that the legislation produces worse public health outcomes than existing liability regimes, obliterates claims to redress supported by corrective justice, and unfairly burdens victims by forcing them to b…Read more
  •  210
    Beyond inclusive legal positivism
    Ratio Juris 22 (3): 359-394. 2009.
    In this essay, I characterize the original intervention that became Inclusive Legal Positivism, defend it against a range of powerful objections, explain its contribution to jurisprudence, and display its limitations and its modest jurisprudential significance. I also show how in its original formulations ILP depends on three notions that are either mistaken or inessential to law: the separability thesis, the rule of recognition, and the idea of criteria of legality. The first is false and is in…Read more
  •  154
    Democracy and social choice
    with John Ferejohn
    Ethics 97 (1): 6-25. 1986.
  •  135
    On the Relationship Between Law and Morality
    Ratio Juris 2 (1): 66-78. 1989.
    Instead of being embarrassed and uneasy about the implications of the separation thesis, positivists should welcome the fact that they cannot account for the obligatoriness of law. The rule of recognition is only a social rule and introduces no grounds for obligation.
  •  128
    The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (edited book)
    with Scott Shapiro
    Oxford University Press. 2002.
    One of the first volumes in the new series of prestigious Oxford Handbooks, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law brings together specially commissioned essays by twenty-six of the foremost legal theorists currently writing, to provide a state of the art overview of jurisprudential scholarship.
  •  121
    Blameworthiness and Time
    Legal Theory 18 (2): 101-137. 2012.
    Reactive emotion accounts hold that blameworthiness should be analyzed in terms of the familiar reactive emotions. However, despite the attractions of such views, we are not persuaded that blameworthiness is ultimately a matter of correctly felt reactive emotion. In this paper, we draw attention to a range of little-discussed considerations involving the moral significance of the passage of time that drive a wedge between blameworthiness and the reactive emotions: the appropriateness of the reac…Read more
  •  120
    Beyond the Separability Thesis: Moral Semantics and the Methodology of Jurisprudence
    Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (4): 581-608. 2007.
    Next SectionIn emphasizing the importance of the separability thesis, legal philosophers have inadequately appreciated other philosophically important ways in which law and morality are or might be connected with one another. In this article, I argue that the separability thesis cannot shoulder the philosophical burdens that it has been asked to bear. I then turn to two issues of greater importance to jurisprudence. These are ‘the moral semantics of law’ and ‘the normativity of theory constructi…Read more
  •  114
    Jules Coleman, one of the world's leading philosophers of law, here presents his most mature work so far on substantive issues in legal theory and the appropriate methodology for legal theorizing. In doing so, he takes on the views of highly respected contemporaries such as Brian Leiter, Stephen Perry, and Ronald Dworkin.
  •  92
    In Harm's Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 1994.
    For several decades the work of Joel Feinberg has been the most influential in legal, political and social philosophy in the English-speaking world. This 1994 volume honours that body of work by presenting fifteen essays, many of them by leading legal and political philosophers, that explore the problems that have engaged Feinberg over the years. Amongst the topics covered are issues of autonomy, responsibility and liability. It will be a collection of interest to anyone working in moral, legal …Read more
  •  88
    Justice in Settlements
    with Charles Silver
    Social Philosophy and Policy 4 (1): 102. 1986.
    INTRODUCTION In any society relatively few disputes are brought to judges for resolution. Most are handled informally or forgotten. Fewer still are cases that go to trial. Most are settled. Compromises are reached even in cases where issues are hotly contested and where millions or billions of dollars in damages are claimed. Recently, for example, one of the most controversial lawsuits of our time, the Agent Orange case, was settled. In that case, veterans of the Vietnam War, their spouses, and …Read more
  •  81
    On the moral argument for the fault system
    Journal of Philosophy 71 (14): 473-490. 1974.
  •  71
    Moral theories of torts: Their scope and limits: Part II (review)
    Law and Philosophy 2 (1). 1983.
    One approach to legal theory is to provide some sort of rational reconstruction of all or of a large body of the common law. For philosophers of law this has usually meant trying to rationalize a body of law under one or another principle of justice. This paper explores the efforts of the leading tort theorists to provide a moral basis - in the sense of rational reconstruction based on alleged moral principles - for the law of torts. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I consi…Read more
  •  68
    Theories of tort law
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  66
    Risks and wrongs
    Oxford University Press. 1992.
    This book by one of America's preeminent legal theorists is concerned with the conflict between the goals of justice and economic efficiency in the allocation of risk, especially risk pertaining to safety. The author approaches his subject from the premise that the market is central to liberal political, moral, and legal theory. In the first part of the book, he rejects traditional "rational choice" liberalism in favor of the view that the market operates as a rational way of fostering stable re…Read more
  •  65
    Legal positivism
    In Dennis M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Blackwell. 1996.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Jurisprudence: Method and Subject Matter Legality and Authority Positivism: Austin vs. Hart The Authority of Law Judicial Discretion Incorporationism and Legality Raz' s Theory of Authority Incorporationism and Authority Conclusion Postscript References.
  •  64
    H.L.A. Hart'sThe Concept of Lawis the most important and influential book in the legal positivist tradition. Though its importance is undisputed, there is a good deal less consensus regarding its core commitments, both methodological and substantive. With the exception of an occasional essay, Hart neither further developed nor revised his position beyond the argument of the book. The burden of shaping the prevailing understanding of his views, therefore, has fallen to others: notably, Joseph Raz…Read more
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  •  52
    Corrective Justice and Property Rights: JULES L. COLEMAN
    Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (2): 124-138. 1994.
    Suppose the prevailing distribution of property rights is unjust as determined by the relevant conception of distributive justice. You have far more than you should have under that theory and I have far less. Then I defraud you and in doing so reallocate resources so that our holdings ex post more closely approximate what distributive justice requires. Do I have a duty to return the property to you? There are many good reasons for requiring me to return to you what I have taken. One is that whil…Read more
  •  51
    Justice and the Argument for No-Fault
    Social Theory and Practice 3 (2): 161-180. 1974.
  •  50
    Private law theory (edited book)
    Garland. 1994.
    The Tragedy of the Commons The population prohlem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality. ...
  •  44
    Market Contractarianism and the Unanimity Rule*: JULES L. COLEMAN
    Social Philosophy and Policy 2 (2): 69-114. 1985.
    This essay is part of a larger project exploring the extent to which the market paradigm might be usefully employed to explain and in some instances justify nonmarket institutions. The focus of the market paradigm in this essay is the relationship between the idea of a perfectly competitive market and aspects of both the rationality of political association and the theory of collective choice. In particular, this essay seeks to identify what connections, if any, exist between one kind of market …Read more
  •  43
    Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka (edited book)
    with Christopher W. Morris
    Cambridge University Press. 1998.
    Gregory S. Kavka was a prominent and influential figure in contemporary moral and political philosophy. The essays in this volume are concerned with fundamental issues of rational commitment and social justice to which Kavka devoted his work as a philosopher. The essays take Kavka's work as a point of departure and seek to advance the respective debates. The topics include: the relationship between intention and moral action as part of which Kavka's famous 'toxin puzzle' is a focus of discussion…Read more
  •  43
    Rational Choice and Rational Cognition
    Legal Theory 3 (2): 183-203. 1997.
    There is a close but largely unexplored connection between law and economics and cognitive psychology. Law and economics applies economic models, modes of analysis, and argument to legal problems. Economic theory can be applied to legal problems for predictive, explanatory, or evaluative purposes. In explaining or assessing human action, economic theory presupposes a largely unarticulated account of rational, intentional action. Philosophers typically analyze intentional action in terms ofdesire…Read more
  •  42
    Contracts and torts
    Law and Philosophy 12 (1). 1993.