•  4929
    Responsibility for Implicit Bias
    Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3): 274-306. 2012.
    Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for…Read more
  •  3991
    Responsibility for implicit bias
    Philosophy Compass 12 (3). 2017.
    Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two decades have revealed implicit biases. Although implicit processes are pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead us into error. The most problematic forms of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite intentions to the contrary, implicit biases can influence our behaviours and judgements, contributing…Read more
  •  1558
    The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias
    with Joseph Sweetman
    In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    The term 'implicit bias' has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical discourse. Our aim in this paper is to scrutinise the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is l…Read more
  •  1147
    Implicit Bias, Character and Control
    with Dan Kelly
    In Jonathan Webber & Alberto Masala (eds.), From Personality to Virtue, . pp. 106-133. 2016.
    Our focus here is on whether, when influenced by implicit biases, those behavioural dispositions should be understood as being a part of that person’s character: whether they are part of the agent that can be morally evaluated.[4]  We frame this issue in terms of control. If a state, process, or behaviour is not something that the agent can, in the relevant sense, control, then it is not something that counts as part of her character. A number of theorists have argued that individuals do not hav…Read more
  •  848
    The Retributive Emotions: Passions and Pains of Punishment
    Philosophical Papers 39 (3): 343-371. 2010.
    It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they are a part, are morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering of the wrong-doer, and the aim to bring thi…Read more
  •  819
    Punishment and Justice
    Social Theory and Practice 36 (1): 78-111. 2010.
    Should the state punish its disadvantaged citizens who have committed crimes? Duff has recently argued that where disadvantage persists the state loses its authority to hold individuals to account and to punish for criminal wrongdoings. I here scrutinize Duff’s argument for the claim that social justice is a precondition for the legitimacy of state punishment. I sharpen an objection to Duff’s argument: with his framework, we seem unable to block the implausible conclusion that where disadvantage…Read more
  •  547
    Clarifying Capacity: Reasons and Value
    In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Health, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    It is usually appropriate for adults to make significant decisions, such as about what kinds of medical treatment to undergo, for themselves. But sometimes impairments are suffered - either temporary or permanent - which render an individual unable to make such decisions. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 sets out the conditions under which it is appropriate to regard an individual as lacking the capacity to make a particular decision (and when provisions should be made for a decision on their behalf…Read more
  •  393
    Implicit Bias and Prejudice
    In M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, Routledge. 2019.
    Recent empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit biases: fast, automatic, and difficult to control processes that encode stereotypes and evaluative content, and influence how we think and behave. Since it is difficult to be aware of these processes - they have sometimes been referred to as operating 'unconsciously' - we may not know that we harbour them, nor be alert to their influence on our cognition and action. And since they are difficult to contr…Read more
  •  299
    How, if at all, do the findings of social psychology impact upon philosophical analyses of discrimination? In this chapter, I outline key findings from three research programs from psychology – concerning in-group/out-group favoritism; implicit bias; and stereotype threat. I argue that each set of findings presents challenges to how philosophical analyses of group discrimination are formulated, and propose possible revisions to be explored in future work.
  •  222
    Relational autonomy and paternalistic interventions
    Res Publica 15 (4): 321-336. 2009.
    Relational conceptions of autonomy attempt to take into account the social aspects of autonomous agency. Those views that incorporate not merely causally, but constitutively necessary relational conditions, incorporate a condition that has the form: A necessary condition for autonomous agency is that the agent stands in social relations S. I argue that any account that incorporates such a condition cannot play one of autonomy’s key normative roles: identifying those agents who ought to be protec…Read more
  •  214
    Two Ways of Socialising Responsibility: Circumstantialist and Scaffolded-Responsiveness
    In Marina Oshana, Katrina Hutchison & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility, Oup Usa. pp. 137-162. 2018.
    This chapter evaluates two competing views of morally responsible agency. The first view at issue is Vargas’s circumstantialism—on which responsible agency is a function of the agent and her circumstances, and so is highly context sensitive. The second view is McGeer’s scaffolded-responsiveness view, on which responsible agency is constituted by the capacity for responsiveness to reasons directly, and indirectly via sensitivity to the expectations of one’s audience (whose sensitivity may be more…Read more
  •  183
    Excluding Evidence for Integrity's Sake
    with Federico Picinali
    In Christian Dahlman, Alex Stein & Giovanni Tuzet (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford University Press. 2021.
    In recent years, the concept of “integrity” has been frequently discussed by scholars, and deployed by courts, in the domain of criminal procedure. In this paper, we are particularly concerned with how the concept has been employed in relation to the problem of the admissibility of evidence obtained improperly. In conceptualising and addressing this problem, the advocates of integrity rely on it as a standard of conduct for the criminal justice authorities and as a necessary condition for the st…Read more
  •  179
    Implicit Bias, Self-Defence, and the Reasonable Person
    with Federico Picinali
    In Matt Matravers & Claes Lernestedt (eds.), The Criminal Law's Person, Hart Publishing. 2022.
    The reasonable person standard is used in adjudicating claims of self-defence. In US law, an individual may use defensive force if her beliefs that a threat is imminent and that force is required are beliefs that a reasonable person would have. In English law, it is sufficient that beliefs in imminence and necessity are genuinely held; but the reasonableness of so believing is given an evidential role in establishing the genuineness of the beliefs. There is, of course, much contention over how t…Read more
  •  175
    What is implicit bias?
    with Robin Scaife and Tom Stafford
    Philosophy Compass 12 (10). 2017.
    Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit implicit biases. This is due to the development of innovative behavioural measures that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self-report measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what does it mean to characterise such biases as implicit? Can we satisfactorily articulate the grounds for identifying them as bias? And crucial…Read more
  •  169
    Oppressive Praise
    Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 7 (4). 2021.
    Philosophers have had a lot to say about blame, much less about praise. In this paper, I follow some recent authors in arguing that this is a mistake. However, unlike these recent authors, the reasons I identify for scrutinising praise are to do with the ways in which praise is, systematically, unjustly apportioned. Specifically, drawing on testimony and findings from social psychology, I argue that praise is often apportioned in ways that reflect and entrench existing structures of oppression. …Read more
  •  161
  •  144
    Implicit Bias and Reform Efforts in Philosophy: a Defence
    with Jennifer Saul
    Philosophical Topics 46 (2): 71-102. 2018.
    This paper takes as its focus efforts to address particular aspects of sexist oppression and its intersections, in a particular field: it discusses reform efforts in philosophy. In recent years, there has been a growing international movement to change the way that our profession functions and is structured, in order to make it more welcoming for members of marginalized groups. One especially prominent and successful form of justification for these reform efforts has drawn on empirical data rega…Read more
  •  129
    Gender-neutrality and family leave policies
    In Luvell Anderson & Ernie Lepore (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Applied Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    Dembroff and Wodak (2018, 2021) argue that we have a duty to use gender-neutral pronouns, but do not extend this argument to all other aspects of our language. We evaluate the extent to which gender neutral language is desirable in the context of parental leave schemes, taking as a case study the parental leave schemes found at a Higher Education Institution in the UK. We argue that the considerations Dembroff and Wodak (2018, 2021) take to speak against gender specific pronouns and some other g…Read more
  •  117
    Implicit Bias and Reform Efforts in Philosophy
    Philosophical Topics 46 (2): 71-102. 2018.
    This paper takes as its focus efforts to address particular aspects of sexist oppression and its intersections, in a particular field: it discusses reform efforts in philosophy. In recent years, there has been a growing international movement to change the way that our profession functions and is structured, in order to make it more welcoming for members of marginalized groups. One especially prominent and successful form of justification for these reform efforts has drawn on empirical data rega…Read more
  •  102
    I here focus on two debates about the conditions for self-governance. In one, the metaphysical debate, theorists are concerned with the potential threat that causal determinism poses to self-governance. In another, the relational debate, theorists are concerned with the potential threat that certain social conditions—especially those that are oppressive to certain social groups—pose to self-governance. MacKenzie and Stoljar have suggested (2000) that the concerns of these two debates do not inte…Read more
  •  81
    Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility by Nelkin (review)
    Analysis 73 (1): 198-202. 2013.
    What must the world be like, and what must we agents be like, in order to be morally responsible for our actions? In Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility, Dana Nelkin develops and defends what she dubs the ‘rational abilities’ view (RA) of moral responsibility. On this compatibilist view, an agent is morally responsible for an action, in a sense which makes it appropriate to hold her accountable for that action, if she has ‘the ability to do the right thing for the right reasons, or a good…Read more
  •  72
    VIII—What Do We Want from a Model of Implicit Cognition?
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2): 153-179. 2016.
    In this paper, I set out some desiderata for a model of implicit cognition. I present test cases and suggest that, when considered in light of them, some recent models of implicit cognition fail to satisfy these desiderata. The test cases also bring to light an important class of cases that have been almost completely ignored in philosophical discussions of implicit cognition and implicit bias. These cases have important work to do in helping us understand both the role of implicit cognition in …Read more
  •  67
    Substantively Constrained Choice and Deference
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2): 180-199. 2010.
    Substantive accounts of autonomy place value constraints on the objects of autonomous choice. According to such views, not all sober and competent choices can be autonomous: some things simply cannot be autonomously chosen. Such an account is developed and appealed to, by Thomas Hill Jr, in order to explain the intuitively troubling nature of choices for deferential roles. Such choices are not consistent with the value of self-respect, it is claimed. In this paper I argue that Hill's attempt to …Read more
  •  56
    A Communicative Conception of Moral Appraisal
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3): 267-278. 2007.
    I argue that our acts of moral appraisal should be communicative. Praise and blame should communicate, to the appraised, information about their status and competences as moral agents; that they are recognised by the appraiser as a competent moral agent, and thus a legitimate candidate for appraisal. I argue for this thesis by drawing on empirical data about factors that can affect motivation. On the basis of such data, I formulate a constraint, and argue that two prominent models of moral appra…Read more
  •  53
    The antisocial networker
    The Philosophers' Magazine 53 (53): 112-113. 2011.
  •  48
    Bias in Context: An Introduction to the Symposium
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 72 (2): 163-168. 2020.
    In this introduction, we acquaint readers with a selection of work coming out of the "Bias in Context" conference series, which ran from 2016 to 2017. Featured authors in the symposium include Gabriella Beckles-Raymond (writing about bad faith and implicit bias explanations), Daniel Kelly and Lacey Davidson (writing about gender norms and the internalization of social structures), and Alex Madva (writing about solutions to racial integration and an empirical mindset). We sketch the larger themes…Read more
  •  47
    It is customary to remark, in writings on retributivism, that the meaning of the term is so diffuse and variably applied that there is no one concept or justificatory principle picked out by the term. Cottingham identified 9 different ideas captured by the term retributivism, and a similar paper could today no doubt identify as many again. This edited volume of essays on retributivism does justice to that customary remark, by bringing together a range of writings on retributivism many of which p…Read more